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ABSTRACT
Trademark law has de-evolved. It has transitioned from an
efficient mechanism for ensuring competition into an inefficient
regime for capturing economic rents. In this Article, I focus on the
role that party self-interest has played in biasing the evolution of
trademark law. This self-interest tends to lead parties to (1)
challenge efficient legal rules and seek to replace them with
inefficient, anticompetitive rules, and (2) accede to inefficient,
anticompetitive rules once they are in place. Almost by definition,
when a rule of trademark law promotes competition, it reduces the
market surplus or rents that current producers capture. As a result,
parties will seldom spend resources either to defend an efficient
trademark rule or to challenge an inefficient trademark rule in the
hope of replacing it with a more efficient rule. Instead, inefficient
trademark rules offer a party, usually the trademark owner, the
opportunity to capture rents. As a result, at least one party will have
a correspondingly strong interest in defending such inefficient
trademark rules or, if necessary, challenging efficient trademark
rules in the hope of replacing them with inefficient trademark rules.
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The net result has been something of a perfect storm for
trademark law. Efficient legal rules are repeatedly challenged until
they are replaced with inefficient legal rules, at which point no one
challenges them. The entirely predictable result of this process is
exactly what scholars have observed: courts have re-written
trademark law so that it protects far too much and far too broadly.
Rather than ensure competition, it serves to restrict competition and
to maximize the profits of trademark owners. Rather than promote
consumer welfare, it has become a form of corporate welfare.
We cannot, however, fix the problems with trademark law
through substantive trademark doctrine. Substantive reform, even
radical substantive reform, would simply provide a new starting
point from which inefficient common law evolution would again
proceed. To fix the ongoing de-evolution of trademark law, we need
to change the process of trademark litigation to ensure, first, that
parties have an adequate incentive to defend and fight for efficient
legal rules, and second, that courts have the information they need to
recognize the efficient legal rule and render judgment accordingly. In
this Article, I identify and evaluate several possible mechanisms for
solving trademark’s ongoing common law de-evolution.
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INTRODUCTION
Once upon a time, trademark law served the interests of consumers. No
more. Today, trademark law serves the interests of trademark owners.
Somewhat surprisingly, courts, and not Congress, are to blame for
trademark’s evolution from efficient market regulator to inefficient rent
protector. If we look back at the Trademark Act of 1946, more generally
known as the Lanham Act, Congress provided for a narrowly tailored regime of
limited protection that promoted competition and enhanced consumer welfare.
Yet, since the enactment of the Lanham Act, courts have re-written the statute
into a bloated and sometimes-incoherent morass. As a result, trademark law
today protects far too much and reaches far too broadly. Rather than ensure
competition, it serves instead to restrict competition and to maximize the
profits of trademark owners. Rather than promote consumer welfare, it has
become a form of corporate welfare.
A number of scholars have decried various doctrinal developments that
reflect this trend. These substantive critiques have focused on: (1) the
expanding subject matter of trademark law;1 (2) the expanding scope of the
infringement standards and over enforcement of trademark rights;2 (3) an
1. For my own previous work on this subject, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Trade Dress
Emperor’s New Clothes: Why Trade Dress Does Not Belong on the Principal Register, 51 HASTINGS
L.J. 1131 (2000) [hereinafter Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor] (explaining the mistakes in law and
policy that led to the recognition of trade dress protection under the Lanham Trademark Act). For
works by other authors, see, for example Peter J. Karol, Affixing the Service Mark: Reconsidering the
Rise of an Oxymoron, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 357 (2013) (observing that much of recent
trademark expansionism can be tied to lax service-mark requirements, and criticizing brand-owner
abuse of the service mark registration regime); Alexandra J. Roberts, How to Do Things with Word
Marks: A Speech-Act Theory of Distinctiveness, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1035 (2014) (arguing that trademark
law overprotects descriptive terms).
2. For my own previous work on this subject, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark
Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999) [hereinafter Lunney, Trademark Monopolies] (analyzing the
shift from deception-based trademark protection to property-based trademark protection). For works
by other authors, see, for example, Mark Bartholomew, Trademark Morality, 55 WM. & MARY. L.
REV. 85, 157 (2013) (arguing that “by expansively defining probative intent, judges protect established
brands at the expense of young upstarts. By and large, the judicial focus on intent helps only trademark
plaintiffs.”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution
Cases, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 541 (2008) (arguing that dilution theories are
so broad that other doctrines—like the use in commerce requirement—need to function as bulwarks
that cabin overbroad claims); Michael Handler, What Can Harm the Reputation of a Trademark? A
Critical Re-evaluation of Dilution by Tarnishment, 106 TRADEMARK REP. 639 (2016) (criticizing
tarnishment theories of dilution as overbroad and empirically unlikely to track actual harm to brands);
Mary LaFrance, No Reason to Live: Dilution Laws as Unconstitutional Restrictions on Commercial
Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 709 (2007) (arguing that dilution laws are unconstitutional limitations on
speech because dilution is not limited to speech that is false or misleading); Mark A. Lemley & Mark
P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2209 n.30 (2016) (collecting examples of
overbroad trademark enforcement); Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109

1198

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:1195

undue weakening of the limitations on trademark protection and the
prerequisites to obtain protection;3 and (4) a general disconnect between
sensible trademark policy and actual trademark doctrine.4 Despite the wide
range of these critical perspectives, none as yet have explored why judicial lawmaking has gone so badly wrong in trademark law. Of course, in any human
system, occasional mistakes will happen. Yet, the mistakes in trademark cases
have not been isolated: they have been consistent, even systematic. Bad
decisions tend to stick. Good decisions don’t. Instead, good decisions tend to
be either distinguished and rewritten until they are meaningless, or extended to
different facts and become bad decisions.5 The question is, why? Why have

MICH. L. REV. 137, 137 (2010) (arguing that trademark owners empirically enforce marks against
uses even when “neither mark owners nor consumers suffer any injury from that use”); Jeremy N.
Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769 (2012) (criticizing post-sale theories of confusion
endorsed by the lower federal courts); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law
and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 507 (2008) (“[T]he cognitive theory of dilution . . . does
not rest on sufficient empirical evidence to justify its adoption.”); Alfred C. Yen, The Constructive
Role of Confusion in Trademark, 93 N.C. L. REV. 77 (2014) (arguing that consumer confusion should
not be categorically treated as harmful because certain amounts or types of confusion may be socially
and economically valuable).
3. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Cybermarks, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1375 (2010) (criticizing trademark
protection for functional uses of marks, such as searching and indexing); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A.
Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1670 (2007)
(arguing that undue expansion of the concept of trademark use in the sale of key word advertisements
on the Internet improperly expands the scope of trademark infringement by converting parties who, at
best, might be secondarily liable to direct infringers); Jake Linford, Are Trademarks Ever Fanciful?,
105 GEO. L.J. 731 (2017) (criticizing the notion of fanciful trademarks by noting that trademark
holders rely on sound symbolism); Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 385–88; Roberts,
supra note 1 (arguing that trademark law overprotects descriptive terms); Vanessa P. Rollins,
Trademark Fair Use: Braun® Versus the Bunny, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 285 (2009)
(arguing that trademark law employs unduly narrow approaches to fair use).
4. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs
on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 777 (2004) (“[C]ourts have stretched trademark
doctrine . . . based . . . not on the normative goals of trademark law, but on unexplored instincts and
tenuous presumptions about consumer expectations and practices.”); Mary LaFrance, Steam Shovels
and Lipstick: Trademarks, Greed, and the Public Domain, 6 NEV. L.J. 447 (2006) (exploring
anticompetitive consequences of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999) (arguing that courts produce
economically inefficient results by treating trademarks as real property); Jessica Litman, Breakfast
with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999) (arguing that
trademark doctrine has become disconnected from its economic and normative justifications); Lunney,
Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 421–39 (showing that existing trademark doctrine generates
market power and associated welfare losses without any offsetting welfare gains); Mark P. McKenna,
A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67 (2012) (arguing that
expansive trademark protection does not protect consumers and suggesting how trademark scope
should be redefined to protect consumers); P. Sean Morris, Trademarks as Sources of Market Power:
Drugs, Beers and Product Differentiation, 35 J.L. & COM. 163 (2017) (examining empirical examples
of market foreclosure and entry barriers to argue that trademark law causes anticompetitive results).
5. For example, in trade dress protection, the United States Patent and Trademark Office first
allowed the registration of trade dress on the principal register in 1958. The trade dress at issue was the
truly unusual shape of the Haig & Haig pinch whiskey bottle. See Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm’r Pat. 1958). Twenty-four years later, the Court of Customs and Patent
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courts repeatedly expanded trademark protection in ways that any reasonable,
objective evaluation would show is undesirable?
As it turns out, at least part of the answer is deceptively simple: courts are
captives of their own process, and that process is party driven. Faced with a
given legal rule, parties decide whether to comply or violate the rule; they
decide whether to litigate or settle any resulting dispute; and they decide what
arguments and theories to advance and then provide the information the court
uses to resolve the dispute. Parties thus set the judicial agenda, and they control
the information available for judicial decision-making. Perhaps most
importantly, in doing all of this, parties act in their own self-interest. To the
extent that parties are rational and self-interested, they will not care whether an
existing legal rule is efficient or inefficient, nor will they care about the costs or
benefits that an existing legal rule imposes on others. They will care only about
how the existing legal rule affects them.
The party-driven nature of the judicial process introduces, among other
issues, three potential biases into the evolution of legal rules: (1) selection bias;
(2) activity bias; and (3) framing bias.6 First, a selection bias arises because the
parties’ incentives lead them to bring the wrong cases to court for judicial
resolution. In order to maximize their profits, trademark owners repeatedly
bring litigation challenging efficient or defending inefficient interpretations of
trademark law. At the same time, that same self-interest will often influence
potential parties not to challenge inefficient or defend efficient interpretations
of trademark law. Second, even before litigation begins, activity bias arises in
markets as parties decide which legal rules to challenge and with which to
comply. Once again, parties’ potential self-interests lead them to act in ways
that will lead to litigation challenging efficient interpretations of trademark
law, but not inefficient ones. Third, framing bias arises because the standing
rules of trademark law frame the dispute as one between two competitors. The
standing rules thus implicitly frame the question for the court as: Who, as

Appeals approved the registration of the far more ordinary and everyday shape of the Glass Plus
bottle. See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1343–44 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
6. See infra Part III.A. As this Article will discuss, law and economics scholars, beginning
with Paul Rubin, have focused on the role that party self-interest plays in shaping the evolution of
common law rules. See Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51
(1977); see also infra notes 197–217 and accompanying text. Initially, they thought that this selfinterest, acting like the invisible hand of the market, would lead the common law to evolve toward
efficient legal rules, but they eventually concluded that such efficient evolution would happen in only
rare and special circumstances. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve
the Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 145 (1980) (showing that—rather than
applying generally—the common law process leads to efficient legal rules only in the exceptional
circumstance where every rule but the best rule is challenged); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental
Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
575, 577–79 (1997) (discussing misalignments between private and social incentives in litigation).
This Article extends that analysis and is the first to apply it to the evolution of trademark law as a case
study.
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between these two competitors, should prevail? Yet the real question in
trademark litigation should be: How do I rule so that consumers prevail?
Both selection bias and activity bias arise in the evolution of trademark
law because trademark litigation often entails asymmetric stakes. In trademark
litigation, courts have, at least traditionally, rarely awarded damages.7 Instead,
courts have traditionally awarded the successful trademark plaintiff injunctive
relief that orders a defendant to stop using the infringing mark. As a result, the
stakes in trademark litigation are usually whether the defendant may continue a
given course of conduct or must cease. This choice between allowing and
prohibiting the use of the mark and the corresponding choice between a
narrower and broader interpretation of trademark protection represents a
decision between encouraging and discouraging competition—or in some
cases, between competition and monopoly. Given a choice between more
competition and less, the optimal legal rule is almost always the legal rule that
leads to more competition. As a general matter, competition leads to lower
prices, greater consumer choice, and a more efficient allocation of available
resources.8 More competition is therefore almost always better than less.9
Unfortunately, while increased competition is great for consumers, it does
not usually generate much in the way of economic rents for sellers. In fact,
increased competition tends to reduce, even eliminate, the combined rents or
producer surplus available to competitors in the market. While increased
competition can sharply increase consumer surplus, consumers do not have
standing under federal trademark law. Only commercial market participants
(i.e. sellers) do. As a result, if trademark law is or becomes inefficiently

7. See, e.g., Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, 684 F.3d 187, 194 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that
“damages awards turn out to be comparatively rare in trademark cases primarily, it appears, because of
the difficulty of proving them.”) (citing Michael J. Freno, Trademark Valuation: Preserving Brand
Equity, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1055, 1062–63 (2007)). The two exceptions to this general rule are (1)
reverse confusion, and (2) counterfeiting cases.
8. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 85–86 (1921) (noting that
perfect competition produces the optimal allocation of available resources and thereby maximizes
social welfare); see also F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 12–19 (Edward Jaffe et al. eds., 2d ed. 1970) (same); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE
THEORY OF PRICE 38 (1942) (same); Francis M. Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization,
47 AM. ECON. REV. 22 (1957) (same); Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1
ECONOMICA 167, 170 (1934) (“The output which monopoly alone can evoke is not normally regarded
as preferable to the alternative products which free competition would allow to emerge.”).
9. I recognize the limitations that Lipsey and Lancaster’s work on second-best theory places
on this statement. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 22 REV.
ECON. STUD. 11, 13 (1956) (proving that once the conditions of perfect competition are not satisfied in
one market, it becomes impossible to say whether social welfare will increase or decrease by making
another market more competitive). In this particular context, however, I believe that increasing
competition in consumer markets is welfare-enhancing for the usual reasons—specifically lower
prices and greater consumer choice. But if second-best theory makes an overall welfare claim
impossible, this Article’s analysis remains important and relevant as a positive description of the
process. I will also freely confess, as between trademark owners and consumers, a distributive
preference for consumers.
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anticompetitive, challenging the law is socially desirable, but unlikely.
Moreover, unlike the legislature, federal courts may not simply reach out and
rule on whatever injustices they perceive in our society. Rather, under Article
III, they must wait for parties to bring disputes before them.
Unfortunately, the expected returns for a trademark defendant challenging
an inefficient, anticompetitive trademark rule usually do not justify the expense
of such a challenge. Although prevailing in litigation would enable a trademark
defendant to remain in or enter a market—and to thereby capture whatever
profit, rent, or surplus it can—prevailing in litigation also enables other
competitors to do likewise. Moreover, these other competitors can enter the
market without bearing the cost of litigation.10 Because prices in reasonably
competitive markets are a function of marginal cost, even a prevailing
trademark defendant will find it difficult to recoup its litigation expenses by
raising its prices. If it tried to do so, other competitors, who did not bear the
cost of litigation, will undercut its prices and take its sales.11 Similarly, because
the market is competitive, any given competitor will not usually earn sufficient
rents directly to cover the costs of litigation. As a result, a self-interested
trademark defendant will seldom find it worthwhile to spend the resources
necessary to challenge an inefficient interpretation of trademark law. Rather
than bear the cost of litigation, most would-be defendants modify their
behavior to comply with the law, even if it is inefficient. Or if sued, they tend

10. Non-mutual collateral estoppel would allow a similarly situated defendant to assert the
prior ruling to bar the trademark plaintiff from asserting a claim it had previously lost against a
different defendant. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971)
(recognizing non-mutual collateral estoppel in patent litigation and holding that a patentee is estopped
from asserting a patent against a defendant after a court has found the patent invalid in litigation
involving another defendant).
11. Patent law confronts a similar free rider problem for defendants challenging the validity of
questionable patents. Challenging such patents is a public good, but may not be in the self-interest of
any given defendant. If a defendant successfully invalidates a patent or enters a market by establishing
non-infringement, other competitors can follow the path the defendant paid to blaze. Prices will fall
and consumer surplus will rise sharply. However, the successful defendant will capture relatively little
of the resulting welfare gain. While the process is similar in trademark, there is a fundamental
difference. The existing literature focuses on inadequate incentives to challenge a particular patent.
This Article shows that a similar process creates inadequate incentives to challenge inefficient
interpretations of trademark law, rather than a particular trademark, though that may also be true.
There is extensive literature on the inadequacy of the incentive to challenge questionable patents,
particularly in the pharmaceutical patent and reverse payment settlement context. See FED. TRADE
COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAYOFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 8 (2010);
Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation
Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., FTC v. Actavis: The Patent-Antitrust
Intersection Revisited, 93 N.C. L. REV. 375, 387–88 (2015) [hereinafter Lunney, FTC v. Actavis]; John
R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 333–34 (2001) [hereinafter Thomas, Patent Bounties]; see also Gideon
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1483 (2013)
(recognizing that this problem may apply to intellectual property cases more generally).
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to settle. The net result of this selection process is exactly what we have
observed in trademark law: bad decisions tend to stick.
Efficient and pro-competitive interpretations of trademark law will, on the
other hand, face repeated challenges. Almost by definition, successfully
challenging an efficient interpretation of trademark law will lead to less
competition. It may do so directly, by prohibiting a would-be competitor from
entering a market altogether. Or it may do so indirectly, by increasing a
competitor’s costs or the degree of product differentiation in the market. Where
increased competition reduces economic rents, decreased competition increases
them. For a trademark plaintiff, the prospect of capturing those increased rents
provides a powerful incentive to challenge an efficient interpretation of
trademark law if they believe they have a chance to persuade a court to reinterpret trademark law in a way that reduces competition. As a result, even if a
court gets it right in a given case and adopts an efficient, pro-competitive
interpretation of trademark law, we should expect self-interested trademark
plaintiffs to repeatedly challenge the resulting legal rule. Given heterogeneity
in the a priori beliefs of judges as to the merits of various legal rules, such
repeated challenges will, sooner or later, find a sympathetic judicial ear. When
they do, the original pro-competitive interpretation of trademark law will
become less so, as later decisions limit and distinguish it. The inevitable result
of this process is, again, exactly what we have observed: good decisions don’t
last.
The net result has been a perfect storm for trademark law: in the face of
an efficient legal rule, self-interested trademark plaintiffs litigate until the rule
becomes inefficient. At which point, self-interested trademark defendants
largely accede to it. In trademark law, the party-driven nature of litigation thus
brings exactly the wrong cases to court. Parties, by and large, choose to litigate
cases that seek to move trademark law towards a set of legal rules that are both
inefficient and anticompetitive, maximizing trademark owners’ profits at the
expense of the broader public interest.12
Unfortunately, courts, as captives of their process, are not likely to
recognize and consistently reject the inefficient legal interpretations trademark
plaintiffs repeatedly advance. The same asymmetric stakes that bring the wrong
cases to court also make judicial mistakes on trademark issues more likely.
Because of the asymmetric stakes, trademark owners will have more to spend
on litigation. With their greater resources, trademark owners can hire better
lawyers, retain more-persuasive experts, and gather evidence more extensively.
Just as courts do not have perfect information on the efficient legal rule, they
also do not have perfect information as to the facts of any given case. Inside the
courtroom, asymmetric resources are likely to skew courts’ and juries’ views of
12. Cf. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–102 (1974) (explaining how well-to-do parties prevail in
litigating content of legal rules).
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the truth. Outside the courtroom, these asymmetric resources support a whole
ecosystem of lawyers and trade groups, dedicated to establishing the
propositions not only that trademark owners deserve these rents, but that
interpreting the law in a manner that ensures trademark owners can capture
more of these rents is good for the economy and society as a whole. The
resulting praise for expanding trademark law and criticism of any narrowing,
again, make it difficult for courts to recognize and correct their mistakes.
The asymmetric stakes and resulting selection bias that bring the wrong
cases for judicial resolution also skew the nature of the cases and defendants
that courts will see. An average defendant will seldom bother litigating a case
that falls near trademark’s traditional or existing prohibitions. Instead, they will
litigate only those cases where they feel that they have a very high chance of
winning—cases where the plaintiff is advancing some novel theory or
otherwise stretching trademark’s traditional reach. For that reason, most cases
that are litigated will be outliers. Courts will not, however, readily recognize
them as such. Because they have limited information, courts will tend to look at
the set of litigated cases to define what constitutes a “normal” or typical
trademark dispute. But if all litigated cases are outliers, using the set of
litigated cases to define “normal” will prove misleading. A given trademark
plaintiff’s claim will not seem outrageous compared to other litigated claims if
only outrageous claims are litigated.
At the same time, the same asymmetric stakes also create a second
potential bias: activity bias. Once a court has held that certain conduct
constitutes trademark infringement, that initial ruling will change the associated
market in ways that tend to reinforce the appearance that the court’s initial
ruling was correct. Mainstream manufacturers and retailers will avoid the
conduct at issue and leave the field to more opportunistic and thinly capitalized
entities.13 The quality of would-be defendants’ goods will fall. As the risk of a
finding of trademark infringement rises, so too does the risk that goods will be

13. In the field of sports merchandising, when the issue of selling unauthorized t-shirts bearing
a team’s emblem first arose in the 1970s, we see defendants such as Champion Products—a wellknown, mainstream sportswear manufacturer. See Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods. Inc., 686
F.2d 1040, 1047 (3d Cir. 1982). After the courts expanded trademark law to prohibit such
unauthorized merchandise, Champion Products and other mainstream manufacturers and retailers
acted in their self-interest and acceded to the rule. As a result, when the issue arose thirty years later,
the defendant was Smack Apparel—a thinly capitalized, opportunistic retailer, rather than a wellknown, mainstream sportswear manufacturer. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d
465, 477–78 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1268 (2009). Smack Apparel was willing to risk its
capital on the uncertain, or perhaps not so uncertain, borders of the merchandising prohibition for the
same reason drug dealers and bootleggers were: the illegality, or perhaps questionable legality, of the
behavior limited competition and ensured a high profit margin. In the trademark world, counterfeiting
is profitable precisely because trademark law prohibits it. Paradoxically, counterfeiting—if done
successfully—becomes more profitable as trademark prohibitions on counterfeiting are more
stringently enforced. See infra notes 256–260 (providing further discussion of the Smack Apparel
case).
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seized as a remedy.14 As the risk of seizure rises, a party’s willingness to invest
capital in, and hence ensure the quality of, the associated goods will fall. As a
result, the risk that consumers will be tricked into buying lower quality goods
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Moreover, if we have two legal rules, one
of which is repeatedly challenged, while the other is left unchallenged, there is
a natural and human tendency to believe that there must be some underlying
problem with the first rule, but not the second. Unfortunately, that very natural
tendency is exactly wrong in the trademark context. Rather than reflect the
efficiency or desirability of the underlying rule, it simply reflects the parties’
asymmetric stakes. Thus, instead of helping courts recognize their mistakes, the
asymmetric stakes will lead parties in the marketplace to respond in ways that
tend to reinforce a court’s initially mistaken ruling.
In addition to the previously recognized problems of selection and activity
bias, a third potential source of bias for judicial law-making generally is the
framing bias that arises from resolving issues in the context of litigation.
Through standing rules, litigation frames a dispute as a conflict between the
interests of the plaintiff and the defendant. The litigation frame implicitly
suggests that the role of the court is to decide, as between the plaintiff and the
defendant, where justice lies. But focusing exclusively on fairness, justice, or
equity as between the parties directly before the court can lead a court badly
astray—because litigants may not properly represent the interests of other
potential parties and the public. That is why hard facts make bad law.
In the trademark context, viewing the dispute as a conflict between the
interests of the plaintiff and the defendant is particularly pernicious. Such a
framing omits entirely what is usually the most important interest, that of
consumers. The stakes in trademark law are not just asymmetric, but
misleadingly so. The self-interest of the plaintiff and the defendant fails to
encompass the substantial welfare gains that increased competition brings to
consumers. The asymmetric stakes for the parties thus fail to reflect the true
and full welfare implications of a trademark rule for society generally. Because
of standing rules, consumers are not a party before the court; they have no
opportunity to present evidence showing how the court’s ruling will affect their
welfare. The trademark plaintiff and defendant, on the other hand, are parties
before the court and do have the opportunity to present evidence on how the
court’s ruling will affect them. It is only natural for a court to focus on the
parties before it. While both parties can argue and present evidence attempting
to show that their position would also improve consumer welfare, courts
justifiably greet such evidence with skepticism, as it comes second-hand from a
self-interested party. The litigation frame thus encourages a court to view a

14. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (2008) (providing “seizure of goods” as a remedy for use of a
counterfeit mark).
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trademark dispute as a dispute solely between the parties and to ignore or
downplay the consumer interest.
Since the work of Kahneman and Tversky,15 we know that how we frame
an issue will influence how we resolve the issue. In trademark disputes, we can
usually frame the question to be answered in two ways. First, we can frame the
question as whether the plaintiff or the defendant better deserves to capture
producer surplus associated with a market or a demand that the plaintiff has
created.16 Second, we can frame the question as whether consumers would be
better off if the plaintiff or the defendant prevailed. The standing rules of
trademark litigation implicitly suggest that the first frame is the correct one.
But from a social welfare or utilitarian perspective the second framing of the
question is correct. Unfortunately, while some courts have been able to look
beyond a defendant’s seeming opportunism and recognize that the second
frame is the correct one,17 most have not. Seeing the dispute as simply a
question of who gets to collect surplus that the trademark plaintiff’s efforts
have created, courts are too quick to rule in favor of trademark plaintiffs. The
frame that trademark litigation creates has thus contributed to trademark law’s
de-evolution.
This is not to say that trademark’s evolution has been entirely one-sided.
While the general trend of trademark law has been towards decidedly broader
protection, that trend has not been universal. Courts have sometimes narrowed
the availability or scope of trademark protection by creating specific defenses
or limitations on protection. These cases and their associated doctrinal
developments serve as an important reminder that although trademark plaintiffs
usually have more at stake in trademark litigation, that is not always true. In
some cases, a particular defendant, because of their market position, the nature
15. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
16. For an example of a court making this frame explicit, consider the Third Circuit’s
explanation for allowing the University of Pittsburgh to enforce merchandising rights despite forty
years of non-enforcement:
It is, however, equally beyond question that, while the market for imprinted soft goods, in
the sense of their physical availability to the public and the public’s corresponding
knowledge of that availability, exists as a result of Champion’s efforts, the ultimate demand
for the product is a direct result of the efforts of Pitt to make its name widely known
through athletic and educational accomplishments. With negligible exception, a consumer
does not desire a “Champion” T-shirt, he (or she) desires a “Pitt” T-shirt. The entire
impetus for the sale is the consumer’s desire to identify with Pitt or, perhaps more
realistically, with Pitt’s successful athletic programs. From this point of view, then, it is
Champion which seeks to profit from Pitt’s investment, particularly in its athletic program.
This formulation of the issue reflects a growing and unsettled aspect of the law of unfair
competition both at common law and under the Lanham Act.
Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods. Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1047 (3d Cir. 1982).
17. See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1968) (noting that “[d]isapproval of
the copyist’s opportunism may be an understandable first reaction, ‘[b]ut this initial response to the
problem has been curbed in deference to the greater public good.’ American Safety Table Co. v.
Schreiber, 269 F.2d at 272.”).
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of their industry, or other circumstances, has both: (1) a stake in the specific
litigation at issue, and (2) a broader economic interest tied to the conduct at
issue in the litigation. In at least some of these cases, the plaintiff’s stake is far
more limited, encompassing only the specific use at issue. In such cases, we
should expect the trademark defendant not only to fight, but to fight harder than
the opposing trademark plaintiff. Just as we expect trademark law to evolve in
favor of trademark plaintiffs generally because plaintiffs usually have more to
gain from winning, the evolutionary perspective suggests that, in those
exceptional cases where a given trademark defendant has more to gain, we
should expect trademark law to develop in ways that favor that defendant and
others similarly situated. Again, this is what we observe.
Unfortunately, cases where a trademark defendant has more to gain have
proven to be the exception, rather than the rule. As a result, these cases have
not been enough to turn trademark law’s expansive, evolutionary tide.
Moreover, rather than serve to limit the expansion of trademark protection
generally, courts have tended to use these exceptional cases as a basis for
creating specialized doctrines or defenses that narrow trademark protection
only for a particular use or a specific class of defendants. The resulting increase
in trademark law’s complexity has sharply increased the costs and risks of
trademark litigation. As a result, trademark law is becoming an increasingly
two-tiered system. For those that can afford litigation, trademark law produces
reasonably sensible, albeit expensive, results; but for those that cannot afford
trademark litigation, trademark law has become something else entirely. It has
become a mockery of justice that bars entities both from enforcing their own
trademark rights and from defending themselves against bullies.
The net result of these evolutionary pressures is that trademark law has
become both inefficient and unduly complex. Simply put, the expanded forms
of trademark protection we have today create market power with no redeeming
pro-competitive benefits. Against this generally overbroad protection, courts
have created a range of narrow, complex, and idiosyncratic defenses that
insulate only particular uses by particular users in particular situations.
Unfortunately, fixing trademark law will require more than mere
correction of substantive trademark doctrine. The judicial decisions that have
systematically expanded trademark protection in ways that maximize
trademark owners’ rents while reducing consumer welfare are not accidents;
they are the inevitable result of a common law evolutionary process that is
biased in favor of trademark plaintiffs. Absent some fundamental change in the
process of trademark litigation or common law development, even if we could
adopt a “perfect” trademark regime, it would not last. It would simply provide
a new starting point, similar to the 1946 Lanham Trademark Act, from which
inefficient common law development of trademark doctrine would proceed.
More fundamental structural change is therefore required.
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To explore these issues, Part I begins with a review of the judicial
expansion of trademark protection over the last century, exploring how courts
have sacrificed both efficiency and consumer welfare to increase the profits of
trademark owners.18 Part II, then, examines that process and looks at how cases
are selected for litigation. Through this examination, it identifies the ways in
which the different incentive structures facing trademark plaintiffs and
trademark defendants are likely to bias trademark’s common law evolution.
Part III explores possible solutions to the structural defects in the trademark
litigation process.
My key point, though, is simple. Addressing the problems that have
developed with trademark law requires not only changes to specific substantive
trademark doctrine, but also changes to the structure and process of trademark
litigation. Such structural reform must ensure: first, that more of the right cases
are selected for judicial resolution, so that inefficient legal rules tend to be
challenged, while efficient legal rules are not; and second, that courts do a
better job of resolving correctly the cases before them. Only through such
structural reform can we ensure that whatever substantive doctrinal revisions
we make to trademark law will endure. If we do not make such structural
changes, then these evolutionary pressures will continue to influence the
development of trademark law. As bad as trademark law is today, in terms of
inefficiency and undue complexity, left unchecked, these evolutionary
pressures will lead to a trademark law of tomorrow that is far, far worse. With
these thoughts in mind, we now turn to the story of trademark’s evolution.
I.
TRADEMARK LAW’S EVOLUTION: FROM CONSUMER WELFARE TO CORPORATE
WELFARE
Although the Court has suggested that Congress, in enacting the
Trademark Act of 1946, “significantly changed and liberalized the common
law,”19 that is untrue. With only two or perhaps three limited exceptions,20
Congress retained the traditional scope and limitations of the common law.
Congress did not adopt the radically expanded trademark protection we suffer
from today. The judiciary did. Before and after the Trademark Act’s enactment
in 1946, courts radically expanded the subject matter and scope of trademark
protection by systematically overturning Congress’s carefully considered
18. In noting these doctrinal changes, I am not suggesting that courts have intentionally
sacrificed consumer welfare for corporate welfare. To the contrary, I am fairly certain that courts
would advance consumer welfare if they knew how. But courts are captives of their own process.
19. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 171 (1995).
20. The two innovations found in the Trademark Act were: (1) Congress allowed descriptive
words that had become distinctive (in the trademark sense) to be registered as trademarks, see id.; and
(2) Congress created the incontestability defense, limiting the grounds on which an incontestably
registered trademark could be challenged. A third possible innovation is the recognition of service
marks.

1208

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:1195

judgment on the proper scope and limits of trademark protection. We now turn
to two of the more egregious examples of trademark law’s judicial deevolution.
A. Judicial Expansion of Trademark Protection: A Tale of Two Examples
1. Expanding the Infringement Standard
Our first tale concerns the judicial expansion of trademark’s infringement
standard. It begins with the standard that Congress adopted in the Trademark
Acts of 1881 and 1905. In both of those Acts, Congress defined the scope of
trademark protection using identical language:
Any person who shall, reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably
imitate any trade-mark registered under this act and affix the same to
merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as those
described in the registration, shall be liable to an action on the case for
damages for the wrongful use of said trade-mark . . . .21
As set forth, the language contained two important and express limitations
on the scope of trademark protection. First, it limited protection to instances
where a defendant had “reproduce[d], counterfeit[ed], cop[ied], or colorably
imitate[d]” a registered mark.22 In practice, this limited protection to a
defendant’s use of either the same or a nearly identical mark. Second, it further
limited protection to those instances where a defendant used the same mark on
“merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties.”23 In practice,
this limited protection to a defendant’s use of the same types of goods. These
statutes thus expressly required a would-be trademark plaintiff to satisfy the socalled double identity test—by showing that a defendant used the same mark
on the same goods.24
Under this standard, the use of the same mark on a different product did
not constitute trademark infringement. For example, in 1912, Borden’s
Condensed Milk, which had long used Borden as the brand name for its
condensed milk, sued another company that began using the name “Borden’s”
for ice cream.25 Although the district court granted relief, the Seventh Circuit
reversed and rejected the claim.26 The court held that because milk and ice
21. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, 503–04 (emphasis added); Trademark Act of
1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, 728.
22. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, 503–04; Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592, 33
Stat. 724, 728 (containing the same “reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate” language).
23. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, 503–04; Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592, 33
Stat. 724, 728 (containing the same “merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties”
language).
24. For a modern application of the double-identity test, see Rebecca Tushnet, Registering
Disagreement: Registration in Modern American Trademark Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 867, 932–34
(2017).
25. Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden’s Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510 (7th Cir. 1912).
26. Id. at 515.
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cream were not competing products, there could be no unfair competition.27
Recognizing that ice cream and milk did not share the “same descriptive
properties,” the plaintiff nevertheless argued that it should be entitled to relief
for two reasons.28 First, it intended to enter the ice cream market.29 The court
rejected this argument, insisting that the law “deals with acts and not
intentions.”30 Because the defendant actually began selling ice cream under the
Borden’s name first, the defendant held the rights to that name for ice cream.31
The plaintiff’s intent to enter that market was simply irrelevant.32 Second, the
plaintiffs argued that it was selling its condensed milk to ice cream
manufacturers, and that could lead ice cream dealers to mistakenly believe that
the plaintiff had made the defendant’s product.33 The court also rejected this
argument, holding that the specter of confusion was simply too “speculative
and remote” to justify relief.34
Just five years later, however, the Second Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion on similar facts in Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co.35 In that
case, the plaintiff had used the name “Aunt Jemima’s” for self-rising flour for
years, when the defendant began using “Aunt Jemima’s” for syrup.36 Because
the two goods did not have “the same descriptive properties,” the district court
dismissed the complaint.37 On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.38 Although
the court acknowledged the traditional limits of trademark law, it nonetheless
felt that the two products were sufficiently related that consumers were likely
to believe that the plaintiff had made the defendant’s product.39 It therefore
granted relief and enjoined the defendant’s use.40 As the court explained:
It is said that even a technical trade-mark may be appropriated by any
one in any market for goods not in competition with those of the prior
user. This was the view of the court below in saying that no one
wanting syrup could possibly be made to take flour. But we think that
goods, though different, may be so related as to fall within the
mischief which equity should prevent. Syrup and flour are both food
products, and food products commonly used together. Obviously the
public, or a large part of it, seeing this trade-mark on a syrup, would
27. Id. at 514.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 514–15.
30. Id. at 515 (quoting George v. Smith, 52 F. 830, 832 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 247 F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917).
36. Id. at 412.
37. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 234 F. 804, 805 (E.D.N.Y. 1916), rev’d, 247 F.
407 (2d Cir. 1917).
38. Aunt Jemima Mills Co., 247 F. at 409–10.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 412.
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conclude that it was made by the complainant.41
Although the case law proceeded in fits and starts, sometimes embracing
the Aunt Jemima approach, and sometimes the traditional “same descriptive
properties” approach,42 gradually the courts began to embrace the broader Aunt
Jemima approach. Although plainly inconsistent with the statutory language of
the Trademark Act of 1905, this did not appear to trouble courts much.
Eventually, they simply held that Congress had intended to adopt the related
goods test when it used the “same descriptive properties” language in the 1905
Act.43
Although the Second Circuit in Aunt Jemima expanded trademark’s
infringement standard to encompass use of the same mark on related goods,
this expansion nevertheless retained trademark’s traditional focus on confusion
as to source. As the Aunt Jemima court itself found, syrup and self-rising flour
were sufficiently related that “the public, or a large part of it, . . . would
conclude that [the defendant’s product] was made by the complainant.”44
Just seven years after Aunt Jemima, however, the Sixth Circuit expanded
the infringement standard further yet, and abandoned confusion as to source as
a requirement for finding trademark infringement.45 In Vogue Co. v.
Thompson-Hudson Co., the plaintiff had long used the name “Vogue”—along
with a mark depicting a woman and a capital letter “V,” known as the “VGirl”—for its fashion magazine.46 When the defendant thereafter adopted a
strikingly similar V-Girl for its hats, the plaintiff sued, alleging trademark
41. Id. at 409–10.
42. The Supreme Court confronted the question whether trademark protection extended
beyond goods with the same descriptive qualities in Beech-Nut Co. v. Lorillard. Co., 273 U. S. 629
(1927). The Court found it unnecessary to resolve the issue: “It may be true that in a case like the
plaintiff’s its rights would not be sufficiently protected by an injunction against using the marks upon
goods of the same class as those to which the plaintiff now applies it and to which its registration is
confined. Upon that we express no opinion.” Id. at 632.
43. As Judge Learned Hand explained:
There remains the question of registration, the goods not being of the ‘same descriptive
properties’ in the colloquial sense. It would plainly be a fatuity to decree the registration of
a mark whose use another could at once prevent. The act cannot mean that, being drafted
with an eye to the common law in such matters. While we own that it does some violence
to the language, it seems to us that the phrase should be taken as no more than a recognition
that there may be enough disparity in character between the goods of the first and second
users as to insure against confusion. That will indeed depend much upon trade conditions,
but these are always the heart of the matter in this subject. It is quite true that in Rosenberg
v. Elliott (C. C. A.) 7 F.(2d) 962, the court felt bound to find that caps and suits had the
same descriptive properties, quite independently of the confusion which had arisen. We
cannot say that that is the case here, for the fact that flash-lights and locks are made of
metal does not appear to us to give them the same descriptive properties, except as the trade
has so classed them. But we regard what the trade thinks as the critical consideration, and
we think the statute meant to make it the test, despite the language used.
Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) (L. Hand, J.) (citation omitted).
44. Aunt Jemima Mills Co., 247 F. at 410.
45. Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509 (6th Cir. 1924).
46. Id. at 509–10.
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infringement.47 The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that
no reasonable consumer would believe that Vogue magazine had begun
manufacturing the defendant’s hats.48 Although the Sixth Circuit agreed that
such confusion as to source was unlikely, it nonetheless reversed.49 In the Sixth
Circuit’s view, the defendant’s use would likely lead consumers to believe that
the plaintiff had sponsored or endorsed the defendant’s hats.50 It held that such
sponsorship confusion was sufficient to sustain the cause of action.51
As the court explained:
Plaintiff’s magazine is so far an arbiter of style, and the use of
plaintiff’s trade-mark upon defendants’ hats so far indicates that the
hats were at least sponsored and approved by the plaintiff, that the
same considerations which make the misrepresentation so valuable to
defendants make it pregnant with peril to plaintiff.52
As the twentieth century wore on, courts continued to expand the
infringement standard. In 1955, the Second Circuit expanded the infringement
standard to encompass confusion arising post sale among onlookers, rather than
at the time of purchase by the purchaser.53 In 1968, a federal district court
expanded the infringement standard to encompass confusion as to affiliation or
association, a much broader and more ambiguous standard than confusion as to
source or endorsement.54 In 1975, the Second Circuit expanded the
infringement standard to encompass initial interest confusion—confusion that
47. Id. at 510.
48. As the Sixth Circuit explained:
The District Court thought that, so far as the case counted on unfair competition, it must be
dismissed, because there was no competition between the publishing of the magazine and
the manufacture of hats, and that, so far as it counted on trade-mark infringement, it failed,
because magazines and hats are not articles ‘of the same descriptive qualities.’
Id.
49. Id. at 512.
50. Id. at 511.
51. Id. at 512.
52. Id.
53. Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-LeCoultre Watches, Inc.,
221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955); see also Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir.
1991) (holding that cars which were intended to mimic the appearance of Ferraris infringed upon
Ferrari’s trade dress in its cars even though purchasers were not confused); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc.
v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 492 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding that sale of low-priced imitation Rolexes
constituted trademark infringement even though purchasers were not confused).
54. Carling Brewing Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 297 F. Supp. 1330, 1337–38 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
In an attempt to justify the expansion, the court explained:
Given the general situation where the public is generally unaware of the specific corporate
structure of those whose products it buys, but is aware that corporate diversification,
mergers, acquisitions and operation through subsidiaries is a fact of life, it is reasonable to
believe that the appearance of “Black Label” on cigarettes could lead to some confusion as
to the sponsorship of EITHER or both the cigarettes and the beer. Whether the public
concludes (if it really draws a specific conclusion) that plaintiff’s Black Label beer may
have become connected with Philip Morris, or that Carling may now be putting out
cigarettes is immaterial.
Id. at 1337.

1212

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:1195

initially attracts the attention of consumers to the defendant’s goods, even
though it is dispelled before any actual purchase.55 In the same year, the Fifth
Circuit expanded the infringement standard to create a merchandising right for
professional and, by extension, amateur sport teams.56 It did so by holding that
use of a sports team’s logo on merchandise, or as merchandise, inevitably led
consumers to believe that the team had sponsored or approved the use.57 In
1977, the Tenth Circuit expanded the infringement standard to encompass
reverse confusion—confusion where, rather than mistakenly believing that the
plaintiff made the defendant’s goods, consumers mistakenly believe that the
defendant made the plaintiff’s goods.58
Congress, for its part, did not take the lead in expanding trademark
protection. On the only two occasions when Congress appeared to expand the
infringement standard,59 it merely adopted statutory language that recognized
what courts had already done.60 Thus, in the 1946 Act itself, Congress replaced
55. Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331,
1341–42 (2d Cir. 1975).
56. Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); see also Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d
76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981) (recognizing a similar merchandising right for popular television shows).
57. As the court explained:
The confusion or deceit requirement is met by the fact that the defendant duplicated the
protected trademarks and sold them to the public knowing that the public would identify
them as being the teams’ trademarks. The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source
and origin of the trademark symbols were in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act.
See Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, 510 F.2d at 1012. In a later decision, the Fifth Circuit insisted that this
language, despite what it says, did not do away with the confusion requirement:
Boston Hockey also reiterated our unbroken insistence on a showing of confusion, and we
believe that our opinion must be read in that context. Under the circumstances there—
involving sales to the consuming public of products bearing trademarks universally
associated with Boston Hockey—the fact that the buyers knew the symbols originated with
Boston Hockey supported the inescapable inference that many would believe that the
product itself originated with or was somehow endorsed by Boston Hockey.
Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 389 (5th Cir. 1977).
58. Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1371–72 (10th
Cir. 1977) (applying Colorado law). Applying Indiana law, the Seventh Circuit had rejected the
reverse confusion theory just nine years before. Westward Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 388
F.2d 627, 633–34 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 927 (1968).
59. On a third occasion, Congress amended the infringement standard through a 1962
Housekeeping Amendment to the Lanham Act. Some courts have cited this action as an excuse for
their own expansions of the trademark infringement standard. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944
F.2d 1235, 1244 (6th Cir. 1991) (relying on the “1967” [sic] Amendment as evidence that Congress
intended public confusion generally to be actionable); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F.
Supp. 484, 492 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (relying on the 1962 Amendment as evidence that confusion of
public, and not just purchasers or prospective purchasers, was actionable); Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v.
A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 694 n.10 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (justifying its finding of
infringement, in part, based on differences between how the Lanham Act was “originally drafted” and
how it had been amended). But as discussed, Congress did not intend this amendment to expand the
infringement standard in the ways courts have interpreted. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra
note 2, at 469–75.
60. Some may argue that Congress broadened the infringement standard through two other
statutory amendments: (1) the 1962 Housekeeping Amendments to the Lanham Act; and (2) the

2018]

TRADEMARK’S JUDICIAL DE-EVOLUTION

1213

the “same descriptive properties” language of the 1881 and 1905 Trademark
Acts with language adopting Aunt Jemima’s likelihood of confusion as to
source approach.61 And in 1988, Congress amended section 43(a) to encompass
confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship.62 But in these amendments, Congress
simply acceded to parts of the broader infringement standard that courts had
created.
In short, trademark’s infringement standard expanded substantially over
the course of the twentieth century, and the judiciary is responsible for that
expansion.
2. Expanding Trademark Subject Matter: The Rise of Trade Dress
Protection
Our second tale concerns the administrative and judicial expansion of the
subject matter eligible for protection as a trademark, and in particular, the rise
of so-called “trade dress” protection. Today, the phrase “trade dress” refers to
those aspects of a product’s packaging or its configuration, shape, or design
that consumers use to identify the product’s source.63 In form, a trade dress
claim looks and sounds like a trademark claim: by imitating distinctive
packaging or product features, competitors can trick consumers into buying
their products mistakenly believing they are getting the original. In substance,
however, a trade dress claim is usually an attempt to bar the imitation of a new
and popular product outright. It seeks to bar not only unfair competition, but
competition generally.
Because trade dress protection poses inherently greater risks to
competition,64 before the 1946 Trademark Act, trademark protection was
available only for words, emblems, or symbols affixed to products.65 The shape

Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995. I have explained why both arguments are wrong in another
article. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 408–10, 469–78.
61. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1)(a) (2012)). Although the relevant statutory language is routinely ignored today, Congress
retained the language imposing the first identity requirement, i.e. that the defendant’s mark be nearly
identical, in the 1946 Act. Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, 503 (“Any person who
shall reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate any trade-mark registered under this act . . . .”),
with Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2012))
(“Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant—(a) use in commerce any reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark . . . .”).
62. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3946
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994)).
63. As the Court recognized in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., where distinctive trade
dress includes a product’s “total image and overall appearance” “and may include features such as
size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.” 505
U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (1992) (quoting Taco Cabana v. Two Pesos, 932 F.2d 1113, 1118 (5th Cir. 1991)
and John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)).
64. See, e.g., Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor, supra note 1, at 1162–75.
65. Today, this is often referred to as the “technical” trademark limitation. See id. at 1140–41.
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or configuration of a product could not qualify as a trademark; at best, imitation
of the configuration of a product or its packaging could give rise to a claim for
unfair competition.66 This was an important distinction. While both claims
focus on whether a defendant’s actions are likely to trick or deceive consumers
as to the source of the goods they are buying, for a trademark claim, both
secondary meaning and a likelihood of confusion can be inferred from the
similarity of the marks alone.67 In contrast, for unfair competition, the
deception had to be shown.68 It was not enough to show that a defendant had
imitated a popular product.69 Proving unfair competition required something

66. See, e.g., Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562, 572 (1893) (determining that,
without a patent, the similar product was “the common property of all mankind” while still considering
whether there was unfair competition); Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lenel, Inc., 181 F.2d 3, 4–5 (5th Cir.
1950) (“It is elementary that a color or container cannot be a trade-mark. . . . [T]here can be no trademark in a package, the shape of a bottle, or a letter of the alphabet.”); Société Anonyme de la
Distillerie de la Liqueur Benedictine de L’Abbaye de Fecamp v. Puziello, 250 F. 928, 928 (E.D.N.Y.
1918) (granting relief for imitation of packaging under the theory of unfair competition and noting that
“[t]he statute of February 20, 1905, allowing the registration of a trade-mark in use for more than 10
years, does not alter the fundamental proposition, that a trade-mark is a design or mark rather than a
container or package.”); Phila. Novelty Mfg. Co. v. Rouss, 40 F. 585, 587 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1889) (“[I]n
ordinary circumstances, the adoption of packages of peculiar form and color alone, unaccompanied by
any distinguishing symbol, letter, sign, or seal, is not sufficient to constitute a trade-mark.”); Adams v.
Heisel, 31 F. 279, 280 (C.C.E.D. Ohio 1887) (“It is well settled that a person cannot obtain the
monopoly incident to a trade-mark by the mere form of a vendable commodity that may be adopted.”);
WILLIAM HENRY BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS AND ANALOGOUS SUBJECTS
§ 89c at 109 (2d ed. 1885) (noting that “[t]here are decisions which, at the first glance, seem to hold
that the mere form of the vendible article may constitute a technical trade-mark. Careful analyses
cannot fail to induce the conclusion, that the principles of unfair competition, rather than those
appertaining to trade-marks, were the bases of judgment.”); JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF
TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 53, 54, 57 (4th ed. 1924).
67. See, e.g., Md. Stadium Auth. v. Becker, 806 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (inferring both secondary
meaning and a likelihood of confusion from the defendant’s intentional copying of a word mark,
“Camden Yards”), aff’d, 36 F.3d 1093 (4th Cir. 1994).
68. See Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 266, 269–70
(7th Cir. 1943) (stating that “[t]he essence of unfair competition is fraud. And like fraud, it is never
presumed, and its existence must be established by a clear preponderance of the evidence.”) (citations
omitted).
69. Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938) (noting that “a particular
manufacturer can no more assert exclusive rights in a form . . . which, in the minds of the public, is
primarily associated with the article rather than a particular producer, than it can in the case of a name
with similar connections in the public mind.”); William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S.
526, 531 (1924) (stating that “[t]he petitioner or anyone else is at liberty under the law to manufacture
and market an exactly similar preparation . . . . [b]ut the imitator of another’s goods must sell them as
his own production.”); Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 257 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 910 (1962); Modern Aids, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 264 F.2d 93, 94 (2d Cir.
1959) (per curiam) (noting that “[e]ven [where a plaintiff is entitled to relief against an imitator for
unfair competition], however, the relief would go no further than to require the defendant to make
plain to buyers that the plaintiff was not the source of the machines sold by it”); Paramount Indus., Inc.
v. Solar Prods. Corp., 186 F.2d 999, 1001–02 (2d Cir. 1951); Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Frances Denney,
Inc., 99 F.2d 272, 273 (3d Cir. 1938) (per curiam); Vogue Ring Creations, Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F.
Supp. 609, 613 (D.R.I. 1976) (stating that “[i]t is well established that copying another’s article is not,
standing alone, unfair competition. It must be shown that the defendant so confusingly presented his
product through packaging, labeling or otherwise as to lead purchasers to believe that they were
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more.70 Moreover, even where deception was shown, relief was usually limited
to a requirement of proper labeling.71
While unfair competition law thus provided some protection against
imitation of a product’s design or packaging, that protection was difficult to
obtain. Even when obtained, the remedy was sharply limited. In William R.
Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., for example, the plaintiff brought suit against
the defendant when the defendant copied the plaintiff’s popular product.72 The
plaintiff’s product, known as Coco-Quinine, was a mixture of chocolate and
quinine, and was sold as a medicinal or pharmaceutical compound.73 The
defendant’s product was a similar chocolate and quinine mixture known as
Quin-Coco.74 Soon after the defendant began selling its compound, the plaintiff

buying the plaintiff’s article.”); Remco Indus., Inc. v. Toyomenka, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 948, 952, 955
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Key West Hand Print Fabrics, Inc. v. Serbin, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 287, 292 (S.D. Fla.
1965). For other differences, see generally Milton Handler & Charles Pickett, Trade Marks and Trade
Names—An Analysis and Synthesis: I, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 168 (1930) (describing greater
requirements, and narrower scope of protection, for trade names under the doctrine of unfair
competition as compared to protection of trademarks).
70. See Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917) (noting
that so long as defendant was careful to identify goods as its own, the defendant was fully entitled to
“copy the plaintiff’s goods slavishly down to the minutest detail”); see also Warner & Co., 265 U.S. at
532 (allowing competitor to use chocolate as flavoring for quinine mixture but requiring proper
labeling to identify defendant’s product as its own); West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222
F.2d 581, 586, 589, 595 (6th Cir. 1955) (“The identical imitation of the goods of another does not in
itself constitute unfair competition.”); Gum, Inc. v. Gumakers of Am., Inc., 136 F.2d 957, 960 (3d Cir.
1943) (copying of cylinder-shaped bubble gum not actionable as unfair competition where defendant’s
product labeled as its own); Zangerle & Peterson Co. v. Venice Furniture Novelty Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d
266, 269 (7th Cir. 1943) (“Copying a design not patentable is not unfair competition.”); Sinko v.
Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F.2d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1939) (finding imitation of the plaintiff’s product not
actionable); Remington-Rand, Inc. v. Mastercraft Corp., 67 F.2d 218, 220 (6th Cir. 1933) (similarity in
appearance in defendant’s products not actionable); Meccano, Ltd. v. Wanamaker, 250 F. 450, 452–53
(2d Cir. 1918) (defendant not liable for unfair competition as long as it properly labels its similar
products as its own), aff’d, 253 U.S. 136 (1920); John H. Rice & Co. v. Redlich Mfg. Co., 202 F. 155,
158–60 (3d Cir. 1913) (similarity in product’s design and appearance alone not actionable as unfair
competition); Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1904) (noting that “[u]nfair competition is
not established by proof of similarity in form, dimensions, or general appearance alone.”); GlobeWernicke Co. v. Fred Macey Co., 119 F. 696, 704 (6th Cir. 1902).
71. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs., Inc., 467 F.2d 304, 309–10 (2d Cir. 1972)
(finding no unfair competition despite similarity between original and imitator because defendant had
plainly labeled its product as its own); Modern Aids, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., Inc., 264 F.2d 93, 94
(2d Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (noting that even if plaintiff can show consumer deception as a result of
defendant’s imitation, relief is limited to the requirement of proper labeling); West Point Mfg. Co. v.
Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 588, 589 (6th Cir. 1955); J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile
Co., 120 F.2d 949, 955–56 (8th Cir. 1941) (ruling that “[l]abeling is the usual and accepted method of
distinguishing the goods of one manufacturer from those of another in the market” and limiting relief
to requirement of proper labeling and accuracy in statements made concerning defendant’s products).
72. 265 U.S. 526, 528 (1924).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 528–29.
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sued, alleging, inter alia,75 unfair competition due to the similarities between
the products.76 The trial court rejected the claim, but the Third Circuit reversed
and held that the defendant should be unconditionally enjoined from using
chocolate in its product.77 The Supreme Court disagreed, however.78 In its
view, the wrong was not in imitating the plaintiff’s product.79 Rather, the
wrong was in suggesting to pharmacists “that, without danger of detection,
prescriptions and orders for Coco-Quinine could be filled by substituting QuinCoco.”80 It was this deceptive passing-off, not the mere imitation of a popular
product, that made the defendant’s competition unfair.81 Despite finding for the
plaintiff, the Court limited relief to a requirement that the defendant label its
product in a manner that clearly distinguished it from Coco-Quinine and that
affirmatively stated it was not to be substituted for Coco-Quinine when a
prescription called for, or a customer asked for, Coco-Quinine.82
As the William R. Warner & Co. decision reflects, the protection available
to a plaintiff against product imitation under the rubric of unfair competition
was sharply limited. In enacting the Trademark Act of 1946, Congress retained
this traditionally limited scope. In the Act, Congress expressly barred the
registration of trade dress on the principal register, as well as its protection
under section 43(a). To do so, Congress in 1943 expressly amended the bill that
would become the Trademark Act of 1946. At the behest of the Department of
Justice, Congress amended the bill to limit the subject matter of “trademarks”
and “service marks” eligible for registration on the principal register and for
protection under section 43(a) to “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof.”83 Now, readers who are familiar with only the last thirty
years of trademark decisions may point out that Justice Breyer, in Qualitex,
interpreted the words “symbol or device” in the Act to encompass “anything at
all that is capable of carrying meaning.”84 Unfortunately, the Court’s
interpretation is not just wrong, but exactly the opposite of what Congress

75. The plaintiff also alleged trademark infringement due to the similarities in the parties’
names for their respective products. The Court rejected the claim on the grounds that a descriptive
name could not serve as a trademark. Id. at 529.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 533.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 530.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 532–33.
83. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(2016)) (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those
manufactured or sold by others . . . .”). For a more detailed discussion of these issues, please see
Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor, supra note 1, at 1148–50.
84. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (“Since human beings
might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this
language, read literally, is not restrictive.”).
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intended. The Court took language that Congress specifically intended to limit
the scope of trademark subject matter, by defining that subject matter in terms
of historically recognized categories, and interpreted that language to broaden
the scope of trademark subject matter.
In giving the phrase “symbol or device” a broad interpretation, the
Qualitex Court violated virtually every major canon of statutory construction.
First, the Court interpreted the Act as if the 1943 narrowing amendment had
not occurred.85 Second, the Court gave the words “symbol or device” their
broad ordinary meaning, rather than the narrower meaning that they carried as
terms of art within trademark law.86 Third, the Court’s broad interpretation
made the other words in the statutory definition, “word” and “name,”
redundant.87 Fourth, even though Congress used different words to define the
subject matter for the principal register and the supplemental register, the
Court’s broad interpretation essentially rewrote the Act to define the
“trademarks” and “service marks” that are eligible for registration on the
principal register as broadly as the “marks” that are eligible for registration
only on the supplemental register.88 Fifth, the Court also ignored the relevant

85. Compare Trade-marks: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Patents on H.R. 82,
78th Cong. 14 (1944) (“The term ‘trade-mark’ includes any word, name, symbol or device or any
combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and
distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others.”), and Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540,
60 Stat. 427 (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those
manufactured or sold by others . . . .”), with H.R. 4744, 76th Cong. § 46 (1939), reprinted in Trademarks: Hearings on H. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patents,
76th Cong. 172 (1939), at 9, 172 (“The term ‘trade-mark’ includes any mark which is entitled to
registration under the terms of this Act and whether registered or not.”). See, e.g., I.N.S. v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442–43 (1987) (noting that “[f]ew principles of statutory construction are more
compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language
that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.”) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392–93 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); see also Stone v. I.N.S., 514
U.S. 386, 397 (1995) (“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment
to have real and substantial effect.”).
86. See McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991); Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (stating that “where Congress borrows terms of art in which are
accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts
the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it
was taken . . . .”); Woods v. Lawrence Cty., 66 U.S. 386, 399 (1861) (noting that “terms of art are to
be understood in their technical sense when used in a statute”).
87. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140–41 (1994) (noting that courts must
construe statutes to give effect, if possible, to every provision); Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112,
115 (1879) (stating that “[i]t is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that significance and effect
shall, if possible, be accorded to every word”).
88. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. at 432 (1987) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16, 23 (1983)).
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legislative history wherein Congress explained that it was adopting the
amendment specifically to bar trade dress protection.89
Of course, the Qualitex decision was not the first judicial mistake on the
trade dress issue. Rather, it was the culmination of a forty-year succession of
errors. Almost as soon as the ink was dry on the Trademark Act, would-be
trade dress owners began petitioning the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
and the judiciary to overturn Congress’s carefully considered decision to
relegate trade dress to the supplemental register.90 In 1952, for example,
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing, better known as “3M,” sought to register
the now-classic shape of a cellophane tape dispenser on the principal register.91
But the PTO refused. The Chief Examiner specifically rejected the argument
that Congress intended “symbol or device” to be interpreted broadly.92 As the
Chief Examiner explained with respect to the word “device,” for example:
The word “device” appearing in the definition of trademark cannot aid
applicant. The word “device,” which also appears in the older
definitions, is not used as referring to a mechanical or structural device
but is used in the sense of one of the definitions of the word; “an
artistic figure or design used as a heraldic bearing or as an emblem,
badge, trade mark, or the like,” rather than in one of the other
meanings of the word.93
Rather than refer to a mechanical device, Congress intended the word “device”
to carry its technical meaning within trademark law as a coat of arms or other
form of heraldry.
But would-be trade dress owners did not give up. Year after year, they
continued to seek registration of their trade dress on the principal register.94

89. See Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor, supra note 1, at 1150–52 (quoting Mr. Rogers’
statement that the broader language allowing registration of trade dress on the supplemental register
was solely for the purpose of enabling registration of trade dress in foreign countries that recognized
such protection).
90. Congress expressly defined “marks” eligible for registration on the supplemental register
to include both “package” and “configuration of goods” and thus provided for registration of trade
dress on the supplemental register. 15 U.S.C. § 1091(c) (2012). The supplemental register, however,
provides no substantive domestic rights. See, e.g., Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N2G Distributing,
Inc., 763 F.3d 524, 530 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that a “Supplemental Registration confers no
substantive trademark rights beyond those under common law [and] [s]ection 26 of the Lanham Act
expressly excludes Supplemental Registrations from certain advantages gained by registration on the
Principal Register”) (quoting 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:36
(4th ed. 2014)). Providing for registration on the supplemental register does, however, facilitate
obtaining protection in other countries that require proof of a domestic registration before they will
register a foreign mark.
91. Ex parte Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 74, 76 (Chief Exam’r 1952).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Ex parte Babson Bros. Co., 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 115, 116 (Chief Exam’r 1954)
(“What applicant is attempting to register is a ‘configuration of goods’ and it has been held in a
number of cases that such configuration, if registrable, cannot be registered on the Principal Register
but only the Supplemental Register.”); Ex parte Boye Needle Co., 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 124
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Case after case, their petitions were rejected. Finally, twelve years later in
1958, they found a sympathetic administrative ear. And with a stroke of her
pen, the new Commissioner of Trademarks Daphne Robert Leeds overturned
Congress’s decision on the issue and allowed trade dress on the principal
register.95
Once the PTO got the federal trade dress ball rolling, courts were eager to
lend a hand. Indeed, when the PTO tried to slow the trade dress trend it had
started, courts rejected its attempts. In 1960, in In re Kotzin, when the PTO
refused to register the placement and shape of a clothing tag on its own—
without the associated words or symbols that appeared on the tag—the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals insisted that the applicant could obtain registration
as long as it could show secondary meaning.96 In 1964, in In re Mogen David
Wine Corp., when the PTO refused to register the shape of a wine bottle
because it was protected by a design patent, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals again reversed.97 In 1982, in In re Morton-Norwich Products, when
the PTO refused to register the shape of the Glass Plus spray bottle on the
grounds that it was functional, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
reversed and sharply narrowed the functionality limitation on trade dress
protection.98 In 1985, in In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., when the PTO
refused to register the color pink uniformly applied to fiberglass insulation as a
trademark, the Federal Circuit reversed and held that a uniform color could
serve as a trademark.99
The other federal appellate courts, although a bit late to the game, soon
joined in. In 1976, the Eighth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to

(Chief Exam’r 1953); Burgess Battery Co. v. Marzall, 101 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D.D.C 1951), aff’d sub
nom. Burgess Battery Co. v. Watson, 204 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (“The omission of reference to
labels or dress of goods in connection with the principal register and the inclusion thereof on the
supplemental register would seem to indicate an intention to confine such matters to the supplemental
register.”); Ex parte Am. Enka Corp., 81 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 476, 478 (Comm’r Pat. 1949) (noting that
“this definition [of a trademark] was apparently taken, directly, or indirectly from that contained in the
treatise on the ‘Law of Trade-Marks,’ by Francis H. Upton, published in 1860, prior to the enactment
of any provision in Federal law for the registration of trade marks”).
95. See Ex parte Haig & Haig, Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm’r Pat. 1958).
96. 276 F.2d 411, 414–15 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
97. 328 F.2d 925, 932 (C.C.P.A. 1964); see also In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1347
(C.C.P.A. 1974) (reversing PTO’s refusal to register the shape of a home thermostat as a trademark
where a design patent protected the shape and the shape was the product itself).
98. 671 F.2d 1332, 1343–44 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
99. 774 F.2d 1116, 1127–28 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Given that the PTO initially rejected the notion
that a uniform color could serve as a trademark and only changed its position when the Federal Circuit
forced it to do so, it is more than a little curious that Justice Breyer in his Qualitex opinion relies on the
PTO’s position as support for the Court’s conclusion that a uniform color could serve as a trademark.
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 172 (1995) (noting that “the Patent and
Trademark Office had adopted a clear policy (which it still maintains) permitting registration of color
as a trademark”).
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protect trade dress under section 43(a).100 Other circuits were not far behind.101
Strikingly, none of these decisions even discussed the fact that Congress
specifically amended the language of section 43(a) to preclude trade dress
protection. As the circuit courts gleefully jumped on the trade dress express, the
Supreme Court was eventually presented with the opportunity to fix the lower
courts’ mistake. However, rather than correct the mistake, the Court joined the
parade through its 1992 decision in Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana. In a truly
embarrassing opinion,102 the Court further loosened the standards for protecting
trade dress by holding that trade dress could be inherently distinctive and thus
receive protection without proof of secondary meaning.103 The Court offered
no explanation or basis for rewriting section 43(a) to encompass trade dress
protection, but simply assumed that Congress must have intended such
protection all along. Just three years later in Qualitex Corp. v. Jacobsen
Products, the Court had a second chance to correct the mistaken expansion of
subject matter eligible for trademark protection. Instead, it chose once again to
rubber stamp those mistakes. Indeed, it went a step further and tried to justify
the judicial recognition of trade dress protection by pointing to the broad
ordinary language meaning of the phrase “symbol or device” in the statute.104

100. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 86 (1976); see also LeSportsac, Inc. v. K mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985); Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 830–32 (11th Cir. 1982); Sun-Fun
Products, Inc. v. Suntan Research & Development Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1981).
101. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981).
102. Although there are a number of aspects of the decision that are embarrassing, two are
particularly so. First, the Court insisted there was no textual basis for treating traditional trademarks
and trade dress differently. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992) (“It
would be a different matter if there were textual basis in § 43(a) for treating inherently distinctive
verbal or symbolic trademarks differently from inherently distinctive trade dress.”). Contrary to the
Court’s insistence, however, Congress added the “word, name, symbol, or device” language to section
43(a) specifically to preclude trade dress protection. See, e.g., Walter J. Derenberg, The Lanham
Trade-Mark Act of 1946: Practical Effects and Experiences After One Year’s Administration, 38
TRADE-MARK REP. 831, 835 (1948) (noting that items that might qualify as trade dress “were
deliberately left outside the definition of a ‘trademark’ in section 45” and are therefore not eligible for
registration on the principal register). Hence, there is a quite clear and express statutory basis for
treating traditional trademarks and trade dress differently. Second, the Court further insisted it cannot
“engraft[] onto § 43(a) a requirement of secondary meaning” not otherwise found in the statutory
language. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774. Yet at the same time, the Court had no trouble “engrafting”
onto the statute a functionality limitation. Id. at 775 (noting that “[o]nly nonfunctional, distinctive trade
dress is protected under § 43(a)”). Of course, there was no functionality limitation in the statute in
1992. Congress added a functionality limitation to section 2 six years later, in 1998. See Trademark
Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 150-330, § 201(a)(2)(A)(ii), 112 Stat. 3064, 3069 (1998)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2016)). Because Congress intended to preclude trade
dress protection altogether in 1946, there was no need for a functionality limitation in the statute.
Congress did not add such a limitation until the courts forced its hand in 1998 and 1999. See
Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 150-330, § 201(a)(2)(A)(ii), 112 Stat. 3064,
3069 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2016)); Trademark Amendments Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 43, § 5, 113 Stat. 218, 220 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2016)).
103. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776.
104. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
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The Court was apparently unaware that Congress added that phrase precisely to
bar trade dress protection.105
As courts formally recognized product design and packaging as a type of
trademark despite Congress’s expressly stated intention to the contrary, they
also watered down the requirements for protection against product imitation
and thereby broadened the scope of that protection. First, where the common
law once required actual proof of secondary meaning, the Supreme Court’s
Two Pesos decision eliminated that requirement for non-generic, nondescriptive product packaging.106 Even where courts required proof of
secondary meaning, they allowed the trier of fact to infer it from the uniqueness
of a design, the extent of sales or advertising, or the fact of imitation itself.107
Second, where the common law once defined a product feature as functional so
long as it served “a substantial and desirable use,”108 courts narrowed the
functionality limitation to encompass only those features that were “essential to
the use or purpose of the article or . . . affect[ed] the cost or quality of the
article.”109 Third, where the common law once required deceptive acts in
addition to mere product similarity, courts held that similarity alone was
sufficient to support an infringement finding.110 Finally, where the common

105. The defendant in the case, Jacobson Products, did argue that pre-1946 Supreme Court
cases had stated that a uniform color was not eligible for trademark protection, id. at 169-73, but did
not apparently explain to the Court how, when, and why Congress added the “word, name, symbol, or
device” language to the bill that became the Trademark Act of 1946.
106. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776. But see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S.
205 (2000) (restricting the Two Pesos analysis to product packaging and requiring proof of secondary
meaning for product design claimed as trade dress).
107. Compare A.C. Gilbert Co. v. Shemitz, 45 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1930) (ruling that similarity
resulting from imitation and “many sales and much advertising” did not establish secondary meaning
in design of article), and Gen. Time Instruments Corp. v. U.S. Time Corp., 165 F.2d 853, 854–55 (2d
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846 (1948) (ruling that sale of 3,000,000 clocks and expenditure of
$2 million in advertising from 1939 to 1946 was insufficient to establish secondary meaning), with
Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., Inc., 870 F.2d 512, 517 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872
(1989) (finding secondary meaning based upon sales and advertising expenditures alone).
108. William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 531 (1924) (finding that
defendant could imitate exactly the chocolate flavoring of plaintiff’s medication because it “serves a
substantial and desirable use”); see also Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569,
572 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding the pink color for a stomach remedy functional because it was ‘“designed
to present a pleasing appearance to the customer and to the sufferer’”); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.,
198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952); J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954
(8th Cir. 1941) (“A feature of goods is functional . . . if it affects their purpose, action or performance;
or the facility or economy of processing, handling or using them.”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS § 742 (1938)); Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917);
Smith v. Krause, 160 F. 270, 271 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908) (refusing to protect the words “Merrie
Christmas,” woven into a ribbon as a trademark because “the fact that it has ‘Merrie Christmas’
inscribed upon it adds a value to it over the value of a plain ribbon”).
109. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982).
110. The evidence of confusion in the Sears and Compco cases has become entirely typical of
the type of evidence sufficient to establish infringement. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 226 (1964) (holding evidence of confusion consisted of similar appearance plus: (1) labels
were not attached to showroom lamps; (2) customers had asked manufacturer of higher priced lamp
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law once limited relief to a requirement of proper labeling, courts held that
proper labeling was no longer sufficient to avoid an infringement finding.
Courts would prohibit the imitation of desired product features even where a
defendant was careful to identify the imitation as its own.111
As with the infringement standard, Congress was not the one to expand
the subject matter of trademark protection and weaken the limitations on socalled trade dress protection. It was the courts. Despite Congress’s express
direction to the contrary, courts first recognized trade dress as a type of
protectable trademark, then steadily whittled away the common law’s
limitations on the availability and scope of that newly recognized protection.
B. Separating the Wheat from the Chaff: When Expansive Trademark
Protection Hurts Consumers
Essentially all of this judicial expansion in trademark protection hurts
consumers and reduces social welfare. In the marketplace, social welfare is the
aggregate welfare of the market participants. Thus, social welfare is maximized
when the sum of producer and consumer welfare in that marketplace is
maximized. If we use producer and consumer “surplus”—defined as the
economic benefit captured in excess of marginal cost—as a measure of that
welfare, then social welfare is maximized when the total surplus to the
producers and consumers in a given market is maximized.112 In a perfectly
competitive market, competition drives prices down to the marginal cost of
production.113 In such a competitive market, producers that are more efficient
than the marginal producer earn some surplus,114 but consumers capture the

about the difference in the lamps; and (3) two customers, who purchased the more expensive lamp,
complained to the manufacturer of the more expensive lamps when they learned that “substantially
identical lamps” were available at a “much lower price”); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,
376 U.S. 234, 236–37 (1964) (explaining evidence of confusion consisted of similar appearance plus a
request by a single plant manager that Day-Brite service was what turned out to be fixtures made by
Compco); see also Am. Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 270 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding
unfair competition from product simulation even though court recognized that “[t]here is some but not
much evidence of actual confusion”).
111. Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to say that proper labeling is itself a wrong. See,
e.g., Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1220–21 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting that
“Fruehauf’s reliance upon the fact that its trailer was labeled as its own product and sold through its
own channels of distribution is not only misplaced, but also self-defeating. . . . [S]uch a marketing
practice by a dominant figure in the market tends to promote rather than ensure against confusion.”)
(citation omitted).
112. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 11, 67 (1988)
(noting that when the goods at issue are only a small share of consumer expenditures and price
changes therefore generate small income effects, “it may be appropriate to assume . . . that the
consumer surplus is a good approximation of welfare”).
113. See, e.g., id. at 6 (“A key property of competitive equilibrium is that each good is sold at
marginal cost.”).
114. In the traditional analysis, supply curves slope upward and demand curves slope
downward. Price is set at the point where the supply and demand curves intersect. In a competitive
market, this is at the marginal cost of the marginal supplier. All of the non-marginal suppliers face
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vast majority of the available surplus.115 By restricting competition, policy
makers can increase prices in the market and thereby shift some of the surplus
from consumers to producers. But shifting surplus from consumers to
producers does not merely redistribute wealth. To shift surplus from consumers
to producers requires raising prices, and raising prices inevitably imposes some
degree of deadweight loss, as some consumers will be unable to afford the
higher prices.116 As a result, to increase producer surplus by any given amount,
we must transfer at least that much surplus from consumers and reduce
consumer surplus yet further as a result of the deadweight losses higher prices
impose.117 Moreover, when the prospect of producer surplus appears, producers
may spend real resources competing to capture it. Such rent-seeking
expenditures can convert what would have been surplus into cost.118 For that
reason, maximizing total surplus in a market requires maximizing consumer
surplus in the market.119 Or to put it in a more familiar form, competition
maximizes social welfare; monopoly and market power reduce it.120
Applying this simple rule to trademark law requires a realistic appraisal of
whether a given trademark decision will yield competition and, if so, what sort
lower marginal costs and so earn rents equal to the difference between their marginal cost and the
price. For a graphical illustration, see id. at 9.
115. Consumers capture surplus equal to the difference between their reservation value for a
good and the price of that good. For example, if I am very thirsty, I might be willing to pay ten dollars
for a bottle of water. In a competitive market, I do not have to pay my full reservation value, but only
the market price for such a bottle. The difference remains in my pocket as consumer surplus. For a
graphical illustration, see, for example, id. at 8.
116. As Tirole has explained:
In contrast with the behavior of a competitive firm . . . , a firm exercising monopoly power
over a given market can raise its price above marginal cost without losing all its clients.
Such behavior leads to a price that is too high and to a “dead-weight” welfare loss for
society . . . .
Id. at 65.
117. See, e.g., id. at 76 (noting that “monopoly pricing lowers consumer surplus and raises a
firm’s profit relative to a competitive behavior. The decrease in surplus exceeds the increase in profit
by an amount equal to the dead-weight loss.”).
118. See, e.g., id. at 76 (stating that “[i]t is clear that the existence of this potential rent may lead
to rent-seeking behavior. Firms will tend to spend money and exert effort to acquire the monopoly
position; once installed in that position, they will tend to keep on spending money and exerting effort
to maintain it.”) The practice of paying radio stations and other public performance venues to play a
particular song in order to increase the popularity of, and hence demand for, the song is one example.
See, e.g., R. H. Coase, Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 269 (1979)
(providing a detailed account of payola throughout the past century).
119. See, e.g., id. at 9 (noting that “[t]he total surplus is maximized when the consumer price is
equal to the marginal cost . . . .”).
120. This is the first theorem of welfare economics. See, e.g., id. at 6 (noting that “[r]oughly
stated, the first [fundamental welfare theorem] says that a competitive equilibrium is Pareto
optimal . . . .”). For application of this principal more generally in intellectual property scholarship,
see, for example, Kristelia A. García, Facilitating Competition by Remedial Regulation, 31 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 183, 190 (2016); Andrea M. Hall, Standing the Test of Time: Likelihood of Confusion in
Multi Time Machine v. Amazon, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 815, 842 (2016); Camilla A. Hrdy, Patent
Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1325 (2016); Louis Kaplow, On the
Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 683, 686 (2011).
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of competition. Compare, for example, the welfare consequences of the Vogue
hat case with those of the Boston Professional Hockey decision. By enjoining
the defendant from selling hats labeled “Vogue”, the Vogue court did not
prohibit the defendant from entering the market for fashionable hats. The
defendant was free to do so as long as it did not use a mark for its hats that
would mislead consumers. It could still make and sell fashionable hats; it just
had to market them under a different name.121 In contrast, by prohibiting the
defendant from selling the emblems of NHL teams and from selling
merchandise bearing those emblems, the Boston Professional Hockey court
effectively barred the defendant from entering the market for such merchandise
altogether. While the defendant remained free to sell t-shirts or other
merchandise without the NHL symbols, a significant number of consumers
likely would not consider them acceptable substitutes for real NHL
merchandise. After the court’s decision, for consumers who wanted such
merchandise, there would be only one source: the NHL itself. Moreover, unlike
the Vogue mark, the emblem on a jersey plays no trademark role. It conveys no
otherwise unobservable information regarding the quality or nature of the
merchandise.122 The Boston Professional Hockey decision thus replaced
competition with monopoly and thereby reduced social welfare.123
Moreover, we cannot justify the Boston Professional Hockey decision on
the basis that the NHL created the demand for the merchandise, a version of “if
value, then right,”124 as the court seemed to.125 Neither can we justify it on the
slightly different basis that the NHL will reinvest the surplus from merchandise
sales into improving the product.126 If either were a sufficient basis for
121. I have defined the relevant market as the market for fashionable hats. For an extensive
justification of that market definition, see Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 421–38;
see also Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market
Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055 (2012) [hereinafter Lemley & McKenna, Market
Definition] (advocating a similar approach).
122. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait
Accompli, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 478–95 (2005); Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 395–
99, 433–37.
123. I recognize that some consumers may prefer authorized merchandise, but the leagues can
satisfy that demand by identifying their apparel as “official” or “authorized.” That some consumers
may want official merchandise provides no justification for depriving other consumers of the choice to
buy unauthorized apparel by prohibiting the sale of such merchandise altogether.
124. Felix Cohen used the “if value, then right” phrase to capture the argument that if a person
or entity creates value, the law should recognize a legal right in the creator to capture that value. See
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809
(1935).
125. See Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d
1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). (“The argument that confusion must be
as to the source of the manufacture of the emblem itself is unpersuasive, where the trademark,
originated by the team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale of the emblem.”).
126. As Arnold Plant once said, “a special case for a monopoly . . . cannot rest on the general
proposition that if business men are enabled to make monopoly profits, some of them will be devoted
to good works.” ARNOLD PLANT, THE NEW COMMERCE IN IDEAS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 15
(1953).
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accepting monopoly, then monopoly would become preferable to competition
generally—an absurd outcome. As a general rule, competitive markets already
provide the efficient level of incentive for firms to invest in quality products.127
In those rare and exceptional cases where competitive markets are likely
to fail to provide sufficient incentive, patent and copyright provide incentives
to fill the gap.128 Even if patent and copyright leave some gaps unfilled, we
should not use trademark law to address remaining gaps.129 In contrast to
trademark, patent and copyright are expressly tailored to address such instances
of market failure. Their limitations on subject matter and prerequisites serve to
provide protection only in cases where the nature and extent of creative
investment make market failure likely.130 At the same time, their scope of
protection, available defenses such as copyright fair use, and limited duration
serve to provide both protection and a corresponding incentive sufficient to
correct the likely market failure without imposing undue social cost.131
Trademark has none of these features. Its subject matter is not limited, and
its prerequisites are not tailored to define when the nature and extent of the
creative investment makes market failure likely.132 Similarly, its scope and
duration of protection are not designed to provide an incentive that is precisely
sufficient to correct that market failure without imposing undue social costs.133
127. Klein and Leffler have modeled brands as an informal guarantee of product quality. See
generally Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981). In their model, consumers continue to purchase brands
that honor their implicit and informal guarantee of quality and abandon those that do not. Id. at 620–
21. As part of their model, Klein and Leffler show that some degree of supra-competitive pricing is
necessary to make this informal guarantee effective. Id. at 621–23. The rents associated with that
pricing provide the incentive for maintaining quality and the punishment for failing to do so. Id.
128. See, e.g., Lothar Determann & David Nimmer, Software Copyright’s Oracle from the
Cloud, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 168 (2015); Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute
Infringement Liability in Patent Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 4 n.3 (2016); Philip Merksamer,
Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom: Metastasis of Mayo and Myriad and the Evisceration of Patent
Eligibility for Molecular Diagnostics, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 495, 500 (2016).
129. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 456–62.
130. See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, The Informational Value of Patents, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
259, 321 (2016); Jamie F. Cárdenas-Navia, Thirty Years of Flawed Incentives: An Empirical and
Economic Analysis of Hatch-Waxman Patent-Term Restoration, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1307
(2014) (arguing that patent exclusivity is required because of high investment costs); Pamela
Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software
Copyright Infringement, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215, 1292–94 (2016) (arguing that copyright
protection should focus on helping investors recoup costs). To be clear, I am not talking about the
market failure that arises from imperfect information. Trademark law is tailored to address that market
failure. The question then becomes whether the mark at issue is: (1) providing material and otherwise
unobservable information to the consumer; and (2) that information cannot be made available through
a cheaper (to competition) means. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 431–32.
131. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Patent Law’s Parismony Principle, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1693,
1710–11 (2010); Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1383, 1385–86 (2014); Hannibal Travis, Pirates of the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian
Copyright and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777, 777 (2000).
132. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 457–59.
133. See id. at 458–59.
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Most obviously, where patent and copyright protection both have defined and
limited terms, trademark protection is potentially perpetual, lasting as long as
the protected “mark” remains in use and retains its distinctiveness.
In sum, to maximize total surplus, courts should strive to maximize
consumer surplus. To maximize consumer surplus, courts should resolve
trademark disputes to promote competition and to minimize monopoly and
market power. Yet, courts have not done so. To understand why, the following
Section takes a preliminary look at the judicial decisions through which
trademark law has become inefficient for consumers.
C. Judicial Decision Making: A Dysfunctional Process
Looking at the judicial de-evolution of trademark law over the course of
the last hundred years, certain dysfunctional patterns emerge. First, procompetitive trademark decisions tend to be challenged repeatedly until they are
distinguished or rewritten, while anticompetitive decisions tend to stick.
Second, sound reasoning that supports efficient interpretations of trademark
law is ignored, and absurdly weak reasoning that supports inefficient
interpretations triumphs. Third, trademark defense counsel often fail to make
relevant arguments in the initial cases, and stare decisis makes it difficult to
correct them afterwards.
All it takes is one bad decision for an anticompetitive trademark rule to
stick. Consider, for example, the path by which so-called trade dress became
eligible for registration on the principal register. Almost as soon as the ink
dried on the Trademark Act of 1946, applicants attempted to register various
forms of trade dress on the register. In a series of well-reasoned decisions from
1949 to 1954, the Patent and Trademark Office repeatedly denied the
registrability of trade dress on the principal register.134 But parties seeking trade
dress registration did not give up. They kept at it for a decade until finally, in
1958, they found a receptive, and perhaps corrupt,135 administrator willing to
overturn Congress’s carefully considered decision on the issue and allow the
registration of trade dress on the principal register.136 Thus, the pro-competitive
rule denying registration to trade dress was repeatedly challenged until the law
changed.
Compare that to the recognition of a merchandising right for sports teams.
In its 1975 Boston Professional Hockey decision, the Fifth Circuit rewrote
trademark law to give professional sports teams the right to control the sale of

134. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
135. As I have explained elsewhere, see Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor, supra note 1, at
1156 n.88, Assistant Commissioner Leeds rewrote the law to allow trade dress registration on the
principal register for a company that would become her client when she left the Office and returned to
private practice.
136. See Ex parte Haig & Haig, Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm’r Pat. 1958).
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merchandise bearing their team names and logos.137 A few years later, in 1982,
the Third Circuit reiterated and reinforced the merchandising right in its
University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products decision.138 In that case, after a
bench trial, the district court found that laches precluded the University of
Pittsburgh’s enforcement of the merchandising right where Champion had been
selling unlicensed apparel and other merchandise bearing the University’s
name and logo for more than forty years.139 On appeal, a panel of the Third
Circuit reversed and held that laches did not apply based largely on the “if
value, then right” reasoning of Boston Professional Hockey.140 The
University’s efforts created the value of the logo; Champion “merely
package[d] and exploit[ed] it.”141 Thus, the Third Circuit held that the
University had enforceable rights in the logo.142
These two decisions created an inefficient, welfare-diminishing
merchandising right for sports teams. They both raised prices for, and restricted
consumer choice with respect to, such merchandise. Moreover, they imposed
these anticompetitive consequences without reducing material consumer
confusion or search costs.143 Yet, unlike the efficient legal rule barring the
137. See Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d
1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975) (holding as a matter of law that sales of
unauthorized merchandise bearing team logos or the logos themselves created an actionable likelihood
of confusion).
138. 686 F.2d 1040 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 107 (1982).
139. Id. at 1042–43 (noting that Champion had been selling merchandise bearing the Pitt name
and logo since 1936).
140. Id. at 1049.
141. Id.; see also Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods. Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1047 (3d Cir.
1982) (“[I]t is Champion which seeks to profit from Pitt’s investment, particularly in its athletic
program.”).
142. Id. at 1049.
143. In trying to explain the nature of the consumer confusion that was present, the Boston
Professional Hockey court asserted:
The confusion or deceit requirement is met by the fact that the defendant duplicated the
protected trademarks and sold them to the public knowing that the public would identify
them as being the teams’ trademarks. The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source
and origin of the trademark symbols were in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act.
Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). The court’s explanation, however, entirely fails to show
consumers are confused. At a minimum, confusion presumably requires that a consumer holds a belief
that is not true. Here, consumers believe that the symbols represent the team. True. As the district court
found, they also believe that Dallas Cap & Emblem made the emblems without a license from the
team. Also, true.
Because the court’s reasoning is so weak, outside the context of sports teams, the Ninth
Circuit expressly rejected the reasoning of Boston Professional Hockey. See Int’l Order of Job’s
Daughters v. Lindenburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1980). Even the Fifth Circuit itself later
“re-interpreted” the language of the decision. See Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging
Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 389 (5th Cir. 1977) (insisting that the Boston Professional Hockey decision
required proof of a likelihood of confusion). Yet, thirty years later, when the Fifth Circuit revisited the
merchandising right in the sports context, it reiterated the same fallacious reasoning. Bd. of
Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. and Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 477–78
(5th Cir. 2008) (“By associating the color and other indicia with the university, the fans perceive the
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registration of trade dress, parties did not line up to challenge this new,
inefficient rule. Despite the extremely weak reasoning of the two decisions
establishing the rule, potential defendants essentially acceded to the
merchandising right and modified their behavior to comply. As a result, it took
more than thirty years before the sports merchandising right was challenged in
a federal appellate court.144
Likewise, poorly reasoned, inefficient decisions in trademark law have
had inexplicably more staying power than well-reasoned, efficient decisions.
For example, on the issue of whether trade dress should be eligible for
registration on the principal register, the efficient legal rule is to deny such
registration.145 The early decisions adopting this efficient rule and rejecting
trade dress registration were careful and well-reasoned. They traced the
historical usage of the terms “symbol” and “device” within trademark law to
understand their meaning in the 1946 Act;146 they recognized and gave effect to
Congress’s intentional adoption of a narrower definition of “trademarks” for
registration on the principal register and a broader definition of “marks”
eligible for registration on the supplemental register;147 and they recognized
that Congress intended to maintain the historical practice of denying formal
trademark status to so-called trade dress and relegating claims for trade dress
protection to the realm of unfair competition.148 In contrast, in 1958, Assistant

university as the source or sponsor of the goods because they want to associate with that source.”),
cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1268 (2009).
144. See Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. and Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co.,
550 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1268 (2009).
145. As I have explained elsewhere, see Lunney, Trade Dress Emperor, supra note 1, at 1162–
81, trade dress tends to stifle desirable competition. Even where a product’s design or packaging
provides material information to consumers, there are alternative and cheaper (to competition)
mechanisms, such as arbitrary word marks, to convey that same information.
146. See Ex parte Pulitzer Publ’g Co., 82 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229, 231 (Comm’r Pat. 1949)
(noting that “the definition appearing in the 1946 Act appears not only entirely consistent with the
definitions and statements of the nature of trade marks appearing in many decided cases, . . . but to
have been taken almost literally from such cases and earlier text authority”); see also Burgess Battery
Co. v. Marzall, 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90, 91–92 (D.D.C. 1951) (“The omission of reference to labels or
dress of goods in connection with the principal register and the inclusion thereof on the supplemental
register would seem to indicate an intention to confine such matters to the supplemental register.”); Ex
parte Am. Enka Corp., 81 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 476, 478 (Comm’r Pat. 1949) (noting that “the definition
[of trademark] in section 45 of the Act of 1946 . . . was apparently taken, directly, or indirectly from
that contained in the treatise on the ‘Law of Trade-Marks,’ by Francis H. Upton, published in
1860 . . . .”).
147. See Ex parte Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 74, 75 (Chief Exam’r 1952);
see also Ex parte Babson Bros. Co., 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 115, 116 (Chief Exam’r 1954); Ex parte
Boye Needle Co., 100 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 124 (Chief Exam’r 1953); Burgess Battery Co., 92
U.S.P.Q. at 91–92 (noting that “[t]he omission of reference to labels or dress of goods in connection
with the principal register and the inclusion thereof on the supplemental register would seem to
indicate an intention to confine such matters to the supplemental register.”).
148. See Ex parte Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 76 (“Applicant asserts that
a court would enjoin a competitor from any attempt to pass off its goods as those of the applicant, but
this does not indicate that the court would base its action upon trade mark rights . . . .”); see also
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Commissioner Daphne Leeds adopted the inefficient legal rule and allowed the
registration of trade dress on the principal register.149 In her opinion, she did
not address the language, history, or policy against providing such protection;
nor did she acknowledge Congress’s deliberate decision to bar such protection.
Instead, Leeds merely stated without reasoning or support, “[T]he contour or
conformation of the container may be a trademark—a symbol or device—
which distinguishes the applicant’s goods, and it may be registrable on the
Principal Register.”150 Her “reasoning,” such as it is, consists of the use of
dashes to suggest equivalence between a “contour of a container” and a
“symbol or device.” It is absurd on its face. Yet, over time, Leeds’s
“reasoning” prevailed.
We see a similar dynamic in the narrowing of the functionality doctrine,
where weak reasoning once again prevailed to justify inefficiently expansive
protection. Much like the initial denial of registration for trade dress, we start
functionality’s evolution with a well-reasoned decision. In 1952, the Ninth
Circuit considered whether a china pattern could receive protection against
imitation under unfair competition law in Pagliero v. Wallace China.151 The
court concluded that the pattern was functional and therefore could not be
protected against imitation under the rubric of unfair competition.152 In
embracing a broad, and not-incidentally efficient, interpretation of
functionality, the court acknowledged that a defendant might be able to
compete by creating its own designs, but held that this was irrelevant. The
court stated, “[t]he law encourages competition not only in creativeness but in
economy of manufacture and distribution as well.”153 As time passed, trade
dress plaintiffs repeatedly challenged this sensible ruling until finally, the Third
Circuit rejected this efficient interpretation of functionality and replaced it with
its own narrow, inefficient interpretation.154 In doing so, the Third Circuit
considered only one side of the competitive balance. Its reasoning insisted that

Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. Lenel, Inc., 181 F.2d 3, 4–5 (5th Cir. 1950) (recognizing that “there can be no
trade-mark in a package, the shape of a bottle, or a letter of the alphabet”).
149. See Ex parte Haig & Haig, Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229, 230–31 (Comm’r Pat. 1958).
150. Commissioner Leeds resorts to this substitute for reasoning twice. See Ex parte Haig &
Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229, 230 (Comm’r Pat. 1958) (stating that “[t]he fundamental
question, then, is not whether or not containers are registrable on the Principal Register, but it is
whether or not what is presented is a trademark—a symbol or device—identifying applicant’s goods
and distinguishing them from those of others.”); id. at 231 (stating that “the contour or conformation of
the container may be a trademark—a symbol or device—which distinguishes the applicant’s goods,
and it may be registrable on the Principal Register.”).
151. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
152. Id. at 343.
153. Id. at 344.
154. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981).
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only competition in creating new designs mattered.155 The court simply ignored
the need for competition in the manufacture and distribution of goods.156
Similarly absurd arguments have proven persuasive in inefficiently
broadening the infringement standard. For example, to justify the recognition
of post-sale or “onlooker” confusion, courts have pointed to, first, the statutory
language protecting against confusion “in commerce,” and second, to
Congress’s 1962 amendment of the infringement standard.157 Both arguments
are flawed.
The “in commerce” language has been part of the infringement standard
since the Trademark Act of 1881.158 By including this language, Congress did
not intend to provide a basis for a court a century later to recognize post-sale
confusion as actionable. Rather, Congress included this language in the 1881
Act, and in every subsequent Act, to tie federal trademark protection to
Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.159 Congress did so because
the Court, in its 1879 decision in The Trade-mark Cases, held that the Patent
and Copyright Clause did not provide a basis for federal trademark
legislation.160 Congress needed to clarify that it was acting under its Commerce
Clause authority and therefore repeatedly included “in commerce” language at
a number of points in subsequent Acts.161 The language is thus jurisdictional
and should not serve as a basis for expanding the infringement standard to
encompass post-sale confusion.
The citation to the 1962 Housekeeping Amendment as a basis for
recognizing post-sale confusion is equally problematic.162 In the 1962
Amendment, Congress amended the infringement standard for registered
trademarks by deleting the italicized phrase in the following excerpt:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant—
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the
155. Id.
156. See id. (criticizing Pagliero on the grounds that it “provides a disincentive for
development of imaginative and attractive design. The more appealing the design, the less protection it
would receive.”).
157. See, e.g., Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991) (mistakenly referring to
the Amendments at issue as the 1967 Amendments, rather than the 1962 Amendments); Rolex Watch
U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 492 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
158. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502, 502.
159. See, e.g., United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86,
92–93 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that the “in commerce” language was added to track Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority).
160. 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (holding Congress did not have authority to enact a trademark act
under the Patent and Copyright Clause, article I, section 8, clause 8).
161. For example, in the current trademark statute, in addition to appearing in section 1114(a),
“in commerce” appears in more than twenty other provisions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(a)(1),
(a)(2), (a)(3)(C), (b)(1), (b)(3)(C), (c), (d), (d)(1), (d)(2), 1052(d), (f), 1057, 1058(b), 1062, 1065,
1091(a), 1125(a)(1), 1126(d)(2), 1115(a), (b), 1127, 1141, 1141(h) (2016).
162. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 469–75.
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sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive purchasers as to the
source or origin of such products or services.163
Although, when read in isolation, the plain language of the Amendment might
suggest that Congress intended to expand the infringement standard quite
sharply to encompass confusion of any sort, even a superficial review in
context suggests a far more limited change. As the “Housekeeping” title
immediately suggests, Congress intended the Amendment to be largely nonsubstantive.164 As Congress explained in the legislative history, and as is
revealed by the other changes the Amendment made, Congress’s principal
purpose was to ensure consistency in the language used to express the
likelihood of confusion standard in the four provisions where it appeared in the
Act.165 Before the Amendment, these four provisions had used the same
likelihood of confusion standard, but had expressed it in three different
ways.166 While Congress did intend the deletion of the word “purchasers” to
expand the infringement standard to include a focus on prospective purchasers
as well, Congress also intended to retain trademark’s traditional focus on
confusion among purchasers, whether actual or prospective, as to source.167
Nevertheless, beginning some ten years after the Housekeeping
Amendment was enacted, courts decided that Congress had intended to effect a

163. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a)(1) (2016) (emphasis added).
164. The Senate Report accompanying the Amendments stated:
The purpose of this [1962 Amendment] is to make a number of miscellaneous changes in
the Trademark Act of 1946 so as to clarify the meaning of several of its provisions. The
provisions of the bill affect details of registration, administrative and court procedure,
internal organization of the Patent Office regarding trademark matters, and refinements in
language that experience has shown to be desirable. It also corrects typographical errors in
the Trademark Act of 1946.
S. REP. NO. 87-2107 (1962), as reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2844.
165. In addition to appearing in section 32 of the Act, a likelihood of confusion standard also
appears in sections 1, 2, and 16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052, 1066, 1114 (2016).
166. Before the Amendment, the infringement standard in section 1114 defined likelihood of
confusion in terms of whether a mark “is likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers
as to the source or origin of such goods or services.” See S. REP. NO. 87-2107 (1962), as reprinted in
1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2850. Section 1 of the Act required an applicant to certify that the mark did not
create a likelihood of confusion with a preexisting mark. Id. at 2847. Before the Amendment, the
relevant provision, section 1051(a)(1)(A), defined likelihood of confusion in terms of whether a mark
was “in such near resemblance thereto as might be calculated to deceive.” Id. Section 2 barred the
registration of a mark that created a likelihood of confusion with a previously registered mark, and
section 16 authorized an interference where a mark created a likelihood of confusion with a previously
registered mark. Before the Amendment, these sections defined the standard in terms of whether a
mark so resembled another’s prior mark “as to be likely . . . to cause confusion or mistake or to
deceive purchasers.” See id. at 2845, 2847, 2850; see also Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note
2, at 470–75 (explaining the circumstances behind the 1962 Housekeeping Amendment).
167. S. REP. No. 87-2107 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2845, 2847, 2850; see also
Lunney, The Trade Dress Emperor, supra note 1, at 469–76.
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far more radical expansion in the infringement standard.168 Noting how the
Amendment changed the plain language of the infringement standard, but
ignoring the context, the “Housekeeping” title, and the legislative history,
courts simply asserted that Congress intended the Housekeeping Amendment
to recognize confusion “of any kind” as actionable.169
The role of trademark defense counsel, and their failure to make the
appropriate arguments in lower courts, contributes a great deal to this kind of
inefficient rulemaking at the judicial level. Courts initially interpreted the 1962
Housekeeping Amendment to encompass confusion of any sort without citing
the legislative history or explaining the context in which the Amendment was
adopted, presumably because defense counsel did not raise the issue.170
Similarly, when the Eighth Circuit first recognized federal trade dress
protection under section 43(a), defense counsel missed a crucial opportunity to
argue that Congress amended the provision before its enactment in 1943 to
include the “symbol or device” language precisely to bar trade dress protection.
Instead, defense counsel made the somewhat fatuous argument that the Court’s
decisions in two state law unfair competition law cases preempted the
availability of federal trade dress protection.171 Apparently, defense counsel
mistakenly believed that one federal law, the Patent Act, could preempt another
federal law.
Alternatively, consider Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.172 In
determining whether federal trade dress protection should require proof of
secondary meaning, defense counsel again failed to argue that Congress
168. See Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971); see
also James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir. 1976); Bos. Prof’l
Hockey Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); Rolex Watch U.S.A. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 492–93, 492 n.2
(S.D. Fla. 1986); Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 694, 694 n.10
(N.D. Ga. 1976).
169. For example, the Syntex Laboratories court simply asserted, without offering any support
or analysis, that:
In its original form, the federal infringement section required a showing that the alleged
infringer’s use ‘is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive purchasers
as to the source of origin of such goods or services.’ 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). (Emphasis
supplied.) In amending that section in 1962, Congress eliminated the italicized, qualifying
language, thereby evincing a clear purpose to outlaw the use of trademarks which are likely
to cause confusion, mistake, or deception of any kind, not merely of purchasers nor simply
as to source of origin.
437 F.2d at 568.
170. Various defense counsel repeatedly had the opportunity to make these arguments, but did
not do so. See, e.g., James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir.
1976); Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975); Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437
F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971); Rolex Watch U.S.A. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 492–93, 492 n.2 (S.D.
Fla. 1986); Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A&A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 694, 694 n.10 (N.D.
Ga. 1976).
171. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1214–16 (8th Cir. 1976).
172. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
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expressly excluded protection for trade dress under the Lanham Act.173 As a
result, when the Court asked why there was no express secondary meaning
requirement for trade dress in the registration provision of the Act,174 defense
counsel responded with its own pet theory. Specifically, counsel for Two Pesos
argued that while trade dress could receive protection initially without a
showing of secondary meaning, it would lose protection if it did not develop
secondary meaning in a reasonable time.175 The Court rejected the argument, as
it should have, given that the argument lacks any textual basis, policy
justification, or common law antecedent. The Court did not discuss, and
defense counsel apparently did not present, the correct argument: There was
and still is no secondary meaning requirement for the registration of trade
dress, just as there was no functionality limitation on the registration of trade
dress at the time,176 because Congress, in enacting the Lanham Act in 1946,
had expressly prohibited the registration of trade dress on the principal register.
Because Congress had expressly barred substantive trade dress protection, there
was no need for a secondary meaning requirement or a functionality limitation
in the statute.
Having failed to make these arguments when the issue was initially
presented, stare decisis made it very difficult to correct them afterwards.
Moreover, judges and justices have been reluctant to admit their mistakes. So
when counsel for Walmart in Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Brothers pointed out
that the premises on which Two Pesos was decided were fundamentally
flawed,177 the Court did not take the opportunity to correct its earlier mistake in
Two Pesos. Instead, the Court merely restricted the reach of Two Pesos’ flawed
holding that trade dress could be inherently distinctive to only those cases
where the asserted trade dress consisted of product packaging rather than

173. Id. at 771 (noting that defense counsel “recognize[ed] that a general requirement of
secondary meaning impose[d] ‘an unfair prospect of theft [or] financial loss’ . . . [and] Petitioner
argue[d] that such protection [without proof of secondary meaning] should be only temporary and
subject to defeasance when over time the dress has failed to acquire secondary meaning”).
174. Id. at 774 (stating that “[w]here secondary meaning does appear in the statute, 15 U.S.C. §
1052 (1982 ed.), it is a requirement that applies only to merely descriptive marks . . . .”). The Court’s
assertion is incorrect, or at least, incomplete. For registration on the principal register, sections 2(e) and
2(f), read in conjunction, currently require proof of secondary meaning for trademarks which are: (i)
merely descriptive; (ii) deceptively misdescriptive; (iii) primarily merely a surname; and (iv) primarily
geographically descriptive. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), (f) (2016).
175. Id. at 771 (noting that “[p]etitioner argues that such protection [without proof of secondary
meaning] should be only temporary and subject to defeasance when over time the dress has failed to
acquire secondary meaning.”).
176. Congress added a functionality limitation to section 2 six years later, in 1998. See
Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 150-330, § 201(a)(2)(A)(ii), 112 Stat. 3064,
3069 (1998), (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2016)).
177. See Brief for Petitioner at 15, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000)
(No. 99-150), 1999 WL 1045142 (citing Lunney, Trademark Monopolies).
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product design.178 Where a party sought to protect product design as trade
dress, the Wal-Mart Court required proof of secondary meaning, or as the
Court called it, “acquired distinctiveness.”179
D. Exceptions for Exceptional Cases
Before proceeding to a more careful examination of why judicial decision
making in trademark law has gone awry, I should acknowledge that the
evolution of trademark law has not been entirely one-sided. Courts have
occasionally decided cases in ways that limit or otherwise cut back on the
otherwise expanding scope of trademark protection. Examples include, inter
alia: (i) the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Brothers
requiring proof of secondary meaning for product design trade dress;180 (ii) the
Second Circuit’s decision in Rogers v. Grimaldi181 sharply narrowing the
trademark infringement standard as against movie titles, specifically, and the
titles of creative works, more generally; and (iii) the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing creating the nominative
fair use defense.182 Each of these doctrinal developments rejected attempts to
broaden the scope of trademark protection.
Yet, rather than provide grounds for comfort, these decisions suggest a
second problem with trademark’s judicial evolution: undue complexity.
Because of stare decisis and a judicial reluctance to admit mistakes, later courts
are unlikely to use these cases to cut back on the general expansion in
trademark protection. Instead, they create exceptions to trademark’s general
rules that apply only to particular defendants in particular cases. For example,
as discussed, in Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., the Court was presented
with an opportunity to correct its mistake in Two Pesos. Yet, the Court refused
to do so. Instead, the Wal-Mart Court divided trade dress into product design
and product packaging. It then required proof of secondary meaning only for
product design trade dress.183 By doing so, the Court introduced unnecessary
complexity into the law. The Court also failed to provide guidance to
distinguish between packaging and design, which only made the new
complexity even more intractable.184

178. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (requiring proof of secondary
meaning for product design trade dress, but leaving intact Two Pesos rule for product packaging trade
dress).
179. Id. at 211–16.
180. 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
181. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
182. 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
183. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 215.
184. See id. at 212, 215 (offering two examples, the Tide detergent bottle and the Coke bottle,
to illustrate the line between product design and product packaging, and a tie-breaking presumption
that if trade dress could be considered either design or packaging, it should be considered design).
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Similarly, in Rogers and New Kids, the Second and Ninth Circuits created
exceptions when they faced cases where the expanding scope of trademark’s
infringement standard created absurd or otherwise unacceptable results. Unlike
the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, which was not bound by stare decisis,
the panels of the Second and Ninth Circuit were bound in these two cases. By
the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Rogers and New Kids arose, courts had
accepted implied endorsement theories of infringement. Endorsement theory
allowed courts to find actionable trademark infringement even where only
small numbers of consumers believed that a trademark owner gave permission
to or endorsed the use of its trademark by another.185 Given that broad scope,
neither panel could easily or simply rule that there was no likelihood of
confusion on the facts before them.186 Moreover, given stare decisis, the panels
could not cut back on the implied endorsement theory generally, at least not
without en banc rehearing. As a result, although Judge Kozinski cited earlier
Ninth Circuit cases as a basis for his opinion in New Kids, including
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church from 1969187 and Smith v.
Chanel, Inc. from 1968,188 neither of those cases recognized a nominative fair
use defense. Rather, both found no actionable likelihood of confusion.189
Unfortunately, given the judicial broadening of the implied endorsement theory
through the 1970s and 1980s, by 1992, that path was no longer available to
Judge Kozinski. Instead, to rule for the defendants at the summary judgment
stage, Judge Kozinski in New Kids and the Second Circuit panel in Rogers had
to create specific defenses and exceptions tied to the facts of their cases. And
so they did, with the Rogers court creating a special trademark infringement
rule for movie titles, and Judge Kozinski creating the nominative fair use
defense.
Despite exonerating the specific defendants for the specific conduct at
issue in the two cases, these new doctrines added both unpredictability and

185. This theory initially arose in the Vogue hat case and expanded radically in Boston
Professional Hockey. Some courts found actionable infringement based on consumers’ belief that the
defendant needed permission for the use of the mark. Compare Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci
Pubs., 28 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding actionable trademark infringement based on a survey
that asked whether respondents believed that the defendant “did have to get” Anheuser-Busch’s
permission), with Nat’l Football League Props., Inc. v. ProStyle, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1018 (E.D.
Wis. 1998) (rejecting a survey that asked a similar “did need to get permission” question on the
grounds that it improperly asked respondents for a legal conclusion). Other courts also found
actionable infringement when the plaintiff “went along with” the defendant’s use. See Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding actionable trademark
infringement for defendant’s use of slogan “Mutant of Omaha” on t-shirts where 10 percent of survey
respondents believed that Mutual of Omaha ‘“goes along’ with” the defendant’s use).
186. In Rogers, in particular, the plaintiff presented both survey evidence that confusion was
likely and evidence of actual confusion among the film’s publicists. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001,
1001 n.8.
187. 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969).
188. 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
189. Volkswagenwerk, 411 F.2d at 352; Smith v. Chanel, 402 F.2d at 569.
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complexity to trademark law. In terms of unpredictability, when a circuit court
creates a new defense or exception, an attorney can do little better than guess
whether another circuit court will adopt it, and if so, in what form. For
example, the Second and Third Circuits have adopted the nominative fair use
defense, but both have modified it. While the Third Circuit modified the
doctrine only slightly,190 the Second modified it far more substantially.191 The
Sixth Circuit has so far rejected nominative fair use entirely.192
In terms of complexity, while complexity in trademark rules can improve
our ability to match actual to optimal outcomes, complexity also increases the
cost of trademark litigation. These increased costs have led, and will continue
to lead, to a two-tiered trademark system: one system for those who can afford
it, and a second for those who cannot. For those who can afford it, a complex
legal system can produce reasonably sensible, albeit expensive, outcomes. For
the far larger number of market participants who can no longer afford
trademark litigation, theoretically perfect but complex trademark rules offer
only theoretical justice. In reality, for those who cannot afford to marshal them,
such rules offer no justice at all. Unable to afford the high costs of trademark
litigation, these market participants can neither vindicate their own trademark
interests when infringed by others, nor defend themselves against excessive
and overbroad assertion of trademark rights by well-funded bullies.193
II.
THE REASONS WHY: HOW PROCESS CONTROLS SUBSTANCE
The judicial evolution of trademark law has made it both inefficient and
unduly complex. Although judicial decisions have driven this evolution,
Congress has played a role as well. In enacting the Trademark Act of 1946,
Congress stated that it intended trademark law to serve two masters: consumers
and trademark owners.194 Unfortunately, Congress gave only one of these
masters a voice in the judicial evolution of trademark law. While consumers

190. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lending Tree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005).
191. See Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823 F.3d 153
(2d Cir. 2016) (recognizing the concerns behind the nominative fair use doctrine, but rather than
recognize it as a standalone defense as the Third and Ninth Circuits did, the court incorporated the
three nominative fair use considerations as additional factors in the likelihood of confusion analysis).
192. See PACCAR Inc. v. Telescan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003).
193. For discussions of the rise of trademark bullies, see Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming
Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625; Kenneth L. Port, Open Letter to Director David Kappos of
the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 13 (2011).
194. See S. Rep. No. 1333, at 3 (1946), noting that
[t]he purpose underlying [the Lanham Act] is twofold. One is to protect the public so it may
be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably
knows, it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner
of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product,
he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the
well-established rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark owner.
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play many important roles in trademark litigation,195 “litigant” is not one of
them. Only trademark owners, not consumers, have standing to participate in
trademark litigation.196 Consumers’ interests are represented, to the extent they
are represented at all, only by proxy.
Given this imbalance, it is entirely unsurprising that trademark law has
come to cater to trademark owners—the master who has a voice in the
system—and to ignore the best interests of consumers—the master who has
none. By setting up litigation as a dispute between trademark plaintiffs and
trademark defendants, and omitting consumers entirely, Congress has
facilitated a common law evolutionary path for trademark law driven by
selection, activity, and framing biases. Given these biases, the de-evolution of
trademark law was inevitable. We now turn to a discussion of these biases.
A. How Self-Interest Can Lead to Inefficient Legal Rules
For years, law and economics scholars argued that the common law
development of legal doctrine was more likely to lead to efficient rules than the
politics of the legislature, whose outcomes are largely driven by interest
groups.197 In theory, public choice considerations would drive legislation.

195. For example, consumer understanding determines whether a word or phrase is distinctive
and thus entitled to protection as a trademark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2016) (stating that “[t]he
primary significance of the registered mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser motivation
shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name of goods or
services on or in connection with which it has been used.”). Similarly, trademark’s infringement
standard focuses on whether a defendant’s use is likely to confuse consumers. See also Multi Time
Mach., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2015) (identifying that “‘[t]he core
element of trademark infringement’ is whether the defendant’s conduct ‘is likely to confuse customers
about the source of the products.’” (quoting E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280,
1290 (9th Cir.1992))); Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 776 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that
“[t]herefore, the relevant inquiry is whether Plaintiff’s mark is strong enough outside of Los Angeles
to give rise to a likelihood of confusion among consumers of Dantanna’s restaurant services in
Atlanta.”)
196. See Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 689–92 (2d Cir. 1971) (ruling
that consumers do not have standing under section 43(a)). See also Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co.,
86 F.3d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding in light of the “pro-competitive purpose language found in
§ 45,” most courts agree that “consumers fall outside the range of ‘reasonable interests’ contemplated
as protected by the false advertising prong of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act”); Serbin v. Ziebart
Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1177 (3d Cir.1993) (same).
197. See, e.g., 1 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER (1973);
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 6 (1979)
(indicating that inefficient rules “will be progressively ignored and eventually forgotten” over time
while the efficient rules remain); BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW (1961); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 329 (1972) (noting that “[t]here is abundant evidence that
legislative regulation of the economy frequently, perhaps typically, brings about less efficient results
than the market-common law system of resource allocation.”); John C. Goodman, An Economic
Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. LEG. STUD. 393 (1978); George L. Priest, The Common
Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 65 (1977); Rubin, supra note 6.
Although an early proponent of the theory of the efficiency of common law evolution, Judge Posner is
reportedly now “distinctly skeptical” of the claim that the common law favors rules that ensure
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Concentrated interest groups would hold collective action and transaction cost
advantages over opposing dispersed interest groups. Thus, the disproportionate
voice of concentrated interest groups would persuade the legislature to pass
laws that generated rents for those groups, but reduced social welfare as a
whole. In contrast, the judicial process—the theory goes—would not fall prey
to the collective action advantages that plague the legislative process. If a party
sued or was sued, it would have the same legal right to appearance and
representation as any other party. The collective action advantage of
concentrated interest groups would therefore be nullified because they could
not have outsized influence in the courts. As a result, courts could more readily
identify and adopt efficient legal rules, and if they occasionally made a
mistake, they would recognize it. This would lead inefficient legal rules to be
“progressively ignored and eventually forgotten” over time.198
Yet, in trademark law, the exact opposite has occurred. Congress enacted
a reasonably efficient statute in the Trademark Act of 1946, but courts
reinterpreted it into an inefficient and sometimes-incoherent morass. To
understand why requires a more careful examination of the law and economics
arguments supporting efficient common law evolution.
In the 1970s, two schools of thought developed to explain why the
common law process would lead to efficient legal rules. One group of scholars,
including Paul Rubin and George Priest, argued that the nature of the common
law process itself, like the invisible hand of the market, inevitably leads to
efficient legal rules, whether judges seek efficiency or not (the “nonmotivational” approach).199 A second group, including Richard Posner, posited
that judges, consciously or unconsciously, seek efficient rules (the
“motivational” approach).200 Yet, each of these approaches faces difficulties.201
economic efficiency. Jurgen G. Backhaus, Efficient Statute Law, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 24 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
198. KRONMAN & POSNER, supra note 197, at 6.
199. See Rubin, supra note 6; Priest, supra note 197. See also Goodman, supra note 197.
200. See POSNER, supra note 197; See also Cooter & Kornhauser, supra note 6; Goodman,
supra note 197 (proposing that litigation should lead to efficient common law rules so long as the
private interests of the parties correlate with the corresponding social interests because the party with
more at stake will spend more on litigation, and thus have a better chance of prevailing).
201. The literature on these issues is extensive. Works that explore the proposition include:
FRANCESCO PARISI & VINCY FON, THE ECONOMICS OF LAWMAKING 85–88 (2009); PAUL H. RUBIN,
BUSINESS FIRMS AND THE COMMON LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF EFFICIENT RULES 14 (1983);
MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW
464–67 (2009); Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic
Analysis, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 519 (2006); Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Litigation and the
Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model, 116 PUB. CHOICE 419 (2003); Vincy Fon, Francesco
Parisi & Ben Depoorter, Litigation, Judicial Path-Dependence, and Legal Change, 20 EUR. J.L. &
ECON. 43 (2005); Goodman, supra note 197; R. Peter Terrebonne, A Strictly Evolutionary Model of
Common Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 397 (1981); Georg von Wangenheim, The Evolution of JudgeMade Law, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 381 (1993). On the role of precedent in promoting the
development of efficient legal rules, see Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of
Common Law, 115 J. POL. ECON. 43 (2007); Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Overruling and the
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Under the non-motivational approach, the essential insight is that private
parties will choose to litigate when it is in their self-interest to do so.202 So long
as the parties’ self-interests correspond to the broader public interest at stake,
we should expect to see more litigation challenging inefficient legal rules, and
less, or ideally, no litigation challenging efficient legal rules. As a result, even
if judges do little more than flip a coin, judicial decisions together with the
parties’ decisions of whether to litigate or settle, should improve the efficiency
of legal rules.203
Economics professor Paul Rubin, for example, has argued that parties
would have stronger incentives to challenge inefficient legal rules than to
challenge efficient ones.204 To support his argument, he presented a basic
model of the choice between settlement and litigation in the context of an
accident involving hypothetical parties A and B. In his model, each party will
incur cost C if they litigate. Both parties have the same expectation as to the
likely outcome in the case, where R is the probability that B will win. If B wins,
A will pay B a sum of money, X. In addition, both parties are interested in how
the decision in this case will affect similar disputes between them that may
arise in the future. For example, if A wins the present case, A will win similar
future cases with B as well. As a result, A will no longer incur a future stream
of payments, with a present value TA, consisting of the cost of precautions to
avoid future liability and payments to B for those accidents that nevertheless
occur. Instead, B will incur a stream of future costs, with a present value TB,
consisting of the cost of precautions to avoid accidents in the future and the
cost of those accidents that nevertheless occur.
Given these assumptions, the value VA of litigation to A is:
VA = R(-X) + (1-R)*TA - C
(1)
and the value of litigation to B is:
VB = R(X) + (1-R)*(-TB) - C.
(2)
The parties will settle, rather than litigate, if:
VA > VB .
(3)
Substituting for VA and VB, and simplifying the result, Rubin’s model
suggests that the parties will litigate if and only if:

Instability of Law, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 309 (2007); Thomas J. Miceli, Legal Change: Selective
Litigation, Judicial Bias, and Precedent, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 157 (2009).
202. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979).
203. See Priest, supra note 197; Rubin, supra note 6; see also Cooter & Kornhauser, supra note
6, at 145 (showing that if every rule but the best rule is challenged, then eventually the legal system
tends toward a stable state in which the best rule always prevails).
204. Rubin, supra note 6, at 55 (stating that “[w]e have thus shown that if rules are inefficient,
parties will use the courts until the rules are changed; conversely, if rules are efficient, the courts will
not be used and the efficient rule will remain in force.”).
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(1-R)(TA - TB) > 2C. 205
(4)
In his analysis, Rubin assumed that the legal rule presently favors B, and
thus R > 0.5.206 From an efficiency perspective, the legal rule should seek to
minimize the stream of future costs—that is, it should impose liability on the
lower cost avoider.207 Thus, if TA > TB, the legal rule should impose liability on
B. If TB > TA, the legal rule should impose liability on A. Given this set-up, if
the rule imposes liability on A and is also efficient, then TB > TA, and equation
(4) will never be satisfied.208 As a result, parties will always settle, rather than
litigate, when the legal rule is efficient, and the efficient legal rule will remain
in place. On the other hand, if the rule imposes liability on A and is inefficient
(TA > TB), then litigation becomes more likely. That is, the more inefficient the
legal rule is, the more likely litigation becomes.209 As Rubin explains:
If the parties go to court, B will probably win, since both parties agree
that R > .5. However, whenever this situation arises in the future A will
again go to court. At some point, some court will find in favor of A; at
this point, the law has been changed and is now efficient. From that
time on, precedents will favor A in comparable cases.210

205. There is a math error in Rubin’s equations. The second expression, (1-R)*TA, does not
represent the value A captures from litigating. If R remains unchanged, then A will continue to incur
(1-R)*TA—regardless if A litigates or settles. The value from litigating, rather than settling, comes
from the possibility that litigation may change R in future cases. Thus, Rubin should have used the
change in R from litigating in setting the value of litigating to A, VA = R(-X) + (-ΔR)*TA – C, and
similarly for B. Thus, equation (4) should be: (ΔR)(TB – TA) > 2C. Indeed, in a more realistic model, we
should define TA and TB as functions of R, rather than as constants. Getting the model correct would
confirm Rubin’s intuition in ways that Rubin’s own equation does not. The parties would still choose
to litigate if they could expect litigation to lead towards a more efficient rule, i.e. decrease B’s chance
of winning if B is the lower cost avoider, or increase B’s chance of winning if B is the higher cost
avoider. By using ΔR, instead of (1-R), in equation (4), the correct solution can be satisfied whether B
is the lower or higher cost avoider. If B is the higher cost avoider, then we want to shift liability to A
and want litigation when litigation will shift liability towards A. This occurs when ΔR is positive. The
correct equation (4) shows that such litigation can occur where both (TB-TA) and ΔR are positive. If B
is the lower cost avoider, then we may still want litigation if it will shift liability towards B. This
occurs when ΔR is negative. Again, correcting Rubin’s equation allows room for such litigation when
both (TB-TA) and ΔR are negative. In contrast, in Rubin’s equation (4), (1-R) is always positive. Thus,
equation (4) can only be satisfied if A is the lower cost avoider. As a result, while Rubin’s intuitions
are correct, his model does not mathematically support them.
206. See Rubin, supra note 6, at 54.
207. Id.
208. This illustrates one of the flaws in Rubin’s specification of the model: if TB > TA equation
(4) will never be satisfied because (1-R) is always positive. Rubin’s model improperly suggests that
the parties will always settle rather than litigate if A is the lower cost avoider. At the same time, if B is
the lower cost avoided by a large margin, TA > TB,, then the parties are likely to litigate even if the legal
rule is efficient, i.e. 0 < R < 0.5.
209. See Rubin, supra note 6, at 54.
210. Id. (emphasis added).
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Moreover, because the new rule is efficient, and hence, TA > TB, B will “not
find it worthwhile to go to court” to challenge the new rule once it has
arrived.211
In short, the parties’ self-interest will lead them to a rule that imposes
liability on the lower cost avoider. If liability is initially imposed on the higher
cost avoider, the higher cost avoider will pursue litigation to change the rule,
and the lower cost avoider will not be able to offer a sufficient sum to settle the
litigation in order to keep the inefficient rule in place. If liability is imposed on
the lower cost avoider, the lower cost avoider might still want, from its own
self-interested perspective, to pursue litigation to shift liability to the higher
cost avoider. However, the higher cost avoider will be able to offer the lower
cost avoider a payment that the lower cost avoider will accept to settle the case
and leave the existing rule in place. Thus, liability will remain on the lower cost
avoider.
Given this framework, Rubin argued that the common law process
produces efficient legal rules. This efficiency comes not from judges, however,
but from the parties’ decisions as to whether to settle or litigate any given case.
As Rubin explained: “An outside observer coming upon this legal rule would
observe that the rule is efficient; but this efficiency occurs because of an
evolutionary process, not because of any particular wisdom on the part of
judges.”212
There are weaknesses, however, to Rubin’s approach. First, even if we
were to accept Rubin’s framework, Rubin’s model does not predict that the
common law process will lead to an efficient legal rule in every case. Rather, as
Rubin himself recognized, it predicts that the common law process will lead to
an efficient rule if and only if both parties are interested in how a decision in
the present case will affect similar disputes in the future.213 If only one party is
interested in the case as precedent, Rubin’s model predicts that “there will be
pressure for precedents to evolve in favor of that party which does have a stake
in future cases, whether or not this is the efficient solution.”214
His model thus offers one possible explanation for the inefficiency of
trademark law: as repeat players seeking the rents that inefficient
interpretations of trademark law offer, trademark plaintiffs have an interest in
the common law development of trademark law that typical trademark
defendants lack. As a result, trademark plaintiffs continue to litigate each time
211. Id. In essence, in such a case, A and B switch places, and just as A would settle and avoid
litigation if the legal rule favored B and was efficient, B would also settle rather than litigate if the rule
favored A and was efficient.
212. Id at 55.
213. Id.; see also Goodman, supra note 197 (suggesting that the common law will develop in
favor of the party who spends more resources on winning the case, and arguing that this will lead to
the development of efficient legal rules if and only if higher expenditures correspond to the efficient
rule).
214. Rubin, supra note 6, at 55.
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an issue arises until finally they manage to persuade a court to give them the
legal rule that they want. Potential defendants then largely accede to the new
rule because the rents any given defendant could capture through a successful
legal challenge are insufficient to pay for the challenge itself.
A second weakness of Rubin’s approach is that his welfare conclusions do
not extend beyond the tort law example on which he based his model. In the
tort law context, the parties’ self-interests are a function of the future stream of
payments either party will incur to limit accidents, and their self-interested
resolution of the dispute turns ultimately on which party can avoid accidents at
a lower cost. As it happens, in this particular context, this same consideration—
which party can avoid the accident at a lower cost—also defines the efficient
legal rule. In order to perfectly align the self-interest of the parties with the
public interest in an efficient legal rule, all we need to assume is that the cost of
avoidance for our particular plaintiff and defendant are typical or representative
of other similarly situated plaintiffs and defendants.
Even if we accept the welfare implications of Rubin’s model for tort
litigation, his analysis and conclusions do not apply directly to parties’
decisions of whether to litigate or settle trademark cases. This is because in
trademark litigation, parties decide whether to settle or litigate based upon their
expected chance of success and the producer surplus they will capture by
winning. If we follow Rubin’s model and reasoning, we come to the conclusion
that trademark law will evolve towards the rule of higher producer surplus,
rather than higher efficiency.
Consider a simple example. Assume that there is a market that is
competitive under existing trademark law.215 The goods being sold in the
market generate total surplus of one hundred units. This total surplus is divided
between consumers and eleven competitors in the market. Because the market
is competitive, prices are low and each consumer can choose the version of the
good that he or she finds most satisfying. As a result, most of the surplus in the
market—we will assume eighty units—flows to consumers. The remaining
twenty units flow to the eleven competitors as producer surplus. Although the
market is competitive, there is a dominant firm that captures ten units of the
surplus; the remaining ten competitors capture one unit of surplus each. The
dominant firm is considering trademark litigation against one of its smaller
competitors. Maybe it seeks an expansive interpretation of trade dress
protection; or maybe it seeks an expansive interpretation of infringement. In
either event, the dominant firm seeks to persuade a court to change trademark
law: specifically, to broaden it. If the dominant firm prevails in the litigation,
all ten competitors would have to leave the market, not just the particular
defendant in the litigation. Therefore, if the dominant firm prevails in the

215. Moreover, I will assume that the remainder of the economy satisfies the assumptions of the
perfect competition model so that partial equilibrium analysis is appropriate.
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litigation, the market would no longer be competitive. Prices would rise.
Consumer choice would be reduced. As competitors leave the market, the
dominant firm would capture more of the available surplus—let’s assume fifty
units. The firm’s ten former competitors would leave the market and capture
none. Additionally, higher prices would impose a deadweight loss of twentyfive units. Thus, because of both higher prices and reduced choice, consumer
surplus would fall from eighty units to twenty-five units. Total surplus would
also fall, from one hundred units with narrow trademark protection and
competition, to seventy-five units with broad trademark protection and
monopoly. Ultimately, because of the fall in total surplus, assuming all else
remains constant, the broad interpretation of trademark law is inefficient and
undesirable. Nevertheless, if litigation costs one unit, the dominant firm, acting
as a rational profit-maximizing entity, would file the lawsuit and refuse to settle
if it had more than a 5 percent chance of persuading a court to adopt the broad
interpretation.216 Moreover, despite the efficiency of existing trademark law,
none of the competing firms could afford litigation to defend it. If sued, they
would settle and leave the market. Indeed, as soon as the threat of litigation
became real, they would leave the market on their own. Consumers, on the
other hand, would like to defend the existing rule, but do not have standing.
Even if they did, collective action problems would likely limit their
effectiveness. As a result, the dominant firm would keep suing until a court
adopted its desired interpretation, and trademark law would become
inefficient.217 Once it did, no competitor would have sufficient incentive to
challenge the inefficient rule. It would therefore remain in place.
As the example suggests, when Rubin’s analysis is applied to trademark,
parties’ decisions of whether to litigate or settle will lead trademark law to
evolve towards the rule of the highest producer surplus. If the existing legal
rule generates lower producer surplus for a defendant than the alternative rule
would generate for the plaintiff, then the plaintiff will pursue litigation to
change the rule, and the defendant will not be able to offer a settlement
payment sufficient to persuade the plaintiff to forego the litigation. Just as
predicted in Rubin’s model, sooner or later the plaintiff will win and the rule
will change. In trademark law, once that happens, the new legal rule will
generate higher producer surplus for the plaintiff than the old rule generated for
the defendant. Therefore, a defendant may still want to litigate to capture the
producer surplus offered by the old rule, but the plaintiff will be able to offer
216. Using Rubin’s framework, one of the eleven competitors would offer up one unit to settle
and be allowed to remain in the market. Assuming litigation also costs one unit, the dominant
competitor must expect to win at least two units in remedies for the litigation to be worthwhile. If the
litigation succeeds, then the dominant competitor will capture an additional forty units in rents. Thus, it
needs at least a 5 percent chance of winning those forty units for the expected return to equal at least
two units.
217. Or more likely, the dominant firm would use the threat of trademark litigation to drive its
competitors from the market.
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the defendant worthwhile settlement to leave the new rule in place. Rubin’s
reasoning thus applies directly in this sense.
Rubin’s normative conclusion that this self-interested process leads to
efficient legal rules, however, does not follow in the trademark context. The
efficient legal rule in trademark is not the one that generates only higher
producer surplus, but the one that generates both higher producer and consumer
surplus, combined. Once we go beyond merely redistributing surplus from one
producer to another and offer a trademark plaintiff a higher producer surplus
than the trademark defendants were earning, that increased producer surplus
must come from consumers. To transfer surplus from consumers to a producer
requires higher prices. Higher prices mean deadweight loss and reduced total
surplus. Thus, the rule of higher producer surplus, predicted by the self-interest
of the parties and Rubin’s model as applied to trademark law, is necessarily
inefficient.
The non-motivational approach to deciding trademark cases therefore
would not lead trademark law to evolve efficiently, as some scholars have
posited. To the contrary, further analysis suggests that trademark law will
evolve towards inefficient rules that tend to maximize the profits, or producer
surplus, of trademark owners.
Under the motivational approach, on the other hand, Posner has argued
that the common law process leads to efficient legal rules because judges seek
efficiency.218 The problems with this approach are twofold. First, it is far from
clear that judges seek efficiency. Relatively few legal decisions are phrased in
terms of the efficiency considerations at stake. Rather, they are usually written
using the language of law or morality or fairness or justice. Certainly, there is
some overlap in these concepts, but they are not the same. Second, and more

218. Posner makes the point:
[M]any areas of the law . . . bear the stamp of economic reasoning. Although few judicial
opinions contain explicit references to economic concepts, often the true grounds of legal
decision are concealed rather than illuminated by the characteristic rhetoric of opinions.
Indeed, legal education consists primarily of learning to dig beneath the rhetorical surface
to find those grounds, many of which may turn out to have an economic character. . . . It
would not be surprising to find that legal doctrines rest on inarticulate gropings toward
efficiency, especially when we bear in mind that many of those doctrines date back to the
late eighteenth and the nineteenth century, when a laissez faire ideology based on classical
economics was the dominant ideology of the educated classes in society. . . . Once the
frame of reference is thus expanded beyond the immediate parties to the case, justice and
fairness assume broader meanings than what is just or fair as between this plaintiff and this
defendant. The issue becomes what is a just and fair result for a class of activities, and it
cannot be sensibly resolved without consideration of the impact of alternative rulings on the
frequency of accidents and the cost of accident precautions. The legal and economic
approaches are not so divergent after all.
POSNER, supra note 197, at 21–22.
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importantly, even if judges actively sought to devise and adopt efficient legal
rules, they may be structurally incapable of doing so.219
As a general matter, courts are structurally ill-suited to identify and adopt
efficient legal rules because they have: (1) a very small number of decisionmakers; (2) limited and biased information gathering capacity; (3) a lack of
independent expertise; (4) inability to rule without a case or controversy; (5)
inability to rule when parties choose to settle; and (6) the limitation that a
ruling can resolve only the precise dispute before the court.220 The supposed
advantage of courts relative to legislatures is that courts are insulated from
interest group politics, but as Professor Gillian Hadfield has pointed out, this
advantage “comes at the cost of limited information and consequent bias in the
development of legal rules.”221 Courts can rule only on the cases that come
before them. And while courts have some limited ability to gather information
independently,222 they rely for the most part on the information that the parties
choose to provide them.223
In addition to the selection bias that arises from the parties’ settlement
decisions, activity bias from prior judicial rulings also leads to inefficiency in
trademark law.224 Whenever courts announce a given rule, individuals will
respond to the rule differently depending on their circumstances and
characteristics. Some parties will adjust their conduct to comply with the rule;
others will abandon the conduct at issue altogether; while a third group will
choose to violate the rule.225 These choices will not be random, but the result of
differences between the individuals making the decisions.226 By the nature of
judicial decision making,227 the next time a court revisits an issue, it will

219. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583
(1992); see also Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 149
(2001) (presenting a self-perpetuating model of judicial statutory interpretation where a given
interpretation leads litigants to change their behavior and demonstrate the weaknesses of the
interpretation, which leads a court to articulate a new interpretation, again leading potential litigants to
demonstrate the new interpretation’s weaknesses, and so on).
220. Hadfield, supra note 219, at 604–08.
221. Id. at 615.
222. See FED. R. EVID. 706; see also Hadfield, supra note 219, at 612–14 (noting that judges
can use judicial notice, hypotheticals, and scholarship to broaden the information available to them).
223. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
“Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 684 (1982) (noting that “[s]ince
private litigants have no duty—or strong, personal incentive—to pick and choose the cases they bring
and the arguments they espouse on the basis of their social consequences, we cannot expect them to
apprise the courts fully of the consequences of prospective decisions.”).
224. This analysis draws from Professor Gillian Hadfield’s work. See Hadfield, supra note 219,
at 591–92.
225. Id. at 589–90.
226. Id. at 590–91.
227. Under Article III, a court must await a case or controversy. By necessity, such a case or
controversy can arise only when one party threatens to sue or sues another. A trademark plaintiff can
sue only a violator of trademark law. If a party complies with trademark law or abandons the disputed
conduct, then no trademark litigation will ensue.
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confront one of the violators. Yet, because violators differ systematically from
those who (1) comply with the rule or (2) abandon the conduct at issue, even if
the court could design an ideally efficient rule for the violators, it will not
devise a rule that is efficient for the full range of individuals that the rule
affects.228 Indeed, the court has no real way of gathering information about
those who comply with the rule or abandon the conduct.229 By its own earlier
ruling, the court has eliminated those two groups from its information set, and
restricted the information available to information concerning the violators.
Because the characteristics of violators differ in material ways from the other
two groups, this information set is biased.230 As a result, the court will rule
based upon a biased information set that its earlier ruling created,231 and any
rule the court adopts, even if it actively seeks efficiency, will prove to be
similarly biased.232
On top of the selection and activity bias discussed, making law through
litigation also frames the issue to be decided in a misleading manner: as a
conflict between the parties before the court. These are the parties before the
court; these are the parties that can make arguments and present evidence; these
are the parties the judge will attempt to satisfy.233 In trademark law, the
standing rules implicitly frame the dispute as one between the plaintiff and the
defendant. They further implicitly suggest that the court’s job is to do justice as
between the parties before the court.
While the way in which standing rules frame the dispute may be perfectly
appropriate in torts or contract law, this frame becomes a likely source of error
in trademark litigation for two reasons. First, in trademark disputes, in terms of
efficiency or welfare for society as a whole, the interests of the parties are only
a part of the picture. Usually, consumer welfare should be the overriding
228. Id. at 590–92. One could imagine a more complex set of possibilities where a party tries to
comply with a rule, but violates the rule, because of uncertainty over the application of the rule.
Adding such a category would complicate the analysis, but not in any way alter the conclusion.
229. Id. at 591–92.
230. Id. at 592.
231. If the cases that come before the court remain representative of all possible cases—an
implausible assumption—then one can develop a model in which an efficiency-seeking court produces
efficient legal rules. See Robert Cooter, Lewis Kornhauser & David Lane, Liability Rules, Limited
Information, and the Role of Precedent, 10 BELL J. ECON. 366 (1979).
232. Infra notes 255–260 and accompanying text (discussing the sports merchandising cases
and providing an example of such activity bias arising in trademark law).
233. Although Martin Shapiro and Owen Fiss disagree quite sharply about the nature of judicial
motivation, both agree that the legitimacy and authority of courts come from resolving the dispute
before the court through interaction with the parties. Compare MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A
COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 12–13 (1981) (noting that “most of the conventional
attachment to adversary proceedings is based not on the desire to heighten the level of conflict in
judicial proceedings, but quite the opposite, on the need to have both parties present before the judge if
he is to have any chance of creating a resolution to which both parties will consent”), with Owen M.
Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13
(1979) (stating that “[t]he judge is entitled to exercise power only after he has participated in a
dialogue about the meaning of the public values”).
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consideration. But because consumers are not parties, the litigation frame
encourages courts to overlook or discount the consumer welfare considerations
at stake. Second, even where a court’s ruling matches the efficient outcome for
that case, the same decision and resulting legal principle may prove inefficient
in future cases. A given case may be unrepresentative, and the efficient rule for
resolving that particular case may prove inefficient for the usual run of cases to
which the rule will likely apply.
Consider the expansion of the trademark infringement standard in the
Aunt Jemima and Vogue hat cases. From an efficiency perspective, both
outcomes can be justified. Neither decision prohibited the defendant from
selling its respective product. Both merely forced the defendant to use a nonconfusing mark in doing so. Moreover, the confusion at issue in both cases
seems reasonably likely to have confused consumers in a material fashion. Yet,
the test of a legal ruling is not whether it achieves justice or efficiency in a
particular case, but whether it achieves justice or efficiency over the long run.
Even if they were right on the facts before them, both decisions took important
first steps on the path towards the radically overbroad infringement standard
we have today. From an efficiency perspective, it would have been better for
both plaintiffs to lose. Even if that would have been the inefficient outcome in
those cases, it would have retained the 1905 Act’s far simpler double identity
standard. Of course, the double identity infringement standard would and did
get the answer wrong in some cases. Every legal rule does. But retaining the
double identity standard would have avoided both the parade of false positives
that define trademark litigation today and the undue expense that has made
trademark law a two-tiered system.
Moreover, the trend toward viewing trademarks as property,234 rather than
viewing trademarks as a system for regulating competition, reinforces the
framing bias created by the standing rules of trademark litigation. The view of
trademarks as property encourages courts to ask whether the defendant has
trespassed on the trademark owner’s property. Such an approach necessarily
frames the relevant issue quite differently than would an approach that treats
trademarks as part of a trade regulation system. In the older regime of unfair
competition, fair competition and the imitation necessary to achieve it, served a
properly central role in the legal rules that governed the marketplace.235
Viewing trademarks as property does not.
For these reasons, there is little reason to expect trademark litigation to
lead to efficient legal rules. To the contrary, there is every reason to expect the

234. I have explored the “trademark as property” view and its influence on the development of
trademark law elsewhere. See Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2.
235. See, e.g., Am. Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir. 1959) (stating that
“imitation is the life blood of competition. . . . Unless such duplication is permitted, competition may
be unduly curtailed with the possible resultant development of undesirable monopolistic conditions”).
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common law process to continue to lead, as it has, to trademark rules that are
both inefficient and unduly complex.
B. The Biases in Action: A Case Study of the Merchandising Right
The law and economics approach thus suggests several reasons why the
common law development of trademark doctrine leads to inefficient legal rules.
Its key insight is that parties will litigate only when it is in their self-interest to
do so. Therefore, to the extent that the parties’ self-interests fail to fully capture
the social interests at stake, a selection bias can arise that will bring the wrong
cases to court for judicial resolution.
In trademark law, self-interest will push trademark owners to litigate
cases that will lead to inefficient trademark rules that expand the exclusivity
associated with their marks. While exclusivity does not always mean market
power, it offers the trademark owner at least the possibility of market power
and corresponding rents. And we should expect trademark owners to more
zealously pursue those cases where success offers the chance of market power
and higher rents.
In contrast, it will seldom be in a defendant’s self-interest to litigate cases
that will lead to efficient trademark rules. As discussed previously, if a
defendant prevails, any other would-be competitor can make a similar use
given the legal path the defendant has established.236 A successful defendant
will thus face more direct competition than a successful plaintiff, and will earn
little in the way of rents from prevailing in litigation. Indeed, if success moves
a market from monopoly to competition, we should expect that the combined
profits available to all similarly situated defendants from prevailing in litigation
will be less than those available to the plaintiff from prevailing.237
When a successful trademark defense brings increased competition, the
principal beneficiaries of that increased competition are not the trademark

236. As has been well recognized, this same concern arises in challenging questionable patents.
See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.3d 197, 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that when a
generic defendant prevails in pharmaceutical patent litigation, “consumers, rather than generic
producers, are typically the biggest beneficiaries”); see also Thomas, Patent Bounties, supra note 11.
To solve the problem for pharmaceutical patents, Congress created a specific duopoly incentive
scheme in the Hatch-Waxman Act. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); see also Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for
Pharmaceuticals: Have They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 403–04, 423 (1999) (noting
that “[t]he entire purpose of the 180-day exclusivity provision, at the time it was drafted, was to insure
that one generic competitor would not get a free ride on the litigation effort of another generic
competitor until the party who had borne the cost and risk of litigation had a fair opportunity to recover
its litigation costs”); Lunney, FTC v. Actavis, supra note 11, at 385–88.
237. For that reason, I am skeptical of a system that relies on coerced joinder of all potential
defendants as a means of counterbalancing the asymmetric stakes otherwise generally present in
trademark litigation. See Stein & Parchomovsky, supra note 11, at 1520–30 (proposing such a
scheme).
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defendants, but consumers.238 If a trademark defendant prevails, and the
associated market becomes more competitive, prices will fall. The benefits of
lower prices, however, flow not to the trademark defendant, or other similarly
situated competitors, but to consumers, in the form of enhanced consumer
surplus. This represents a real welfare gain for society. However, because
trademark defendants will not capture this enhanced consumer surplus, they
have no reason to fight for it. To the contrary, we should expect them to settle
even if the consumer welfare gains at stake far exceed the gains available to the
trademark owner and the trademark defendants. Trademark litigation thus
presents asymmetric stakes.
Moreover, those stakes, by omitting the interest of consumers, fail to
reflect the interests of society as a whole. This combination brings the wrong
cases to court for judicial resolution. The same asymmetric stakes also create
an activity bias in how potential trademark plaintiffs and defendants respond to
the legal rules courts create. And by creating those legal rules through litigation
that bars consumers’ direct participation, trademark law incorrectly frames the
issue to be decided.
To illustrate these biases in action, consider, for example, the rise of the
merchandising right in the Boston Professional Hockey decision.239 The first
question is: Why did the trademark owners bring the case? At the time they
filed the lawsuit, they must have believed that they were going to lose. In the
1960s and early 1970s, sales of unauthorized team merchandise were
commonplace; they were indeed the norm. As a result, and as the district court
expressly found, “the usual purchaser, a sports fan in his local sporting goods
store, would not be likely to think that defendant’s emblems were
manufactured by or had some connection with plaintiffs.”240 That fact would
seem to have made the plaintiffs’ chance of success on their trademark claims
vanishingly slim. Yet, the plaintiffs knew that if they could persuade the court
to rule in their favor, they would establish a potentially perpetual licensing
right worth billions.241 For the plaintiffs, even a small chance at those billions
would justify the expense of litigation.242

238. Again, this is well recognized in the analogous situation of challenging questionable
patents. See In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 208 (noting a FTC study that found “that about one year after
market entry an average generic pharmaceutical product takes over ninety percent of the patent
holder’s unit sales and sells for fifteen percent of the price of the name brand product” and concluding
that “[t]his price differential means that consumers, rather than generic producers, are typically the
biggest beneficiaries of generic entry.”) (citation omitted); Lunney, FTC v. Actavis, supra note 11, at
406–08 (estimating that the loss of thirty-four months of patent protection on Prozac cost Eli Lilly
$3.29 billion in discounted net present value; of this, the first generic in the market, Barr Laboratories,
captured just under $300 billion; the remainder went to consumers as surplus).
239. Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
240. Id. at 1012.
241. While a precise estimate of the merchandising right for hockey teams is not available, the
Boston Prof’l Hockey decision became the basis for the licensing of trademarks generally on

1250

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:1195

The second question is: Why did the court adopt the inefficient legal rule?
The district court got it exactly right, finding as a factual matter that consumer
confusion, whether as to source or sponsorship, was unlikely.243 Yet the Fifth
Circuit panel disagreed. It appears that the litigation frame, together with
asymmetric stakes, led the court astray. In justifying its decision, the Fifth
Circuit returned repeatedly to a single point: “the major commercial value of
the emblems is derived from the efforts of plaintiffs.”244 If the question is
simply who, as between plaintiff and defendant, better deserves to capture a
given surplus, the framing “if value then right” may provide a workable
answer. But in trademark litigation, that is not usually the real question. The
surplus available for division is not a given, but depends upon the court’s
resolution of the dispute. The real question then is how a court should rule in
order to ensure the larger total surplus that is associated with a more
competitive market, rather than the smaller total surplus associated with a less
competitive market. To answer that question, “if value then right” is hopelessly
inadequate.245
The framing effect litigation imposes also appeared in the Fifth Circuit’s
alternative justification for its ruling. As a second basis for its decision, the
Fifth Circuit insisted that if it did not expand the plaintiffs’ rights to encompass
the use at issue, then the defendant would obtain the right.246 The panel’s
insistence on this issue is a bit curious. There is no reference in the court’s
opinion to a counterclaim by the defendant, and the district court, after largely
denying the plaintiffs’ claim for relief, did not grant the defendant an injunction
against the plaintiffs’ further sale of team merchandise.247 But the court’s
merchandise. Royalties from that market exceeded $13 billion in 2014. See LIMA Study: Global Retail
Sales of Licensed Goods Hit $241.5B in 2014, INT’L LICENSING INDUS. MERCHANDISERS’ ASS’N
(June 8, 2015), https://www.licensing.org/news/lima-study-global-retail-sales-of-licensed-goods-hit241-5b-in-2014/ [https://perma.cc/YX3X-TCVG].
242. The more interesting question is why the defendant litigated, rather than settled. Indeed,
the defendant even went so far as to file a certiorari petition. See Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc. v.
Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, 423 U.S. 868 (1975) (denying certiorari petition). Presumably, the answer
lies in some combination of a very high chance of success and the value of the defendant’s taskspecific human capital, reflecting the rents that the defendant would earn because of its specialization
in the activity at issue.
243. Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc., et al. v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004,
1012 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
244. Id. at 1011; see also id. at 1012 (noting that “[t]he argument that confusion must be as to
the source of the manufacture of the emblem itself is unpersuasive, where the trademark, originated by
the team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale of the emblem”).
245. See Cohen, supra note 124 (setting forth and then criticizing the “if value, then right”
justification for legal rights).
246. Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, 510 F.2d at 1011 (noting that “defendant sought and ostensibly
would have asserted, if obtained, an exclusive right to make and sell the emblems”).
247. Id. at 1008 (“The district court denied Lanham Act relief and granted only limited relief
for unfair competition, requiring solely that defendant place on the emblems or the package a notice
that the emblems are not authorized by or have not emanated from the plaintiffs. The claim for
damages was denied.”); see also Univ. Book Store v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 33
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (allowing the University of Wisconsin to register a Bucky
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insistence makes somewhat more sense when we consider that the court must
have viewed the dispute as a battle between the plaintiffs and the defendant—if
the plaintiffs did not hold the right, the defendant must. From that view, if the
plaintiffs lose, the defendant must win. Viewing the trademarks at issue as
property reinforces this mistaken perspective; property must belong to
someone.
Asymmetric stakes played a role as well. True, the plaintiffs got lucky and
happened to draw a sympathetic panel in the first case, rather than having to
litigate case after case for ten years as would-be trade dress registrants did.
Nonetheless, given the law of large numbers, such lucky (or from society’s
perspective, unlucky) draws are going to happen. Of course, had the plaintiffs
lost this first case, the monopoly rents potentially available would have drawn
these plaintiffs, or others similarly situated, back. While the unlucky draw
made such repeated litigation unnecessary, the asymmetric stakes nevertheless
influenced this litigation.
Trademark litigation’s generally asymmetric stakes create an ecosystem
around trademarks biased towards the trademark owner’s perspective.
Trademark owners not only have more at stake in particular cases, but
generally. As a result, trademark owners have more incentive to spend
resources protecting their trademarks than trademark defendants. For that
reason, a trademark lawyer is almost necessarily a trademark owner’s lawyer;
there is no organized trademark defense bar. Additionally, for trademark
owners, the International Trademark Association (or INTA) files amicus briefs
seeking to expand trademark protection.248 For trademark defendants, there is
no similar advocacy or trade organization. Even the treatise writers have
demonstrated a bias in favor of trademark owners.249

Badger trademark even though others had developed and initially used the nickname in connection
with the University on apparel and merchandise because the others did not claim Bucky as their own
trademark).
248. See, e.g., Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d
206, 211 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that INTA filed an amicus brief supporting plaintiff); Rosetta Stone
Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 149 (4th Cir. 2012) (same); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie &
Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158, 1162 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011) (same); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v.
Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 253 (4th Cir. 2007) (same); WarnerVision Entm’t, Inc. v.
Empire of Carolina, Inc., 101 F.3d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting the brief filed by INTA that sought
to expand the legal effect of filing an intent-to-use application); see also Ruben J. Garcia, A
Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 339–40 (2008) (noting the
importance of amicus briefs to judicial decision-making).
249. Note, for example, how the Callman treatise changes its description of the 1962
Housekeeping Amendments. Compare 3 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
AND TRADE-MARKS, § 80.1, at 120 (2d ed. Supp. 1965) (noting that the Amendment expanded
confusion inquiry to encompass “potential as well as actual purchasers,” but arguing that the
Amendment did not “go far enough”), with 3A LOUIS ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR
COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES, § 20.01, at 4 (boldly proclaiming that the
Housekeeping Amendment means that the Lanham Act is no longer limited to confusion of source and
instead covers all kinds of trade identity confusion).
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As a result, when the Fifth Circuit panel looked for a legal basis for its
decision, the plaintiffs could point to—and the court could seize on—the 1962
Housekeeping Amendment as expanding the infringement standard.250 While
the court’s expansive interpretation of the Amendment overstated Congress’s
intent,251 other plaintiffs had already argued for such a broad interpretation;
multiple courts had already adopted it; and treatise writers had rejoiced.252
Even though Congress intended something far narrower with the Amendment,
Dallas Cap & Emblem had no similarly convenient and available authority to
rebut the broad interpretation. No defense counsel had argued for the narrower
and proper interpretation of the 1962 Housekeeping Amendment based on the
Amendment’s plain language, context, and legislative history until 1990.253
Thus, asymmetric stakes not only bias the selection of cases for judicial
resolution, they also support an entire ecosystem that facilitates the
presentation of arguments favoring the expansion of trademark protection.
The third question, then, is: Given that the Boston Professional Hockey
decision was widely criticized at the time as a matter of fact, law, and policy,
why did no defendant challenge it directly for thirty years? The answer is that
for parties with standing, it was not in their interest to do so. The licensing
requirement imposed substantial losses on consumers because every dollar in
licensing revenue that trademark owners captured through the right had to
come out of consumers’ pockets. In addition, every dollar in licensing revenue
250. See, e.g., Bos. Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, 510 F.2d at 1010 (“A broadening of the protection
afforded by the statute occurred by amendment in 1962 which deleted the previously existing
requirement that the confusion or deception must relate to the ‘source of origin of such goods or
services.’” Pub.L. 87–772, § 17, 76 Stat. 773 (1962). Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental
Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 860 at n. 8 (5th Cir. 1967).”).
251. See supra notes 162–67 and accompanying text.
252. See Cont’l Motors Corp. v. Cont’l Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 860 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1967)
(“The statute was amended in 1962 to delete the previously existing requirement that the confusion or
deception must relate to the ‘source of origin of such goods or services.’ Pub.L. 87–772, § 17, 76 Stat.
773 (1962). Doubtless this could only serve to broaden, not restrict protection.”); Syntex Labs., Inc. v.
Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971); 3A LOUIS ALTMAN, CALLMANN ON
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES, § 20.01, at 4. Professor McCarthy is a little
more careful. 4 THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 23:7 (4th ed.) (“Congress struck out language in the Lanham Act which required confusion, mistake
or deception of ‘purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods and services.’ Several courts have
noted this expansion of the test of infringement and held that it supports a finding of infringement
when even non-purchasers are deceived.”).
253. In United States v. Hon, counsel for the defendant pointed to the legislative history
accompanying the 1962 Housekeeping Amendment and argued that Congress intended to expand the
likelihood of confusion standard in a narrow fashion, to encompass potential purchasers. 904 F.2d 803,
807 n.2 (2d Cir. 1990). The court rejected the argument and reiterated the longstanding (by that time)
and erroneous view that Congress intended through the Housekeeping Amendment to make actionable
any type of confusion at all. Id. As Hon pointed out:
[T]he Senate Report suggests that the amendment’s purpose was to make clear that the
confusion requirement includes potential purchasers as well as actual purchasers. See S.
Rep. No. 87-2107 (1962), as reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2847, 2850–51. Still,
nothing in the legislative history or the statute as amended excludes from its reach public,
nonpurchaser confusion in the case of counterfeits.
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also imposed on consumers some additional loss, perhaps thirty to seventy
cents, in deadweight and cost conversion.254 But consumers did not and do not
have standing under trademark law, so they could not challenge the ruling
directly. Instead, they had to rely on a proxy, some manufacturer or retailer, to
represent their interest. But for the manufacturers and retailers who had
standing, challenging the ruling was a no-win proposition: On the one hand, if
they funded the necessary litigation and won, they would be able to sell team
merchandise without paying a license fee to the team. On the other hand,
winning the litigation would also open the door for their competitors. Taking
advantage of the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel to insulate their
actions from litigation, competitors could enter the same market without
bearing the actual costs of litigation.255 Moreover, the litigating company
would have had to price its goods to recoup the litigation costs. The other
competitors would not. As a result, the non-litigating retailers and
manufacturers could undercut the litigating competitor’s price and potentially
drive the litigating competitor from the market. Alternatively, if a retailer or
manufacturer chose to litigate and lost, they would be out the money spent on
the litigation.
Either way, a company choosing to litigate the issue would lose
economically. In contrast, if a retailer acceded to the ruling, it could continue to
sell team merchandise with a license from the team. Although the license
royalty would necessitate a higher price for the merchandise, that higher price
would apply to all manufacturers and retailers equally. Any given retailer’s
competitive position would not change vis-à-vis its competitors. Because that
relative competitive position determines the retailer’s revenue, profit, and
market share, being forced to sell authorized team merchandise would not
significantly affect a retailer’s bottom line. Altogether, mainstream
manufacturers and retailers thus had no interest in challenging the ruling in
Boston Professional Hockey and instead complied with it.
Eventually, however, the Boston Professional Hockey decision was
challenged directly in litigation. This brings us to the fourth question: Why
didn’t the later court correct its earlier mistake when it was given the
opportunity? Here, along with the same framing bias that led to the initial
mistake, an activity bias arose that hampered the court’s ability to recognize its
254. There is no general rule as to the likely size of the deadweight losses that will occur. It will
depend upon the precise shape and elasticity of the marginal cost and demand curves. If, for example,
the demand curve is linear and marginal cost is constant, then the deadweight loss will be fifty cents
for every dollar in surplus transferred from consumers to producer. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 557 n.283 (1996).
While the number is easy to calculate, it is not clear that it is the most common ratio that would be
observed in real-world markets.
255. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; See also Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of
Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (recognizing non-mutual collateral estoppel in patent litigation
and holding that a patentee is estopped from asserting a patent against a defendant after a court has
found the patent invalid in litigation involving another defendant).
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own earlier mistake. By ruling that a license was required to sell team
merchandise, the Boston Professional Hockey court changed the associated
markets. As explained previously, mainstream manufacturers and retailers
followed their self-interest and acceded to the new rule. As a result, licensing
and authorized apparel became the norm, and consumer expectation changed
accordingly. The next time the issue arose, some thirty years later, the nature of
the defendant had also changed. All of the mainstream manufacturers and
retailers who might have challenged the rule chose instead to comply. They
chose to comply with the rule not because the rule was just or right or efficient,
but because complying with the rule was in their self-interest. Only those
manufacturers and retailers operating outside the mainstream continued to sell
unauthorized team merchandise, and they did so knowing that they were
breaking the law. Given the court’s initial ruling, their products were now
unlawful and subject to seizure. As a result of the risk of seizure, the optimal
level of investment in product quality fell. Thus, their now-counterfeit products
became cheaper and lower quality. For the same reason, these unauthorized
merchandisers moved to less reputable locations, such as flea markets.
Consequently, the next time the issue came before a court, consumers’ newly
developed expectations as well as the new “fly-by-night” characteristics of the
defendant and its products reinforced the seeming desirability of the court’s
initial ruling against the defendant. Thus, when the Fifth Circuit had the
opportunity to correct its mistake in Boston Professional Hockey, some thirty
years later in Board of Supervisors for Louisiana State University Agricultural
and Mechanical College v. Smack Apparel Co., it did not. Instead, the Fifth
Circuit reiterated and strengthened its earlier decision.256
Thirty years later, not only was the defendant’s seeming opportunism
even more apparent to the court, given that mainstream manufacturers and
retailers had complied with the initial ruling, but the defendant itself, Smack
Apparel, had an economic incentive to lose. As a business concern, Smack
Apparel operated in the shadows of the Boston Professional Hockey decision.
Instead of selling t-shirts bearing team emblems, Smack Apparel sold t-shirts
replicating the color schemes of various universities, not the issue precisely
presented and resolved in Boston Professional Hockey. At issue in the litigation
were six specific t-shirts bearing the scarlet-and-grey, purple-and-gold,
crimson-and-crème, and cardinal-and-gold color schemes of Ohio State, LSU,
the University of Oklahoma, and the University of Southern California, along
with words either touting their participation in the 2004 Sugar Bowl (for LSU
and Oklahoma) or the number of national football titles each had captured (for
Ohio State and USC).257

256. 550 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1268 (2009). Confirmation bias, the
human tendency to interpret new facts to confirm old beliefs, likely played some role as well.
257. Id. at 472–73.
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In approaching the litigation, Smack Apparel faced two possible
outcomes. Either it could have prevailed in the litigation or it could have
lost.258 If it had prevailed, then it could have continued to sell the six t-shirts at
issue. But having prevailed, it would have established the legality of such
conduct and thereby opened the door to competitive entry by other competitors.
If these new entrants were more efficient or enjoyed economies of scale, they
might have not only taken some of Smack Apparel’s market share, but also
might have competed Smack Apparel out of the market entirely. At the very
least, these new entrants would not have had to price their goods to recoup their
litigation costs, as Smack Apparel would have. Moreover, depending on how
broadly or narrowly the court ruled, Smack Apparel might have faced
competition from new entrants not only with respect to the six t-shirts at issue,
but across its product line. For Smack Apparel, winning the litigation battle
might have meant losing the business war.
On the other hand, losing might have meant being ordered to stop selling
the six t-shirts and any others confusingly similar, which is exactly what
happened.259 While Smack Apparel would lose the revenue associated with
those six t-shirts, it could continue to capture the revenue for the rest of its tshirt line. And, by losing, Smack Apparel would have reinforced and perhaps
expanded the legal rules prohibiting its conduct. Because the conduct remained
infringing, mainstream manufacturers and retailers would remain out of the
market, as they have. A loss in the litigation would thereby safeguard Smack
Apparel’s margins and its market share on the rest of its t-shirt line. While
losing left Smack Apparel open to the possibility that other universities would
follow suit and sue regarding their own color schemes, litigation is expensive.
As yet, no other universities have found it worthwhile to engage in the
necessary litigation. In short, by losing the litigation battle, Smack Apparel
won the business war. Like a bootlegger, Smack Apparel could exist only so
long as there was a demand that the law prohibited mainstream manufacturers
and retailers from satisfying. By losing, Smack Apparel kept the prohibition in
place, preserving both its margins and its market in the shadows of the law.
In enacting the Trademark Act of 1946, Congress barred direct consumer
standing and left the representation of consumer interests in trademark
258. It could also have settled. In many areas of the law, we assume that an individual intends
the natural and foreseeable outcome of a given course of conduct. Applying that approach here, we
can assume that Smack Apparel litigated and lost, with an appellate court rejecting every conceivable
argument that might have supported the legality of Smack Apparel’s conduct, precisely because
Smack Apparel wanted such a ruling. Why would Smack Apparel want to lose? There are, at least,
two possibilities. First, perhaps Smack Apparel wanted to lose in order to discourage other potential
non-mainstream—but not quite as far out as Smack Apparel—competitors from entering its market.
Second, perhaps Smack Apparel wanted to establish its reputation so that other universities would note
that if they too sued, Smack Apparel would not go down easily.
259. Id. at 474 (“The district court also enjoined Smack from manufacturing, distributing,
selling, or offering for sale any of the six t-shirt designs found to be infringing or any other similar
designs.”).
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litigation to a proxy: either the trademark plaintiff or the trademark defendant,
depending on the facts of the particular case. But the Smack Apparel litigation
illustrates the reality of trademark litigation. Trademark plaintiffs and
defendants represent their own interests. The consumer interest is not
represented at all.
The rise of the merchandising right thus effectively illustrates the dangers
to the common law evolution of trademark law that selection, activity, and
framing biases present. These considerations do not mean that trademark
defendants will never have an interest in challenging inefficient interpretations
of trademark law. In some cases, a single defendant may have a sufficient
economic stake to undertake the cost of establishing an efficient trademark
rule. Some defendants may also have a business model built on imitation and
copying, so that they have an interest both in the resolution of a particular case
and the precedent it establishes for the future. Our exceptional cases, such as
Wal-Mart Stores, Rogers v. Grimaldi, and New Kids on the Block,260 illustrate
these propositions. Walmart pursued an efficient interpretation of the secondary
meaning requirement for trade dress to preserve its leeway not just to copy
Samara Brothers’ clothing designs, but also to imitate popular products more
generally. That Walmart chose to pursue the litigation, despite its costs,
demonstrates the value of the resulting legal rule, from Walmart’s selfinterested perspective. Motion picture distributors and newspapers presumably
pursued the Rogers and New Kids litigation for similar reasons. In other
instances, particular defendants will pursue litigation even when the average
defendant would not, because of a grudge against the trademark owner or to
vindicate their principles or for other idiosyncratic reasons.
As discussed, however, the fact that the self-interest of particular
defendants in particular cases has led some defendants to challenge overbroad
trademark protection has not been sufficient to slow trademark’s de-evolution
generally. Rather, given stare decisis, it has forced trademark law to become
unnecessarily complex as trademark’s generally expansive tide encounters
unmovable seawalls.
III.
CHANGING THE PROCESS TO CHANGE THE SUBSTANCE OF TRADEMARK LAW
We can now see why trademark law has become such a bloated and
incoherent morass. Courts repeatedly make mistakes in trademark law because,
first, asymmetric and unrepresentative stakes lead to selection and activity bias,
and second, making law through litigation inaccurately frames the question to
be decided. As a result, parties bring the wrong cases to court for judicial
resolution, and courts resolve them incorrectly.

260. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d
994 (2d Cir. 1989); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Substantive trademark reform will not solve this problem. No matter how
clear congressional amendments to correct trademark’s overbreadth might
seem today, in ten or twenty or fifty years, courts will simply reinterpret
Congress’s actions to support broader trademark protection.261 If that seems
implausible, remember Congress added the phrase “word, name, symbol, or
device” in 1943 to the bill that would become the Trademark Act of 1946
specifically to bar protection of trade dress.262 Fifty years later, the Court touted
this exact language as proof that Congress had intended to provide protection
for trade dress all along.263
This suggests a need for more fundamental reform that will: (1) bring
more of the right cases to court; (2) provide courts with better information to
resolve the disputes before them; and (3) reframe the dispute to more
accurately reflect the overriding consumer interests at stake. The simplest
solution would be to give consumers direct standing in trademark litigation.
Unfortunately, while simple, this will probably not solve the problem because
of collective action issues. Nevertheless, a range of potential solutions may
move the system in the right direction. At one end, awareness of the problem,
together with the broader availability of low-cost or pro bono representation for
trademark defendants, may help. At the other, we could abolish private
enforcement of trademarks altogether and leave enforcement entirely to the
Federal Trade Commission.264
Rather than advocate either doing nothing or burning the system down, I
propose a middle course and initially advocate three reforms to improve the
selection and judicial resolution of trademark cases. I believe that these reforms
261. Moreover, the legislative process has flaws, too. Congress got it right in the Trademark
Act of 1946 because the Department of Justice intervened in the process and secured key amendments
in 1943. See Trade-Marks: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong.
58-71 (1944) (Department of Justice, Report on H.R. 82, The Trade-mark Bill). See also Lunney,
Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 421–22, 421–22 nn. 214–15. If recent history is any
indication, Congress is less likely to get a balanced process for more narrowly tailored and specific
amendments.
262. See supra notes 83–94 and accompanying text; see also Lunney, The Trade Dress
Emperor, supra note 1 (explaining Congress’s intent in more detail).
263. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (“Since human beings
might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this
language, read literally, is not restrictive.”).
264. Professor William Baxter has proposed a similar solution for antitrust enforcement. See
Baxter, supra note 223 (arguing that the selection bias that arises from private antitrust enforcement
can be mitigated by substituting public for private enforcement). But as Professor Gillian Hadfield has
argued, public enforcement may not overcome activity bias. Professor Hadfield explains:
[Professor Baxter] argues that ‘the’ bias can be mitigated by introducing public enforcers
who can select cases in a more representative fashion. It is clear, however, that if potential
defendants are sufficiently heterogeneous so that some falling within the ambit of a rule
choose to comply or drop out rather than create a dispute by violating the existing legal
rule, then public enforcement cannot ameliorate the more fundamental bias—the activity
bias—created by heterogeneity. Laws cannot be enforced against those who have chosen
not to violate them.
Hadfield, supra note 219, at 598.
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will improve the process through two mechanisms. First, they will provide
potential trademark defendants with a bounty265 for challenging inefficient
interpretations of trademark law and for defending efficient interpretations.
Second, they will re-frame the issue presented for the court, so that the
overriding interests of consumers are more directly relevant and readily
apparent. These three reforms are: (1) enhanced availability of attorneys’ fees
for prevailing trademark defendants; (2) reinvigoration of attempted
monopolization counterclaims; and (3) broader use of Federal Rule of Evidence
706 to appoint a neutral expert witness to identify and explain the consumer
interests at stake in trademark litigation. Courts can implement all three under
existing law without legislative action.
Though these three reforms will partially ameliorate trademark law’s deevolution, for a complete correction, I propose that Congress amend the
Trademark Act to recognize a new defense: the Strategic Lawsuit Against
Competition (or SLAC) defense. Modeled after existing Strategic Lawsuit
Against Public Participation (or SLAPP) statutes,266 the proposed amendment
would allow a trademark defendant to show that a trademark lawsuit is an
effort to reduce competition by increasing the defendant’s costs, by increasing
the degree of product differentiation otherwise present in a market, or by
excluding the defendant from a relevant market altogether. If the trademark
defendant successfully established the lawsuit’s potential for reducing
competition, then the burden would shift to the plaintiff to show that it is likely
to prevail. The litigation would proceed only if the trademark plaintiff could
make that showing. The following Sections discuss these proposed reforms in
turn.
A. Reform Within Existing Law
To the extent possible under existing law, courts should take the following
three steps in trademark litigation to reduce the selection and activity bias and
reframe the issue presented. First, courts should expand the availability of
attorneys’ fees awards and increase the amount of such awards to prevailing
trademark defendants. Second, courts should allow trademark defendants to
assert viable antitrust counterclaims. Third, courts should make more liberal
use of Federal Rule of Evidence 706 to appoint neutral expert witnesses who
can identify and explain the consumer interests at stake in trademark litigation.

265. Professor Thomas has proposed a similar approach to encourage validity challenges
against questionable patents. See Thomas, Patent Bounties, supra note 11.
266. For an introduction to SLAPP statutes, see John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory
Solutions to the Problems of SLAPPs, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395 (1993); Marc J. Randazza, The Need
for a Unified and Cohesive National Anti-SLAPP Law, 91 OR. L. REV. 627 (2012).
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1. Enhanced Attorneys’ Fees
Prevailing trademark defendants should receive enhanced attorneys’ fee
awards. The awards should be enhanced, relative to existing law, in two senses:
first, they should be awarded more often; and second, they should be larger.
Such awards would provide a cost-based267 bounty to trademark defendants for
challenging inefficient interpretations of trademark law and for defending
efficient interpretations. To some extent, having to pay such a bounty would
also discourage trademark owners from pushing ever more inefficient
interpretations of trademark law.
The proposal would not require congressional action. Section 35(a) of the
Trademark Act already provides for the award of reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party in “exceptional” cases.268 The proposed awards are
consistent with the statutory language, but would require two changes to
existing practice. First, courts would need to redefine and expand the category
of “exceptional” cases. Second, courts would need to expand their willingness
to award “reasonable” attorneys’ fees that exceed the actual attorneys’ fees
incurred.
First, courts should replace the “relative” standard for determining
whether a case is exceptional with an “absolute” or “constant” standard that
defines “exceptional” with respect to the zone of protection that lies at
trademark’s core. In Octane Fitness, the Court defined an exceptional case for
purposes of the parallel attorneys’ fee provision in the Patent Act as:
one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength
of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and
the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was
litigated.269
Given Congress’s identical use of “exceptional” case language in the
Trademark Act, courts will likely apply—and indeed already have applied—the
Octane Fitness standard to trademark cases as well.270 The problem with this
standard as applied to trademark cases is that it uses a relative standard. The
standard asks whether one litigated case “stands out” from other litigated cases.

267. The bounty would be cost-based in the sense that the award would be based upon the cost
to the trademark defendant of undertaking the desired action, rather than based upon the social value
generated by that action. Cf. Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards
for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 695–731 (2004) (surveying different approaches
to bounties in the patent context).
268. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012).
269. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014).
270. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v. Von Drehle Corp., 781 F.3d 710, 720–
21 (4th Cir. 2015); Donut Joe’s, Inc. v. Interveston Food Servs., 116 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1292–94 (N.D.
Ala. 2015); RCI TM Corp. v. R & R Venture Grp., LLC, No. 6:13-cv-945-Orl-22, 2015 WL 668715,
at *9–11 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2015); High Tech Pet Prods., Inc. v. Shenzhen Jianfeng Elec. Pet Prods.
Co., No. 6:14-cv-759-Orl-22TBS, 2015 WL 926023, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2015).
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Such a relative standard for identifying which cases are “exceptional” in
trademark litigation is problematic because asymmetric stakes mean that only
exceptional trademark cases are litigated to judicial resolution. As discussed,
trademark defendants usually have very little to gain by litigating, even if they
prevail. As a result, they will seldom litigate cases to judicial resolution unless
they feel that they have a very high likelihood of prevailing and are therefore
correspondingly certain to capture the very little they have to gain. When faced
with a case squarely in the center of trademark law’s prohibition on unfair
competition, trademark defendants will avoid the conduct at issue so that a
litigated case never arises. Or if they should accidentally stray into trademark’s
core prohibition, the defendant will settle when litigation does arise and thereby
preclude judicial resolution. For that reason, judging whether one trademark
case litigated to judicial resolution is an outlier relative to other such cases is
inherently misleading. The very fact that a trademark case is litigated to
judicial resolution establishes that it is an outlier.
Instead of judging whether a case is relatively exceptional, courts should
use a constant standard. This constant standard would ask whether the
plaintiff’s claims fall within trademark’s core zone of protection. On
infringement claims, for example, courts could define trademark’s core zone of
protection using either the 1905 Act’s double identity standard or the 1946
Act’s standard that assesses the likelihood of confusion of purchasers as to the
good’s source. Both of these standards define cases where consumers are likely
to purchase a product by mistake and be dissatisfied. They thereby define the
sorts of cases where a finding of trademark infringement is likely to enhance
consumer welfare. If a trademark plaintiff advocates a theory of such core
confusion, and loses, then the case would not be considered exceptional and no
award of attorneys’ fees would be made. On the other hand, if a trademark
plaintiff advocates a recognized but more esoteric theory of confusion, such as
post-sale or initial interest, and loses, then the case should be considered
exceptional because the theory of infringement falls outside trademark’s core
zone of protection.
The key point, however, is that the core remains unchanged, even as
trademark law’s outer limits expand. Even if courts define that unchanging core
zone of protection using today’s expansive infringement standard, such an
approach would still be better than Octane Fitness’s relative standard because
it would limit future expansion. As the pressures of selection bias, activity bias,
and framing effects continue to influence courts, trademark protection will
continue to expand. Cases that are close calls, and therefore worth litigating
today, will become slam dunks and therefore quickly settle if they arise in the
future. Claims for trademark protection that seem absurd today will become the
new norm, just as claims for trademark protection that seemed absurd fifty
years ago are the norm today. A relative “exceptional” case standard will
follow the evolving norms and shift similarly. At any given time, only the
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outlier of the litigated outliers will seem exceptional. On the other hand, a
constant or absolute standard that defines exceptional cases based on an
unchanging core can permanently tie trademark law to its welfare-enhancing,
consumer-protection goals. A constant standard would thereby provide an
incentive for potential trademark defendants to fight against inefficient, and for
efficient, interpretations of trademark law.
Merely reimbursing trademark defendants for their attorneys’ fees will
likely prove insufficient, however. Defending a trademark case entails costs
beyond attorneys’ fees. It also entails risk. Even where, from a social welfare
perspective, the defendant should win, there is no guarantee that the defendant
will win in trademark litigation. In trademark cases where the defendants
prevail, the defendants need to receive a bounty that compensates them for the
risk that they would have lost. If all that a defendant stands to gain by litigating
is reimbursement of their attorneys’ fees, but not their risk and other costs,
potential trademark defendants may still lack the necessary incentive to bring
cases.
For example, after the New Orleans Saints won the Super Bowl for the
very first time in 2010, a dispute broke out over the phrase “Who Dat.”271
Numerous parties were selling merchandise bearing the phrase, or a clever
variation thereof, such as “Who Dat,” in connection with the Saints’
championship season and Super Bowl victory.272 A pair of brothers, through
their corporation, Who Dat, Inc., claimed ownership of the phrase as a
trademark.273 Their claims were particularly weak. They had not coined the
slogan or even been the first to use it in connection with sporting events
generally or the Saints specifically.274 They had merely been one of many
parties to exploit the phrase, in their case by releasing a version of the song
“When the Saints Come Marching In” with the phrase “Who Dat Say Dey
Gonna Beat Dem Saints” chanted over a portion of the song.275 After releasing
the song, the brothers sporadically licensed the claimed mark, but their use of it
was intermittent at best.276 Nonetheless, they threatened to sue a number of
local merchants who were selling merchandise bearing the slogan. In response,
the merchants filed for declaratory judgment, asserting that Who Dat, Inc. did
not own a valid trademark in the phrase “Who Dat.”277 Despite pro bono
representation, when the district court denied their summary judgment motions,
the merchants settled and allowed Who Dat, Inc. to retain ownership of the

271. Who Dat Yat Chat, LLC v. Who Dat, Inc., 2012 WL 1118602, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 3,
2012).
272. Id. at *1.
273. Id. at *2.
274. Id.
275. Id. at *2; Associated Press, NFL Claims Trademark Infringement (Jan. 30, 2010),
http://www.espn.com/nfl/playoffs/2009/news/story?id=4871697 [https://perma.cc/YU7Z-T7M5].
276. Id. at *2, 5.
277. Id. at *2–4.
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mark.278 Even though they were receiving free legal representation, the
litigation took their time and effort away from running their businesses. That
distraction and litigation’s other costs made further litigation unattractive,
relative to a settlement.
From a welfare standpoint, New Orleans consumers would have been far
better off with competition than with a monopoly in the market for Who Dat
merchandise. With competition, prices would not have been artificially inflated
by a license royalty. Consumers would have had more and better choices as
merchants competed to come up with the cleverest Who Dat merchandise. But
consumers do not have standing in trademark disputes. And for the merchants
who did have standing, a chance of winning the case—even a substantial
chance—was not worth fighting for, even with free legal representation.
For that reason, my second proposal with respect to attorneys’ fees awards
is that courts award prevailing trademark defendants “reasonable” attorneys’
fees that routinely exceed the defendant’s actual fees by two to three times.
Like treble damages in antitrust cases, the purpose of treble attorney fee awards
to prevailing trademark defendants would be to encourage trademark
defendants to serve as a private attorney general of sorts, and to vindicate the
public interest in efficient interpretations of trademark law.
Granting attorneys’ fees in excess of actual fees would not require a
change to existing law, but would require a change in judicial practice. In
calculating reasonable attorneys’ fees generally, courts begin with the lodestar:
multiplying the number of reasonable hours worked on the case by a reasonable
hourly rate.279 However, after calculating the lodestar, courts retain discretion
to award enhanced fees based upon the “results obtained.”280 As the Court has
explained, “Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should
recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours
reasonably expended on the litigation, and indeed in some cases of exceptional
success an enhanced award may be justified.”281 Applying these rules, courts
have already approved awards of attorneys’ fees as reasonable where they
exceed actual fees incurred.282 Most commonly, this occurs where an attorney
represents the prevailing party on a pro bono basis, or at a subsidized or
nonprofit rate, and the plaintiff incurs no or minimal attorneys’ fees.283 But
278. Today, Who Dat?, Inc. holds four principal register registrations for Who Dat or Who
Dat?. See U.S. Registration Nos. 5,186,320; 4,948,826; 4,402,283; and 4,310,960.
279. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
280. Id. at 434.
281. Id. at 435.
282. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894–95 (1984) (requiring attorneys’ fees awards
in Fair Housing Act litigation to be calculated using private market rates even if prevailing party was
actually represented by lower price non-profit); DiFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.
1985) (awarding attorneys’ fees based upon higher private market rates despite representation by a
non-profit legal services organization).
283. See, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894–95 (1984) (requiring attorneys’ fees awards
in Fair Housing Act litigation to be calculated using private market rates even if prevailing party was
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nothing in the law limits an award of reasonable fees in excess of actual fees to
that situation. It would, however, require some change to existing practice.
Courts today rarely award attorneys’ fees to prevailing trademark defendants,
and when they do, those awards rarely award trademark defendants their full
actual fees. That needs to change.
2. Antitrust Counterclaims
Trademark defendants need to be able to present viable antitrust
counterclaims that can survive summary judgment in order to make the stakes
of trademark litigation more symmetric. At present, the stakes in trademark
litigation are not merely asymmetric, but fundamentally one-sided in favor of
plaintiffs. A plaintiff seeking to expand trademark protection in a manner that
reduces total surplus has everything to gain and very little to lose. Consider
again the merchandising rights for sports teams. If the National Hockey League
can persuade a court to change the law and establish the merchandising right, it
stands to gain billions. If it loses, it is merely out the costs of the litigation.
Enabling trademark defendants to present viable antitrust counterclaims could
shift this incentive structure. Allowing these counterclaims could sharply
reduce the selection and activity bias that plagues the common law evolution of
trademark law and re-frame the issue presented.
In terms of selection and activity bias, a counterclaim for antitrust
damages offers a value-based bounty for potential trademark defendants.
Antitrust counterclaims and their associated damages offer a trademark
defendant not only a chance to recover the costs incurred in defending efficient
legal rules, but an opportunity to generate value for the public by keeping the
market at issue competitive.
The damages potentially available through an antitrust counterclaim
would not only encourage the potential trademark defendant, they would also
independently discourage the potential trademark plaintiff. Because these
damages are, at least in part, value-based, a bounty measured in antitrust
damages can more readily rise to the high levels necessary to deter trademark
plaintiffs from seeking inefficient interpretations of trademark law in markets
where billions are at stake. For example, in the sports merchandising context,
threatening to award Dallas Cap & Emblem enhanced attorneys’ fees is
unlikely to deter the National Hockey League from pursuing litigation given
the billions of dollars in rents it could capture through a monopoly over the
merchandising markets. But a potential antitrust damages claim might deter

actually represented by lower price non-profit); DiFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.
1985) (awarding attorneys’ fees based upon higher private market rates despite representation by a
non-profit legal services organization).
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them, both because such a claim can consider the monopoly rents at stake284
and because it is trebled.285
In addition, including antitrust counterclaims in routine trademark
litigation re-frames the dispute to more accurately reflect the true and full
interests at stake. When the trademark dispute between the National Hockey
League and Dallas Cap & Emblem arose, the real issue was not whether one or
the other should capture a given surplus from the merchandising market at
issue. Rather, the real issue was whether that market should be competitive or
monopolistic. Despite the focus on consumers in trademark law, trademark
litigation considers the overall welfare of consumers only incidentally. In
contrast, an antitrust counterclaim for attempted monopolization would force
the parties, and allow the court, to confront that real issue directly. It would
also re-frame the dispute from a property dispute into a regulatory dispute.
Instead of asking whether one party has gone too far and thereby trespassed on
another’s property, an antitrust counterclaim would ask whether allowing or
prohibiting the defendant’s conduct would promote or disserve competition in
the associated markets.
At the very least, reinvigorating the antitrust counterclaim would remind
courts and juries that many assertions of trademark rights are little more than
strategic lawsuits against competition. Trademark owners use litigation as a
tool to increase would-be competitors’ costs, increase product differentiation,
and otherwise deter or bar competition. Allowing a trademark defendant to
more readily assert an antitrust counterclaim would make a broader swath of
evidence on the competitive structure of the market and the associated
consumer interests relevant and therefore admissible.286 It would thereby give
the court or the jury more complete information on which to resolve the case.
Unfortunately, antitrust counterclaims have become rare in intellectual
property litigation, and when asserted, rarely survive summary judgment. Two
judicial interpretations of antitrust law in particular have made such claims
difficult to establish. First, courts have abolished the presumption that an
284. For attempted monopolization, a prevailing plaintiff may recover based upon its “estimate
of sales it could have made absent the antitrust violation.” Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290
F.3d 768, 794 (6th Cir. 2002). Antitrust damages are therefore not a true value-based bounty. A true
value-based bounty would force a losing trademark plaintiff to pay the defendant the expected
monopoly rents the plaintiff would have captured had the plaintiff prevailed. Thus, if Boston
Professional Hockey had lost the suit, they would have had to pay Dallas Cap the billions in monopoly
profits they captured. The threat of such a payment could deter Boston Professional Hockey from
bringing such a suit in the first place.
285. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2017) (stating that “any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall recover threefold the damages
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee”).
286. As the Court has recognized, “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare
prescription.’” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979). In antitrust, “whether the ultimate
finding is the product of a presumption or actual market analysis, the essential inquiry remains the
same—whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition.” Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984).
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intellectual property right, such as a patent or copyright, confers market
power.287 Courts therefore require proof of market power. At the same time,
courts are often reluctant to define a market narrowly for antitrust purposes.288
Most courts, for example, would be reluctant to define Coca-Cola as its own
product market for antitrust purposes.289 Most courts would almost certainly
include Pepsi and other colas in the relevant market. From an economic
perspective, however, Coca-Cola is almost certainly its own market.290 In
economics, two products compete, or are in the same market, if and only if a
“small but significant and nontransitory” price increase on the first product
would prove unprofitable because it would lead too many consumers to switch
to some other product.291 The cross-elasticity of demand between Coke and
Pepsi is probably insufficient to limit Coke’s ability to profitably raise its
prices.292 Of course, consumers could switch if Coke prices increased, but my
own sense is that they would not.293
287. The Court initially created the presumption that a patent confers market power in a patent
misuse case, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), and then
subsequently extended the presumption to antitrust cases. Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947). In Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), the Court retained and
reiterated the presumption: “[I]f the Government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly
over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the seller
market power.” Id. at 16. However, in 1988, Congress amended the Patent Act to abolish the
presumption of market power in the context of patent misuse. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (2016). In 2006,
the Court, based in part on Congress’s abolition of the presumption in the misuse context, abolished
the presumption for antitrust claims as well. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42
(2006). While the Illinois Tool Works Court formally abolished the presumption, it remanded the case
to allow the respondent, Independent Ink, to try and establish such market power through evidence. Id.
at 46.
288. The Court requires market definition to establish attempted monopolization:
To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a part of trade or commerce under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, it would then be necessary to appraise the exclusionary power of
the illegal patent claim in terms of the relevant market for the product involved. Without a
definition of that market there is no way to measure [the defendant’s] ability to lessen or
destroy competition.
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965).
289. See Lemley & McKenna, Market Definition, supra note 121, at 2056–59; Lunney,
Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 424–25.
290. For an explanation, see Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 424–25; see also
Lemley & McKenna, Market Definition, supra note 121, at 2056–59 (offering the same example).
291. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 1.11 (1992); see also Satellite Television & Associated Res., Inc. v. Cont’l Cablevision of Va., Inc.,
714 F.2d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying Guidelines approach to define relevant product market),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984); Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860,
872 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (using Guidelines approach to define relevant product market).
292. For an explanation, see Lunney, Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 424–25; see also
Lemley & McKenna, Market Definition, supra note 121, at 2056–59 (offering the same example).
293. See Lemley & McKenna, Market Definition, supra note 121, at 2056–59; Lunney,
Trademark Monopolies, supra note 2, at 424–25. As the Court has explained:
For every product, substitutes exist. But a relevant market cannot meaningfully encompass
that infinite range. The circle must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product to
which, within reasonable variations in price, only a limited number of buyers will turn; in
technical terms, products whose “cross-elasticities of demand” are small.
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Market definitions must be more realistic for attempted monopolization
counterclaims to be viable in trademark litigation. Merchandise bearing hockey
team emblems do not compete with merchandise bearing football team
emblems. Further, merchandise bearing the emblems and name of the Dallas
Stars probably do not compete with merchandise bearing the emblems and
name of the Boston Bruins. Courts should recognize the reality that in many
circumstances, popular brands define their own product market. True, not every
trademark confers market power. But as self-interested economic actors,
trademark owners are more likely to engage in litigation to protect trademarks
that do confer market power.294 All that is necessary to solve this particular
problem is a more realistic application of the existing cross-elasticity of
demand standard. Two products compete only when consumers will or do in
fact switch in response to a “small but significant and nontransitory” price
increase. 295
Second, to show attempted monopolization, a party must demonstrate
predatory or anticompetitive conduct.296 Courts usually treat mere assertion of
a losing claim—whether patent, copyright, or trademark—as insufficient to
establish predatory or anticompetitive conduct. In the United States, citizens
have a First Amendment right to petition the government, including the courts,
for redress.297 Finding predatory conduct in every instance where a patent or
trademark plaintiff files a lawsuit and loses would encroach on that First
Amendment right too greatly.298 In addition, it is not clear that Congress
intended the general language of the Sherman Act, aimed at more traditional

Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n. 31 (1953).
294. In Illinois Tool, the respondent made an analogous argument. Specifically, respondent
argued for a rebuttable presumption of market power for patents used to create tying arrangements. Ill.
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42 (2006). The Court rejected the argument. Id. at
43–44.
295. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.11
(1992); see also Satellite Television & Associated Res., Inc. v. Cont’l Cablevision, Inc., 714 F.2d 351,
355 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying Guidelines approach to define relevant product market), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1027 (1984); Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 881 F. Supp. 860, 872
(W.D.N.Y. 1994) (using Guidelines approach to define relevant product market).
296. As the Court has stated, “it is generally required that to demonstrate attempted
monopolization a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or
anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of
achieving monopoly power.” Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
297. U.S. CONST., amend I (stating that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right
of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances”); see Cal. Motor Transp. Co.
v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1972); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
136–38 (1961) (exempting from antitrust liability lobbying efforts directed at obtaining legislation that
would restrict competition).
298. See, e.g., Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1757
(2014) (stating that “[w]e crafted the Noerr–Pennington doctrine—and carved out only a narrow
exception for ‘sham’ litigation—to avoid chilling the exercise of the First Amendment right to petition
the government for the redress of grievances.”).
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restraints of trade, to reach such petitioning activity.299 As a result, courts have
limited the availability of antitrust counterclaims for losing intellectual
property claims to exceptional circumstances.
The Court’s Noerr-Pennington doctrine limits antitrust liability to “sham”
litigation where a plaintiff asserts claims that are: (1) “objectively baseless in
the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the
merits”; and (2) improperly motivated by a subjective intent “to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor,” through the “use [of]
the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process . . . .”300
For example, under this “sham” exception, attempting to enforce a patent that a
party has obtained through fraud or inequitable conduct on the Patent Office
would constitute predatory conduct.301 Because a trademark defendant will
rarely be able to prove that a trademark plaintiff’s assertions are both
objectively baseless and improperly motivated, the Court’s interpretation of the
First Amendment sharply limits the availability and viability of antitrust
counterclaims in response to overzealous assertion of trademark rights. To be
sure, there remains some room when a trademark plaintiff’s claims are
“objectively baseless,” but that is not likely to prove a sufficient deterrent.302
For antitrust counterclaims to become a viable deterrent, courts would
need to expand the “sham” exception, or otherwise limit the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. This would not be unprecedented. In California Motor Transport Co.
v. Trucking Unlimited, for example, one trucking company sued its
competitors, alleging a violation of the antitrust laws when the competitors
joined together to “institute state and federal proceedings to resist and defeat
299. As the Court explained:
Although such associations [to lobby Congress jointly for legislation that would restrain
trade] could perhaps, through a process of expansive construction, be brought within the
general proscription of ‘combination(s) . . . in restraint of trade,’ they bear very little if any
resemblance to the combinations normally held violative of the Sherman Act, combinations
ordinarily characterized by an express or implied agreement or understanding that the
participants will jointly give up their trade freedom, or help one another to take away the
trade freedom of others through the use of such devices as price-fixing agreements,
boycotts, market-division agreements, and other similar arrangements. This essential
dissimilarity between an agreement jointly to seek legislation or law enforcement and the
agreements traditionally condemned by § 1 of the Act, even if not itself conclusive on the
question of the applicability of the Act, does constitute a warning against treating the
defendants’ conduct as though it amounted to a common-law trade restraint.
E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. at 136–37.
300. Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993).
301. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965)
(holding that “the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of §
2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are present”); Transweb,
LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1306–09 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming antitrust
liability for attempted enforcement of a patent procured through inequitable conduct).
302. Adopting the abuse of right prohibition commonly found in civil law states might also
address the issues. For a discussion of the abuse of right prohibition, see, for example, Annekatrien
Lenaerts, The General Principle of the Prohibition of Abuse of Rights: A Critical Position on Its Role
in a Codified European Contract Law, 6 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 1121 (2010).
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[the plaintiff’s] applications” to transport goods in trade.303 The defendants
insisted that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunized their conduct from
antitrust scrutiny.304 But the Court rejected the argument.305 The plaintiff
alleged that the defendants had conspired to institute multiple administrative
and judicial proceedings to effectively deny the plaintiff “free and unlimited”
access to those same agencies and courts.306 The Court held that these
allegations stated a viable antitrust claim and fell within the scope of the
“sham” exception.307 In reaching that conclusion, the Court explained: “First
Amendment rights may not be used as the means or the pretext for achieving
‘substantive evils’ which the legislature has the power to control.”308
As this decision suggests, First Amendment rights are not absolute. Of
course, the California Motor Transport decision on its own is not enough to
ensure the effective viability of antitrust counterclaims as a deterrent to
overzealous trademark enforcement in every case. However, it recognizes the
need to balance the scope of the First Amendment against the substantive evil
of monopoly that the antitrust laws aim to prevent. The decision also suggests
that courts have some discretion in setting that balance. For the threat of an
antitrust counterclaim to become an effective deterrent to rent-seeking
trademark litigation, we may simply need to tilt that balance slightly more
towards preventing the evils of monopoly.
3. Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses
Courts should take advantage of their authority under Federal Rule of
Evidence 706 to appoint neutral expert witnesses to identify and explain the
consumer welfare interests at stake in trademark litigation.309 As a general rule,
courts have proven reluctant to use their authority under Rule 706 and have
preferred instead to let the parties shape the course and content of the
litigation.310 While this is the general American approach to litigation, the
303. 404 U.S. 508, 509 (1972).
304. Id. at 509–10, 511.
305. Id. at 514–16.
306. Id. at 511.
307. Id. at 514–16.
308. Id. at 515 (citation omitted).
309. FED. R. EVID. 706(a) authorizes a court to appoint a neutral expert of its own choosing.
The Rule provides:
(a) Appointment Process. On a party’s motion or on its own, the court may order the parties
to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed and may ask the parties to
submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert that the parties agree on and any of
its own choosing. But the court may only appoint someone who consents to act.
Id. (emphasis added). In the trademark litigation context, the cost of a court-appointed expert becomes
a part of the costs of the case generally. Like other court costs, they are paid by the parties as the court
directs. FED. R. EVID. 706(c).
310. See Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 449 (2009) (noting that
“[p]arty control over case presentation is a central tenet of the American adversarial legal system.”). If
we look at the appellate decisions regarding Rule 706 over the last two years, all of them involve either
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adversary system works well only when all of the real parties in interest are
present and have an opportunity to be heard.
This adversary system generally has not worked well in trademark
litigation because one of the real parties in interest, the consumer, has neither
the right nor the opportunity to be heard. Moreover, neither trademark plaintiffs
nor trademark defendants have proven to be effective representatives for the
missing consumers.
Given that consumer welfare lies near the heart of trademark law,
consumers should have a more direct and vital role in trademark litigation.
Standing rules limit their direct participation as a party. Moreover, even if they
had standing, collective action issues would likely limit consumer participation.
Rule 706 gives courts an opportunity to give consumers a direct voice in
trademark litigation—one that is not subject to the whims and litigation
strategies of the parties.
Under Rule 706, courts have the authority to appoint a neutral expert
witness to identify and explain the consumer interests at stake in trademark
litigation. A court may do so on its own initiative.311 And it may appoint a
witness of its own choosing.312 Given the undeniable and overriding
importance of the consumer interest in trademark litigation and the parties’
unwillingness to represent that interest at the expense of their own, courts
should routinely employ their authority under Rule 706 to appoint a neutral
expert witness and to thereby give consumers a direct voice in trademark
litigation.
Using Rule 706 in this manner would not only give consumers a more
direct voice in the litigation but would also re-frame the issue presented for the
court. A neutral expert can help remind the court that resolving trademark
litigation represents a choice between not two, but three possible outcomes.
The court can rule in favor of the trademark plaintiff; it can rule in favor of the
trademark defendant; or it can rule in favor of consumers.
B. Anti-SLAC Legislation
Congress should amend the Trademark Act to provide trademark
defendants with a strategic lawsuit against competition defense.313 While courts

section 1983 claims or other claims by prisoners who could not afford to hire their own experts. See
Kennedy v. Huibregtse, 831 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting court’s authority to appoint neutral
expert under Rule 706 in the context of a prisoner’s in forma pauperis motion); Foster v. Enenmoh,
649 Fed. Appx. 609 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing application of Rule 706 in connection with section
1983 claim).
311. FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (stating “[o]n a party’s motion or on its own. . . .”) (emphasis added).
312. Id. (stating “[t]he court may appoint any expert that the parties agree on and any of its own
choosing.”) (emphasis added).
313. The proposed SLAC defense is similar to the antitrust counterclaim approach. Like the
antitrust counterclaim, the SLAC defense would focus on the harm to consumers, in the form of higher
prices and reduced consumer choice, that might result from the litigation. Some elements, such as
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can use existing law to help correct the selection, activity, and framing biases
that have led to trademark law’s de-evolution, I do not believe that they go far
enough. In particular, I worry that the First Amendment limits on antitrust
counterclaims so tightly constrain the availability and viability of such
counterclaims that the incentives for trademark plaintiffs to push for inefficient
and anticompetitive interpretations of trademark law will remain fundamentally
one-sided in favor of trademark overreach. For that reason, I propose a strategic
lawsuit against competition (or “SLAC”) defense modeled on state-strategiclawsuit-against-public-participation (or “SLAPP”) statutes.
Enacted in twenty-seven states,314 SLAPP laws are designed to encourage
the public’s exercise of their free speech rights and to discourage the use of
lawsuits to coerce silence.315 Although the statutes differ somewhat in their
details, their basic structure is similar. SLAPP statutes give defendants a
special defense or motion to strike where a plaintiff seeks to deter public
participation through litigation. A defendant has the initial burden to
demonstrate that the litigation arises out of acts that constitute public
participation. For example, the California statute provides a special motion to
strike for a cause of action “arising from any act of that person in furtherance
of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public
issue.”316 Once a defendant has shown that the cause of action arises out of the
damages and the need to show antitrust injury, would differ. While similar, I propose the SLAC
defense as an express alternative because I believe that courts will continue to limit antitrust
counterclaims under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
314. See Tex. Civ. Prac. and Rem. Code Ann. §§ 27.001–27.011 (2011); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 4.24.525 (2010); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 70-a, 76-a (2008); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211; 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 110/1–
110/99 (2007); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-751–12-752 (2006); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-63-501–16-63-508
(2005); 12 V.S.A. § 1041 (2005); Md. Code Ann., Cts. and Jud. Proc. § 5-807 (2004); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 537.528 (2004); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634F-1–634F-4 (2002); N.M. Stat. §§ 38-2-9.1–38-2-9.2 (2001);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.150 et seq. (2001); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-6-1401–1405 (2001); Fla. Stat.
§§ 768.295, 720.304 (2000); 27 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7707, §§ 8301–8303 (2000); La. Code Civ. Proc.
Ann. art. 971 (1999); Ind. Code § 34-7-7-1 et seq. (1998); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-1001–21-1004
(1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-11.1 (1996); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14 § 556 (1995); R.I. Gen. Laws
§§ 9-33-1–9-33-4 (1995); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231 § 59H (1994); Minn. Stat. §§ 554.01–554.05
(1994); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-21,241–25-21,246 (1994); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 41.635–41.670 (1993);
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 (1992); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 8136–8138 (1992).
315. The purpose of the Texas SLAPP statute, for example, is “to encourage and safeguard the
constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in
government to the maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of a
person to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury.” Tex. Civ. Prac. and Rem. Code Ann.
§ 27.002.
316. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). The statute then goes on to define specifically what
constitutes public participation. After generally defining acts in “furtherance of a person’s right of
petition or free speech,” the statute identifies four specific categories:
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,
(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public
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defendant’s public participation, the burden switches to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the plaintiff is more likely than not to prevail on its cause of
action.317
In addition to requiring a plaintiff to make an early showing that it is more
likely than not to succeed on the merits, SLAPP statutes include three other
elements designed to reduce the cost and facilitate the early resolution of
lawsuits that target public participation. First, once a defendant has filed a
motion to strike under a SLAPP statute, discovery is stayed pending resolution
of the motion.318 This reduces the ability of a plaintiff to coerce settlement from
a defendant through expensive and invasive or otherwise harassing discovery
requests. Second, like a preliminary injunction, an order granting or denying a
motion to strike under a SLAPP statute is immediately appealable.319 Third,
prevailing defendants under SLAPP motions are entitled to a mandatory award
of their attorneys’ fees.320 Indeed, some states go further and authorize courts to
award heightened sanctions and bounties to deter would-be plaintiffs from
filing such lawsuits and to encourage defendants to vindicate their rights.321
The reason for SLAPP statutes is that the private interests of the parties to
this type of litigation are often asymmetric and unrepresentative of the public
interest. Public participation is valuable to society as a whole, but any given
defendant’s self-interest in defending that public value is usually small. A
consumer who posts a critical review of a business, for example, is offering a
valuable service to all other consumers in the same market. While the poster
may derive some satisfaction from the act itself, most of the welfare gain from
such speech goes to other consumers. In contrast, the costs of such criticism are
fully concentrated on the target business. As a result, a potential plaintiff will
usually have far more to gain by stifling public criticism than any potential
defendant has to gain through espousing such criticism. When the inevitable
lawsuit comes, a self-interested defendant will seldom have enough at stake to

forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance
of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech
in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e). California expressly exempts commercial speech from the protection
of its SLAPP statute. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.17(c).
317. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1). Some states require a heightened showing
by the plaintiff. Washington state, for example, requires a plaintiff to prove that it is likely to prevail by
clear and convincing evidence. Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.525(4)(b). Resolution of the SLAPP motion is
not admissible in any subsequent trial of the matter nor does it affect the burden of proof at trial. See,
e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(3); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.525(4)(d)(i), (ii).
318. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(g).
319. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(i).
320. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c)(1).
321. See¸ e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.525(6)(a)(2) (requiring court to award prevailing
defendants on SLAPP motions ten thousand dollars in addition to the costs of litigation and attorneys’
fees); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.525(6)(a)(3) (requiring the court to award “[s]uch additional relief,
including sanctions upon the responding party and its attorneys or law firms, as the court determines to
be necessary to deter repetition of the conduct and comparable conduct by others similarly situated”).
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merit defending the lawsuit in the absence of a SLAPP statute. Instead of
defending the public interest in free speech, the defendant will protect her own
interests and settle. Thus, in the absence of a SLAPP statute, we lose not only
the individual opinions enjoined and otherwise chilled, but the integrity of the
public participation process itself.
These interests and concerns closely parallel those we have identified in
trademark litigation. In trademark litigation, the threat is to competition, rather
than to public participation. But in both cases, the self-interest of the particular
defendant does not encompass the full public interest at stake. As a result,
defendants will usually settle when, from a broader public interest or consumer
welfare perspective, we would prefer that they fight.
Congress should therefore amend the Trademark Act to include an
analogous SLAC defense and motion. While the key elements would largely
track the existing state SLAPP statutes, two issues warrant particular attention.
First, in defining a defendant’s initial burden, Congress must take care to set
that initial burden neither too low nor too high. As discussed, essentially every
trademark lawsuit is an attempt to restrict competition; at the very least, a
trademark lawsuit seeks to stop the specific form of competition in which the
defendant is engaging. If Congress sets the standard too low, a SLAC defense
would apply in every trademark case and require a mini-trial under the SLAC
provisions before any trademark case could move forward. Not every
trademark case warrants such scrutiny.322 For example, when a market has
robust competition between substitutes with high cross-elasticities of demand, a
trademark defendant that chooses a fanciful mark identical to that of an existing
competitor should not be able to satisfy its initial SLAC burden.
At the same time, however, Congress should not set the standard
unrealistically high. Market definition should be realistic by defining markets
in terms of products between which consumers readily switch. If the initial
showing is too high, requiring proof of market power in an unrealistically
broad market, for example, then the SLAC provisions would never apply. The
standard should require a realistic showing by the defendant that at least some
consumers would be worse off if the defendant were forced to stop the
behavior at issue. If a defendant could do so, then the burden would switch to
the plaintiff to show a probability of success.
Second, under the proposed defense, a successful defendant should be
entitled to a bounty on top of a mandatory award of attorneys’ fees. As to the
amount of the bounty, I propose that a trademark plaintiff who loses on a
SLAC (or anti-SLAC) motion shall pay the prevailing defendant a bounty of 25
percent of the advertising budget the plaintiff spent on the trademark at issue in
322. I am not convinced a formal classification system and associated nomenclature will help
us separate the cases where spillover effects are likely from those where such effects are unlikely. See
Stein & Parchomovsky, supra note 11, at 1484–86 (dividing defenses in intellectual property disputes
into general, individualized, and class defenses depending upon their spillover effects).
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the relevant geographic and product market for the preceding two years. Courts
have already approved the 25 percent of advertising expenditures standard for
damages in cases involving reverse confusion.323 While these courts have
pretended that the standard is compensatory, I believe the standard is better
seen as a method for enabling small trademark owners to finance trademark
litigation.324
As a bounty, the plaintiff’s advertising expenditures provide some
measure of, and can thus serve as a rough but effective proxy for, the consumer
surplus potentially at risk in the litigation. Awarding prevailing defendants
such a bounty offers them a reward proportional to the public interest that we
are asking them to vindicate. At the same time, the threat of such awards will
deter overzealous trademark plaintiffs in a manner proportional, at least to
some extent, to the monopoly profits they could capture through trademark
litigation. It thereby remedies the otherwise asymmetrical stakes trademark
parties face in cases where a plaintiff brings litigation advancing overbroad and
anticompetitive interpretations of trademark law.
The proposed SLAC amendment would thus shift the incentives facing
both parties in deciding whether to bring, defend, or settle trademark litigation.
It would also influence potential parties’ decisions whether to engage in
conduct that might lead to trademark litigation. A SLAC defense would thereby
reduce the selection and activity bias that have contributed to trademark law’s
de-evolution. Moreover, even if a trademark defendant’s SLAC motion fails,
forcing a court to resolve an anti-SLAC motion at the outset of the litigation
would remind the court of consumers’ central interest in the litigation. It would
thereby re-frame the dispute. Instead of seeing trademark litigation as a
property dispute between the parties, the court would recognize the case as a
regulatory adjudication over the nature and extent of competition permissible in
the marketplace.
IV.
CHARTING A PATH FORWARD
Trademark plaintiffs repeatedly challenge efficient interpretations of
trademark law because it is in their self-interest to do so. Persuading a court to
323. See Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1375–76
(10th Cir. 1977).
324. In my view, no reasonable person can see the measure as compensatory. As Judge
Easterbrook has explained:
Any compensatory award depends on loss, and in treating the need for advertising as a
“loss” the court overlooked the principle that a trademark cannot be worth less than zero.
“Corrective advertising” is a method of repair. Defendant diminishes the value of plaintiff’s
trademark, and advertising restores that mark to its original value. . . . Expenses for repair
cannot be justified when they exceed the value of the asset. If a car worth $4,000 is crushed
in a collision and repair would cost $10,000, the court awards damages of $4,000, not
$10,000 . . . .
Zazú Designs v. L’Oréal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 1992).
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adopt a less efficient, less competitive interpretation of trademark law offers
trademark owners the possibility of capturing economic rents, and in some
cases, very substantial rents. The prospect of capturing such rents can in turn
justify spending money on litigation, even repeated litigation, to challenge
efficient interpretations of trademark law. In contrast, potential trademark
defendants do not have a similarly strong interest in either defending efficient
or challenging inefficient interpretations of trademark law. Even if a successful
defense or challenge sharply increased social welfare, almost all of the benefits
of increased competition would flow to consumers generally in the form of
lower prices and greater consumer choice. Very little of the resulting welfare
gains will flow to any one competitor in the form of economic rents. As a
result, potential trademark defendants will seldom have much interest in
defending efficient, or challenging inefficient, interpretations of trademark law.
The stakes in trademark litigation are thus both asymmetric as between the
parties and unrepresentative of the true social interest at stake. As a result,
since the enactment of the Trademark Act of 1946, and even before, we have
seen a steady de-evolution of trademark law from efficient market regulator to
inefficient rent protector.
Correcting this will require more than mere substantive change in
trademark doctrine, and even substantial substantive reform will not suffice.
Correcting trademark doctrine requires something more fundamental: a change
in the incentives to bring and defend trademark lawsuits and a change in the
way we see these disputes. Trademark litigation is not simply a conflict
between a given plaintiff and a given defendant, though the standing rules of
trademark law unfortunately frame the dispute in that misleading way. Rather,
in almost all trademark cases, the real dispute is over the nature, kind, and
extent of competition that will be permissible in the marketplace. While
trademark law gives standing only to trademark owners and their competitors,
consumers are the real party in interest.
While giving consumers standing directly would probably not solve these
problems because of collective action issues, this Article proposes two types of
change to the process of trademark litigation intended to help mitigate and
hopefully solve the selection, activity, and framing biases that have driven
trademark law’s de-evolution. Courts can accomplish the first type of change
under existing law, without the need for legislative intervention. This type of
change includes: (1) more routine and enhanced award of attorneys’ fees to
prevailing trademark defendants; (2) broader availability and viability of
antitrust counterclaims; and (3) broader use of Rule 706 to appoint neutral
experts to identify and explain the consumer interests at stake. The second type
of change cannot be accomplished through existing law, but requires
congressional action. Specifically, Congress should amend the Trademark Act
to recognize a strategic lawsuit against competition (SLAC) defense—and a
corresponding motion to strike—for all trademark defendants.
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Both types of change seek to shift the incentives otherwise facing
trademark plaintiffs and defendants in litigation and to align them more closely
with the relevant public interest. These changes are necessary to encourage
trademark defendants to vindicate the public interest in efficient trademark
laws and to discourage trademark plaintiffs from seeking interpretations of
trademark law that reduce competition in the marketplace.
At the same time, these two types of change also strive to re-frame the
question presented in trademark litigation. In trademark litigation, the core
question should not usually be whether the plaintiff or the defendant should
win. In most trademark cases, the central question, and the only question that
matters is: How should the court rule so that consumers win? Unfortunately,
the existing practice of trademark litigation conceals that central issue. The
proposed changes help reveal it.
By adopting and implementing the proposed changes, we can bring a halt
to trademark law’s otherwise ongoing de-evolution.

